Office of the Secretary

AFI90-201_AFGM1.1

10 February 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR ALMAJCOM/IG
                          AFISRA/IG
                          AFOSI/IG
                          AFIA/CC
                          NGB/IG

FROM: SAF/IG
          1140 Air Force Pentagon
          Washington DC 20330-1140

SUBJECT: Guidance Memorandum Implementing Immediate Changes to AFI 90-201, *Inspector General Activities*

      This Guidance Memorandum implements changes to AFI 90-201, *Inspector General Activities*. The guidance is based on inspection results and investigation findings. Compliance with this memorandum is mandatory and is effective immediately. To the extent its directions are inconsistent with other AF publications, the information herein prevails, in accordance with AFI 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*. The following entire paragraphs replace, add to, or delete those currently existing in AFI 90-201, *Inspector General Activities*, dated 17 June 2009.

      1.2.6. Deleted.

      1.6.1. Add paragraph: Manages and administers the United States Air Force (USAF) Inspectors Course.

      1.7.1.2. Deficiency/Causal Codes – Descriptive categories of deficiencies and causes identified.

      2.1. General Guidelines. MAJCOMs will establish inspection programs consistent with Mission Directive responsibilities and in accordance with AF inspection guidelines outlined in this instruction. MAJCOM/IGs will conduct independent inspections to assess efficiency and effectiveness of: operational readiness, compliance and nuclear surety (as applicable); then report results of such inspections. HAF Secretariats, Directorates and MAJCOM functionals will coordinate with their respective IGs to schedule, to validate and to deconflict all current and planned inspections, assessments, evaluations and audits. Functional Directorates will develop applicable guidelines, criteria, checklists and resolution requirements to enable IG assessment for readiness and compliance.

Safety is paramount in daily Air Force life and an integral part of every inspection. Inspectors will consider safety aspects, regardless if directly related to inspection activities. Therefore, inspectors will notify the appropriate safety office of all concerns and report as required.

Nuclear surety, at nuclear capable units, is always subject to inspection during any IG inspection. A potential nuclear surety deficiency will be brought to the immediate attention of the inspection team chief.

2.1.1. Inspection Notification. For active duty (AD) units, notification for regularly scheduled inspections will be determined by the MAJCOM/IG for each inspection type. ARC unit notification for regularly scheduled inspections will be forwarded to the appropriate ARC Gatekeeper with a minimum one year notice. Additionally, MAJCOM/IGs (or designee) will send an Inspection Initiation Notification, for all IG inspections, NLT unit inspection in-brief. Provide this initiation notification to all appropriate Air Force agencies through the use of Attachment 4, *Inspection Messages and Summaries,* section A4.1.

2.4. Self-Inspection. All commanders and supervisors are responsible for compliance within their unit. MAJCOMs, FOAs and DRUs will ensure self-inspection programs are established for subordinate units. Self-inspection provides commanders with a tool for internal assessment of unit health and complements external assessments. Units will use HAF inspection checklists and deficiency/causal codes listed in Table 2.1, *Deficiency/Causal Codes and Explanations,* when conducting self inspections. Units, to include MAJCOMs, FOAs and DRUs, may develop supplemental checklists as appropriate, IAW paragraph 2.1.5. Problem-solving responsibility and the corrective action process reside at the lowest appropriate command level. Problem-solving will be applied through the AF 8-Step Problem Solving Model as outlined in the Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO21) Playbook leading to identification of root causes and countermeasures to deficiencies. (Playbook available on the SAF/USMS Community of Practice (CoP) at https://www.my.af.mil/afknprod/ASPs/CoP/OpenCoP.asp?Filter=OO-TR-AF-43).

2.6. Inspection Write-ups. For all inspections, address non-primary inspection activity deficiencies, including safety, surety, or issues of military discipline. These concerns may directly affect an overall inspection rating at the discretion of the inspection team chief and will be documented in an appendix of the final inspection report. For CIs, ORIs, NORIs and additional inspections, inspection reports will only include write-ups categorized as Strengths, Deficiencies, and Recommended Improvement Areas (RIA). RIAs will not be used to document procedural deviations or non-compliance; they are only used to recommend a more efficient or effective course of action. For HSIs see Chapter 7.

Upon inspection team chief validation of a CRITICAL nuclear surety deficiency meeting the criteria of unsafe, insecure or unreliable during a nuclear inspection, the overall inspection rating will be UNSATISFACTORY. When a unit receives an overall UNSATISFACTORY rating due to a CRITICAL nuclear surety deficiency, the area(s) which caused the UNSATISFACTORY rating must be re-inspected in accordance with paragraph 5.11. If the CRITICAL deficiency is identified during a non-nuclear inspection, the MAJCOM/IG will perform a Limited NSI to address the CRITICAL deficiency within 90 days. Additionally, reference paragraph 5.3 for nuclear certification and decertification as required.

2.6.1.4. Reference the applicable instruction, technical order or other source documentation.

2.6.3.6. Problem-solving responsibility and the corrective action process reside at the lowest appropriate command level. The AF 8-Step Problem Solving Model will be applied to all

CRITICAL, nuclear-related SIGNIFICANT and any MAJCOM/IG designated SIGNIFICANT and/or MINOR deficiencies to determine primary and, if applicable, contributing root causes. In addition, the corrective action OPR will assign deficiency/causal codes for all other MINOR deficiencies using a systematic process to determine root causes. The corrective action OPR (event process owner), will assign and report to the applicable MAJCOM/IG, deficiency/causal codes from Table 2.1 for all assigned deficiencies NLT 60 days after the final inspection report is published.

2.6.3.7. MAJCOM FAMs will coordinate and approve corrective action plans, on behalf of the MAJCOM/CC, for all CRITICAL, nuclear-related SIGNIFICANT and any MAJCOM/IG designated SIGNIFICANT and/or MINOR deficiencies. Once the corrective action plan is in place, MAJCOM/IGs may close the identified deficiencies. Corrective action OPRs will provide AF 8-Step Problem Solving documentation (AFSO21 A3 template) in their corrective action report.

2.6.3.8. MAJCOM/IGs will ensure MAJCOM closed root causes, deficiency/causal codes and countermeasures for all nuclear-related CRITICAL, SIGNIFICANT and MAJCOM/IG designated MINOR deficiencies are provided to the AFIA Process Integration Directorate (AFIA/PI). Provide these inputs via the Deficiency and Problem-Solving Data Collection template NLT 90 days after the final inspection report is published (6 months for ARC). MAJCOM/IGs will also provide deficiency/causal codes assigned by the corrective action OPR(s) for all other MINOR deficiencies via the template. An electronic copy of this template can be requested from AFIA/PI workflow at afia.pi@kirtland.af.mil. An updated template will be sent to AFIA/PI when all unit level deficiencies are closed. If all deficiencies are not closed within 90 days after a published final inspection report, the corrective action OPR will report status of all deficiencies to the MAJCOM/IG quarterly until complete.

Change title of Table 2.1. to read "Deficiency/Causal Codes and Explanations"

2.8.2. Add last sentence to paragraph: MAJCOM/IG inspector augmentees will receive proper education and training equivalent to the mandatory inspector courses prior to assuming duties as an inspector augmentee.

2.8.2.4. Paragraph added. AFIA Instructors will train and certify MAJCOM/IG inspectors to teach the Air Force Basic Inspectors' Course to designated MAJCOM inspectors. To ensure currency and standardization in training, AFIA will provide updated training materials to all MAJCOMs (as required) and certified MAJCOM/IG instructors are responsible for ensuring they are using current training materials.

2.8.3. Recurring training. All AF Inspectors will re-accomplish mandatory training NLT 48 months after certification, to include MAJCOM/IG instructors as well as those inspector augmentees who are asked to augment MAJCOM/IG teams on more than one occasion in a two-year period.

2.8.4. Certification. MAJCOM/IGs, at a minimum, will develop (educate, train, certify) all inspectors, instructors, and inspector augmentees. Certification to conduct inspections requires completion of the USAF Inspection course and MAJCOM-specific training. Field observation is required as part of MAJCOM core team inspector development. Field observation requirement is a minimum of one over-the-shoulder inspection by a certified inspector. Field observation is desired for inspector augmentees. MAJCOM/IGs will track and maintain documentation of all inspector and augmentee certifications.

2.9.4.2. NLT 5 work days after IG team out-briefing the inspected unit, send an executive summary of the inspection in accordance with Attachment 4, *Inspection Messages and Summaries,* section A4.2, unless the final inspection report has already been published and distributed.

2.10.1. Update. AF Inspection Gatekeeper**.** SAF/IG establishes AF Inspection gatekeeper guidance, policy and oversight for all AF and Functional Inspections, evaluations and assessments.
2.10.1.2. Add. SAF/IGI will serve as the OPR for AF Gatekeeping policy, oversight and standards pertaining to inspections, assessments and evaluations.
2.10.1.3. Update. The AFIA will serve as AF Gatekeeping LNO to coordinate with MAJCOMs and any external agency requesting inspections, assessments and evaluations of AF units.
2.10.1.4 Update. AFIA is the focal point for scheduling and coordination of all nuclear surety inspections
2.10.1.5 Add. Agencies external to the Air Force will coordinate requests to observe IG inspections through AFIA (primary) or SAF/IGI (secondary) for SAF/IG approval. Upon approval, AFIA will also serve as LNO to coordinate with all external agencies requesting support and observer actions.

2.10.2.1. Add. MAJCOM/CCs should delegate (in writing) MAJCOM Gatekeeper authority and responsibility to MAJCOM/IGs to perform all gatekeeper functions for all AF and Functional Inspections, evaluations and assessments within their MAJCOM. Specifically, MAJCOM/IGs should have the authority to approve or disapprove these activities on behalf of the MAJCOM/CC.

2.10.2.2. Add. MAJCOM/IGs gatekeeper functions include the ability to establish/maintain situational awareness, to integrate and deconflict unit inspections, assessments and evaluations within their MAJCOM.
2.10.2.3 Update. MAJCOM/IGs will update their MAJCOM inspection schedule and inspection results, using the AF standard Inspection template, at least on the first workday in Jan, Apr, July, Oct to enable situational awareness and assessment of the Air Force inspections within each MAJCOM and across the Air Force.
2.10.2.4 Add. MAJCOMs will coordinate all NSIs with AFIA to ensure oversight and inspection requirements are met

2.10.2.5. Add. SAF/IGI, AFIA and MAJCOM Gatekeepers are the trusted agents for No/Minimal-Notice inspections.

3.3.1.5.3. Evaluate unit TIP awareness program, to include local actions to increase CTIP awareness through a variety of public access methods. These methods may include, but are not limited to: hotline posters, base newspaper, commander's channel, commanders' call, handouts and newcomer's briefings/orientation programs.

5.2.3. Certification. In addition to certification requirements of paragraph 2.8.4., MAJCOM/IGs, at a minimum, will certify all NSI inspectors. Inspector certification to conduct NSIs requires completion of prerequisite and mandatory training, as well as field observation. Field observation requirement is a minimum of one over-the-shoulder NSI by a certified NSI

inspector. MAJCOMs may add any MAJCOM-specific training requirements. MAJCOM/IGs will maintain documentation of all NSI inspector certification requirements.

5.3.1. Unit Nuclear Certification. MAJCOM/CCs are the certification authority for nuclear-capable units. In this case a unit is defined as any nuclear-capable Air Force Wing, NATO fighter-bomber Wing/USAFE Munitions Support Squadrons, or AFMC Munitions Squadrons. A nuclear-capable unit is defined as any wing, squadron, or any other designated organization or base that has a mission to receive, store, handle, test, maintain, transport, load and unload, mate and demate, stand alert, or perform strike missions with nuclear bombs or warheads. The unit need not possess nuclear weapons. Successful completion of an INSI/NSI validates nuclear surety and is one of the activities per AFI 63-125, *Nuclear Certification Program*, necessary in gaining (INSI) and sustaining (NSI) nuclear certification.

5.8.1.3. Reference the applicable instruction, technical order, or other source documentation.

5.9.4.2. Retirement Assets. Examine ten percent (10%), as a minimum, of weapons coded for retirement and associated records to ensure they are stored and maintained in accordance with weapons-specific T.O.s and retirement unit requirements contained in T.O. 11N-35-51.

5.11.3. Re-inspection Rating. A successful rating for the re-inspected MGA(s) will not exceed RE-INSPECTED TO ACCEPTABLE (RTA). If all deficient areas are successfully re-inspected, the overall unit rating will be RE-INSPECTED TO SATISFACTORY (RIS). Document re-inspection results IAW Attachment 4 and forward to Table 5.1., Group 1 addressees.

5.12.2.1. CRITICAL, SIGNIFICANT and MAJCOM/IG designated MINOR deficiencies require a description of the OPR's corrective action (to include primary and, if applicable, contributing root causes and Table 2.1 deficiency/causal codes) and a discussion of those measures or procedures initiated to preclude their recurrence. Corrective action OPRs will include AF 8-Step Problem Solving documentation (AFSO21 A3 template) in their corrective action report. Closure of MINOR deficiencies requires a memorandum from the inspected unit to the MAJCOM/IG detailing deficiency/causal codes, corrective actions taken, and that all corrective actions are complete.

5.14.1. AFIA NSI Oversight Team Roles and Responsibilities. The Oversight Team is a separate unit from the Core Team. The Oversight Team will provide a separate report for each inspection routed through the AFIA/CC with a copy provided to SAF/IGI. The AFIA Oversight report will contain any matters deemed appropriate by the Oversight Team including the details of the adjudication effort, to include the dissenting opinion(s). AFIA will provide oversight to 100% of all NSIs, LNSIs and re-inspections of nuclear-capable units. Additionally, AFIA will provide oversight for select INSIs.

5.16.3. Deleted (Requirements included in new paragraph 2.1.1 above)

7.3.2. Deleted (Requirements reside in paragraph 3.2)

7.4.1.1. Certification. Inspector certification to conduct HSIs requires completion of prerequisite and mandatory training, as well as field observation. Field observation requirement is a minimum of one over-the-shoulder HSI by a certified HSI inspector.

7.4.4. Reports and Follow-up Responses. An electronic and/or paper copy HSI report is published and left with the unit and wing CC at the conclusion of the inspection. A final copy

is distributed to AF/SG, MAJCOM/SG, SAF/IGI and other interested staff agencies after review at AFIA.

7.4.4.3. MTF or ARC medical units or AE Squadrons with assessments of "CRITICAL" or "Programmatic Failure" (Scores of 1 or 0) in any element, or assessments of "MAJOR" (Score of 2) in any element that is a repeat finding from the previous HSI will conduct AF 8-Step Problem Solving as outlined in the AFSO21 Playbook, determining root-causes and countermeasures to deficiencies. AF 8-Step Problem Solving documentation (preferably in AFSO21 A3 template) will be forwarded within 90 days for Active-Duty units and 6 months for ARC units and AESs to their respective MAJCOM/SGs (or equivalent), who will track and provide follow-up guidance until resolution. Once resolved, informational copies of the problem solving documentation will also be sent by units to AFIA/SG.

Replace Attachment 4 with new Attachment 4, *Inspection Messages and Summaries* (attachment to this Guidance Memo)

Contact SAF/IGI at DSN 425-1531 with any additional recommendations for improvement.

The directions of this memorandum are void 180 days from the date of this memorandum, or upon publication of an Interim Change or re-write of the affected publication, whichever is earlier.

MARC E. ROGERS
Lieutenant General, USAF
The Inspector General

Attachment:
AFI 90-201, Attachment 4, *Inspection Messages and Summaries* (NEW)

cc:	DOD IG	AF/JA
	JS J3/J39	AF/RE
	DTRA/DDIR/CSNI	AF/SB
	US NSSC (NSS)	AF/SE
	USSTRATCOM IG	AF/SG
	ALMAJCOM-FOA-DRU/CC	AF/ST
	AF/A1	AF/TE
	AF/A2	SAF/US(M)
	AF/A3/5	SAF/AA
	AF/A4/A7	SAF/AQ
	AF/A8	SAF/FM
	AF/A9	SAF/GC
	AF/A10	SAF/PA
	AF/HC	SAF/XC
	AF/HO	

Attachment 4 (NEW)

INSPECTION MESSAGES AND SUMMARIES

A4.1. INSPECTION INITIATION NOTIFICATION.
FROM: MAJCOM/IG or Team Chief
    TO: Inspected Unit/CC
    CC: MAJCOM/CC/CV (or appropriate staff)
        Numbered Air Force/CC, if applicable (or appropriate staff)
        SAF/IGI (safigi.workflow@pentagon.af.mil)
        All recipients in **Table 5.1., Group 1 (Nuclear Inspections only)**

SUBJECT: (Classification) Inspection Initiation Notification of [HSI, INSI, NORI, NSI, NWRM, ORI, CI, or any Limited version thereof] for [unit], [inclusive dates]

1. (Classification) INSPECTION AUTHORITY: The [MAJCOM] IG Team is conducting a/an [no-notice, minimal-notice, scheduled] [HSI, INSI, NORI, NSI, NWRM, ORI, CI, or any Limited version thereof] of the [unit and base] on [inclusive dates] in accordance with AFI 90-201. The inspection Team Chief is [grade and name].

2. (Classification) OVERVIEW: Provide brief summary of the areas or list of MGAs to be inspected. An executive summary of the inspection results will be released NLT 5 work days after the unit out-brief, currently scheduled for DD-Mmm-YY.

3. (Classification) OVERSIGHT: List oversight agencies (if any).

NOTE 1: Send messages via email. Consider message classification, NIPRNET vs. SIPRNET, digital signature, and digital encryption protection.

NOTE 2: MAJCOMs may supplement information contained in this attachment.

NOTE 3: These messages are not a substitute for a final inspection report.

NOTE 4: MAJCOM/IGs or Team Chief will send an Inspection Initiation Notification NLT unit inspection in-brief.

NOTE 5: MAJCOM/IGs or Team Chiefs will update the Inspection Schedule & Results Template found on SAF/IGI CoP (https://www.my.af.mil/afknprod/community/views/home.aspx?Filter=OO-IG-AF-06) NLT 5 work days following unit out-brief.

A4.2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY FOR INSPECTIONS.

[**NOTE:** This summary may contain information not appropriate for public release. This message will not be used as a substitute for HHQ Public Affairs or MAJCOM/PA guidance.]

FROM: MAJCOM/IG or Team Chief

    TO: Inspected Unit/CC

    CC: MAJCOM/CC/CV (or appropriate staff)

        Numbered Air Force/CC, if applicable (or appropriate staff)

        SAF/IGI (safigi.workflow@pentagon.af.mil)

        All recipients in **Table 5.1., Group 1 (Nuclear Inspections only)**

        Corrective Action OPRs

SUBJECT: (Classification) Executive Summary of [HSI, INSI, NORI, NSI, NWRM, ORI, CI, or any Limited version thereof] for [unit], [inclusive dates]

1. (Classification) REFERENCES: (Include all applicable documents; e.g., for re-inspections, refer to report and date of the previous inspection.)

2. (Classification) INSPECTION AUTHORITY: The [MAJCOM] IG Team conducted an [HSI, INSI, NORI, NSI, NWRM, ORI, CI, or any Limited version thereof] of the [unit and base] on [inclusive dates] according to AFI 90-201. The inspection Team Chief was [grade and name].

3. (Classification) OVERVIEW: Provide a brief overview of systems inspected and areas observed.

4. (Classification) UNIT INSPECTION RATING: [overall rating].

5. (Classification) MAJOR GRADED AREA(S): [rating].

6. (Classification) DEFICIENCIES: Identify any CRITICAL, SIGNIFICANT, and repeat MINOR deficiencies that contributed to a less than SATISFACTORY overall unit rating.

7. (Classification) DELETED

8. (Classification) OVERSIGHT: List oversight agencies (if any).

9. (Classification) OTHER INFORMATION: If an additional inspection or assessment was conducted in concert with another agency, provide the overall rating assigned by the other agency (ies). Provide statements from any oversight, inspection, or assessment agency, as applicable.

10. (Classification) LIMITING FACTORS: If any, describe each problem and indicate its effect on the unit mission. Identify the functional manager responsible for corrective action and indicate if the support organization or higher command failed to provide required support. Describe any corrective actions taken during the inspection.

NOTE 1: Send messages via email. Consider message classification, NIPRNET vs. SIPRNET, digital signature, and digital encryption protection.

NOTE 2: MAJCOMs may supplement information contained in this attachment.

NOTE 3: These messages are not a substitute for a final inspection report.

NOTE 4: Pending 2010 Sept IG conference, updating the MAJCOM Inspection Schedule **&** Results Template plus and email notification to AFIA (cc SAF/IGI) can be used inplace of this report. The template can be found on SAF/IGI CoP (https://www.my.af.mil/afknprod/community/views/home.aspx?Filter=OO-IG-AF-06) NLT 5 work days following unit out-brief.

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

This instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 90-2, *Inspector General - The Inspection System* and complements Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3150.2, *DOD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program* and Technical Order (T.O.) 11N-25-1, *DOD Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection System*. It provides guidance and procedures for Air Force readiness, compliance, nuclear surety, and health services inspections. Only this instruction may establish service-wide Inspector General (IG) inspection requirements. This instruction applies to all Air Force (AF), Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC), and Air National Guard (ANG) units. Supplements to this instruction will be coordinated with Secretary of the Air Force, Inspections Directorate (SAF/IGI) before publication and units will forward one copy to SAF/IGI after publication. Use AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*, for any suggested changes to this publication and e-mail to safigi.workflow@pentagon.af.mil.Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained IAW AFMAN 33-363, *Management of Records,* and disposed of IAW the Air Force Records Information Management System (AFRIMS) Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at **https://www.my.af.mil/gcss-af61a/afrims/afrims**/.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This document is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed.

Significant revisions include guidance changes to nuclear surety inspections (NSI), nuclear operational readiness inspections (NORI), establishment of nuclear weapons related material (NWRM) inspections, standards for no-notice and minimal-notice inspections, and references to

the AF eight-step problem solving model leading to identification of root causes and solutions to deficiencies. Also establishes AF NSI Core Team requirements, AF Inspection Agency (AFIA) Oversight Division CONOPs and the NSI adjudication process. Other changes were made in reference to the health services inspection system, total force implications, and emergency management (EM). Directs the creation of standardized Headquarters Air Force (HAF) inspection checklists and requires The Inspector General (TIG) notification when exceeding

Chapter 1

RESPONSIBILITIES

1.1. Secretary of the Air Force, Inspector General (SAF/IG).

1.1.1. Reports on force readiness to the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) and the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force (CSAF).

1.1.2. Approves inspection policy and oversees the AF inspection system.

1.1.3. Serves as the AF point of contact (POC) for notification of evaluations by AF-level and non-AF organizations.

1.1.4. Directs assessment of any AF program or operation, including AFRC and ANG organizations and units, as required.

1.1.5. Coordinates on all AFI and HAF-level proposed assessments, evaluations, or inspections to ensure IG-directed and HAF-level efforts are mutually reinforcing.

1.1.6. Provides feedback to MAJCOM, Direct Reporting Units (DRU), and Field Operating Agencies (FOA) on the adequacy of their Compliance Inspection (CI), Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI), Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI), and Nuclear Operational Readiness Inspection (NORI) programs as required.

1.1.7. Adjudicates discrepancies between NSI and/or oversight teams in accordance with paragraph **5.15.**

1.1.8. Approves AF Special Interest Items (SII).

1.1.9. Chairs the AF Intelligence Oversight Panel and provides quarterly and annual reports to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (ATSD/IO).

1.1.10. Submits summary of inspection activity for the Semiannual Compendium of DOD Intelligence-Related Inspector General and Audit Agency Reports (SAC) through the Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense (DOD IG) as required by Title 10 United States Code (USC) § 8020, *Inspector General*.

1.1.11. Provides annual report of Voting Assistance Program (VAP) inspection results to DOD IG.

1.1.12. Conveys nuclear issues to the Nuclear Oversight Board (NOB) as needed.

1.1.13. Conducts and assists with management reviews of AF programs/processes through assessment, special inquiry, and/or facilitation that result in recommendations to improve processes.

1.1.14. Is authorized, on behalf of the SECAF, to intervene in an inspection during extreme cases involving safety, security or procedural violations.

1.2. SAF/IG Inspections Directorate (SAF/IGI) .

1.2.1. Manages AF inspection policy and provides oversight of inspection policy implementation.

1.2.2. Reports on the adequacy of MAJCOM CI, ORI, NSI and NORI programs to SAF/IG.

1.2.3. Observes MAJCOM/IG teams conducting inspections and provides feedback to the MAJCOM/IG and SAF/IG on the effectiveness of the team's assessment and deliberative/debrief processes.

1.2.4. Provides a summary of inspection results for inclusion in recurring IG briefings to CSAF and cross-flows this information to the MAJCOMs on a continuing basis.

1.2.5. Closes HAF-level and non-AF deficiencies after validation by the responsible HAF functional(s), in coordination with AFIA or the inspecting MAJCOM/IG.

1.2.6. Manages and administers the United States Air Force (USAF) Inspectors Course.

1.2.7. Manages and chairs Configuration Control Board for the Inspector General Evaluation Management System (IGEMS).

1.2.8. Forwards list of certified nuclear-capable units to Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) no later than (NLT) 30 September each year.

1.2.9. Forwards AF Voting Program assessment to DOD IG NLT 31 January each year.

1.2.10. Coordinates on requests for waivers or deferments of nuclear inspections required by paragraph **5.5.1.1.1.** of this AFI.

1.2.11. Manages and administers the AF SII program.

1.2.12. Chairs Nuclear Surety Inspection Process Review Group (NSIPRG).

1.3. Air Force Chief of Safety (AF/SE).

1.3.1. Reviews nuclear surety deficiencies identified in MAJCOM NSI reports.

1.3.2. In support of Air Force Inspection Agency, Inspections and Oversight Directorate (AFIA/IO), provides augmentees in performance of nuclear surety-related oversight of NSIs, Limited Nuclear Surety Inspections (LNSI) and Initial Nuclear Surety Inspections (INSI) per **Chapter 5**.

1.4. The Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Public Affairs (SAF/PA).

1.4.1. If required, directs news media representatives and the public to the proper channels for obtaining IG records through the Freedom of Information Act.

1.4.2. Coordinates with SAF/IGI and MAJCOM PA and IG offices in response to news media queries and public inquiries about IG inspections.

1.5. All Headquarters Air Force (HAF) Secretariat and Air Staff offices.

1.5.1. Develop inspection checklists (with references and highlighted changes since last version) for readiness, compliance, and nuclear surety areas subject to inspection as outlined in this document. Checklists will be coordinated with applicable MAJCOMs, AFRC, and the National Guard Bureau (NGB).

1.5.2. Coordinate on MAJCOM-supplemented inspection checklists.

1.5.3. Submit and sponsor AF SIIs.

1.6. Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA). Conducts inspections, inspection oversight, management reviews, and investigations, as directed by SAF/IG (see **Chapter 7**).

1.7. MAJCOM, AFIA, AF Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency (AF ISR Agency) and AF Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) Inspector General Teams. Establish inspection programs consistent with command mission requirements to assess unit readiness, compliance, and other AF inspection program elements. For the remainder of this instruction, the term ―MAJCOM/IG‖ includes all of the IG teams listed in this paragraph.

1.7.1. Provides Semi-Annual Trend Report to SAF/IGI NLT 15 Jul and 15 Jan of each year. MAJCOM/IGs will use SAF/IGI-provided electronic template. At a minimum, this report will include the following areas:

1.7.1.1. Deficiency Overview – general summary of areas receiving deficiencies.

1.7.1.2. Deficiency Codes – top categories of factors identified in deficiencies, if available.

1.7.1.3. Trends/Analysis – brief assessment of issues and trends in deficiencies, if identified.

1.7.1.4. Summary Table – numerical totals of deficiencies and associated codes, by inspection type and major graded area (MGA).

1.7.2. Utilize HAF and MAJCOM Functional Area Manager (FAM) checklists for conducting inspections.

1.7.3. Designate a POC (Gatekeeper) for notification of evaluations by all AF and non-AF organizations. See paragraph **2.10.** for Gatekeeper responsibilities.

1.7.4. Submit an updated annual inspection activity schedule NLT the last day of each calendar quarter to AFIA to develop a single AF IG inspection schedule product.

1.7.5. Conduct Total Force inspections as outlined in AFI 90-1001, *Responsibilities for Total Force Integration.* With the exception of AFRC CIs, the gaining MAJCOM/IG will take the lead in this development effort, conduct all ORIs, CIs, NORIs, and NSIs, and will collaborate with the respective Air Reserve Component (ARC) to ensure the combat readiness of all Total Force Integration initiative units. Associated Total Force units should normally be inspected as one team with personnel from each of the inspected component's units participating in the inspection.

1.7.6. MAJCOMs with Nuclear-Capable Assigned/Gained Units.

1.7.6.1. Publish approved criteria as a MAJCOM supplement to this instruction and send electronic versions to SAF/IGI.

1.7.6.2. Supplement HAF NSI checklists (with MAJCOM references, and highlighted changes since last version) as required. Include all applicable functions listed in **Chapter 5**.

1.7.6.3. Immediately notify all offices listed in **Table 5.1., Group 1** of changes to unit certification status via electronic means.

1.7.6.4. Appoint a Corrective Action Report Status (CARS) monitor to track corrective actions for all deficiencies identified in DTRA inspection reports. Comply with paragraph **5.12.2.** requirements for DTRA inspection reports.

1.8. All MAJCOM Functional Area Managers (FAM).

1.8.1. Supplement HAF checklists, as required, with MAJCOM references and highlighted changes since last version. Where there is no HAF checklist for specialized MAJCOM functions, MAJCOM FAMs will develop and maintain MAJCOM-specific checklists.

1.8.2. When writing or updating MAJCOM guidance or supplements to AFIs, MAJCOM FAMs will ensure affected checklists are updated. Checklist supplements will be coordinated with applicable HAF functionals, AFRC, and NGB. **Note:** MAJCOM functionals will continue to develop and maintain checklists for their MAJCOMs (with references) until HAF inspection checklists are published. Once applicable HAF checklists are published, MAJCOMs may supplement HAF inspection checklists.

Chapter 2

AIR FORCE INSPECTION PROGRAM GUIDELINES

2.1. General Guidelines. MAJCOMs will establish inspection programs consistent with mission requirements and inspection program guidelines outlined in this instruction. MAJCOM/IGs conduct independent inspections to assess unit efficiency, effectiveness, combat readiness, and nuclear surety, and report results of such inspections. HAF and MAJCOM functional and directorate staffs, working closely with their IG counterparts, will develop applicable guidelines, procedures, criteria, checklists, and resolution requirements for conducting these inspections.

2.1.1. Inspection Notification. For active duty (AD) units, notification for regularly scheduled inspections will be determined by MAJCOM/IG for each inspection type. ARC unit notification for regularly scheduled inspections will be forwarded to the appropriate ARC Gatekeeper with a minimum one year notice.

2.1.1.1. No-Notice and Minimal-Notice Inspections. No-notice and minimal-notice inspections are conducted to assess the day-to-day compliance, operational readiness, and nuclear surety of units. No-notice and minimal-notice can be used for either full-scale or limited-scale inspections.

2.1.1.1.1. For all units, no-notice is defined as 72 hours or less; minimal-notice is less than 45 calendar days. Gatekeepers will be included in the planning of these inspections and will be treated as trusted agents.

2.1.1.1.2. ARC units will participate in MAJCOM/IG no-notice and minimal-notice inspection programs (NSI and NORI). AFRC/CC may direct no-notice or minimal-notice AFRC unit CIs. MAJCOM/IGs must recognize there may be limited availability of ARC unit personnel in some functional areas.

2.1.1.1.3. MAJCOM/IGs with OCONUS units will make every effort to minimize notification to units when inspecting outside regularly scheduled inspections based on the host nation and NATO limitations.

2.1.2. Inspection Footprint. Minimize the inspection footprint to the maximum extent practical. When deemed appropriate, MAJCOM/IGs may give credit for unit activity in conjunction with exercises and contingencies, real world operations, self-inspections, combined inspections, other inspections/evaluations, sampling techniques, and other measures of sustained performance to minimize footprints. These measures can be used to adjust the breadth, duration, and incidence of inspection activities. When practical, IG teams may deploy to forward locations and headquarters during exercises and contingency operations to evaluate processes and performance. Inspectors may observe, but will not interfere with, real world activities unless observed actions are in direct violation of AFIs, technical data, or injury to personnel and/or damage to equipment could occur.

2.1.2.1. MAJCOM/IGs will determine which of their ARC units are gained by another MAJCOM. When scheduling inspections for units gained by multiple MAJCOMs, MAJCOM/IGs will coordinate the inspection schedule in order to conduct concurrent MAJCOM inspections, to the maximum extent possible.

2.1.3. Inspection Alignment with Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF) battle rhythm. Make every attempt to de-conflict inspections with Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF) battle rhythm, enabler unit deployments, and out of cycle expeditionary support deployments. If possible, avoid inspecting units within 60 days before or after a major AEF deployment (more than 20 percent of a unit's assigned personnel deployed).   Final determination with be with MAJCOM/IG.

2.1.4. Inspection Frequency Deviations. MAJCOM/CC approval is required to exceed any inspection frequency directed in this publication. MAJCOM/IGs will notify SAF/IG when a unit will exceed the required inspection frequency and will provide the anticipated inspection date(s). Reference applicable chapter in this publication for specific inspection frequencies.

2.1.5. HAF Checklists.

2.1.5.1. HAF checklists standardize assessment criteria and facilitate AF, MAJCOM, and Numbered Air Force (NAF) inspection, evaluation, and unit self-inspection programs. FAMs must obtain AFIA approval of all checklists. These checklists and templates will be available on the AF Checklist site (**https://wwwmil.afrc.af.mil/afia**/).

2.1.5.2. Functional checklists are a tool available for use by Higher Headquarters (HHQ) and unit personnel when conducting assessments of their programs or activities. The checklists do not constitute the order or limit the scope of any HHQ or unit self-inspection. The checklists do not limit the requirement to comply with any published DOD or AF policies, directives, or instructions. The scope of Nuclear Surety Inspections is limited to requirements listed in TO 11N-25-1 and this instruction.

2.1.5.3. Once an applicable HAF checklist is published, Lead MAJCOMs will supplement HAF checklists (with MAJCOM references), as required for command-specific responsibilities. MAJCOMs will not supplement HAF checklists with any guidance authored above the MAJCOM level. Checklists will be coordinated with applicable HAF functionals, AFRC, and NGB.

2.1.5.4. Checklist Currency. Checklists must be updated within 90 days of guidance changes being posted on the AF e-Publishing website.   All checklists will be reviewed annually by the HAF/MAJCOM functional staffs; HAF checklist review/update conducted NLT 31 Jan with MAJCOM supplement review/update NLT 31 Mar. All updates will be approved by AFIA (for HAF checklist) or MAJCOM/IG (for MAJCOM checklist updates).

2.1.6. Selection for Performance-based Evaluations. Inspection teams will randomly select individuals/teams for executing performance-based evaluations in lieu of the inspected unit self-identifying individuals/teams for evaluation (maintain team integrity as appropriate).

2.1.7. Rating System. Inspection criteria serve as a guideline and are not a substitute for sound inspector judgment. For Total Force Integration initiative units, the association will be given an overall comprehensive rating to reflect how the integrated unit would have performed had the integrated units been presented to a combatant commander for employment. Refer to T.O. 11N-25-1 and paragraph **5.7.** of this instruction for NSI rating.

2.1.8. Validation. MAJCOMs will establish a validation process that provides the inspected unit the opportunity to clarify and/or rebut in a timely manner any potential deficiencies

identified during the inspection as well as coordinate with the appropriate MAJCOM FAM(s) on all critical and significant deficiencies identified during the inspection. Inspectors will validate all potential deficiencies at the lowest appropriate unit and MAJCOM FAM level and resolve any policy interpretation differences with the appropriate FAM/OPR. All validated deficiencies will be documented in the report. This process applies to deficiencies levied against other MAJCOM units or HHQ organizations.

2.1.9. Use of Contractors. Contractors are prohibited from acting in the capacity of an IG inspector; however, contractors may be consulted for their functional expertise. Use of contractors must be in compliance with DOD Instruction 1100.22, *Guidance for Determining Workforce Mix*.

2.1.10. Contracted Functions. Assess and rate contracted functions against Performance Work Statements (PWS). Assess adequacy of PWS to meet mission requirements. Functional checklists will be tailored to address differences between AF checklists and PWS requirements. The contracting officer and/or quality assurance (QA) personnel should accompany the IG during inspections. Develop and implement safeguards to prevent contractor claims related to inspections activities.

2.1.10.1. Rating and Report. Contracted functions will be rated; however, individual contractors will not. Sampling of contracted activity will be coordinated through QA personnel. Contractors may be provided with applicable portions of the report in-accordance-with (IAW) DOD Regulation 5400.7/Air Force Supplement, *DOD Freedom of Information Act Program*.

2.1.10.2. Validation. Validate observations related to contractor functions with the contracting officer and appropriate unit personnel. Deficiencies will be tracked IAW paragraph **2.6.** **Note:** Only the Contracting Officer can take formal action against the contractor for noncompliance or direct contractors to correct deficiencies identified during inspections.

2.1.10.3. Inspector Training. Inspectors and augmentees will complete Phase I QA personnel training or similar on-line training listed below prior to inspecting contracted functions. MAJCOMs will document in their supplement to this AFI if additional contract-specific training is required. Phase I QA personnel training provides general knowledge of QA personnel responsibilities and procedures. On-line training shall consist of at least two of the following three courses:

2.1.10.3.1. ―Seven Steps to Performance-Based Acquisition" training available on-line at: **http://www.arnet.gov/comp/seven_steps/index.html**.

2.1.10.3.2. Defense Acquisition University (DAU) CLC106, ―COR (Contracting Officer Representative) with a Mission Focus", available on-line at: **https://learn.dau.mil/html/login/login.jsp**.

2.1.10.3.3. The Air Force module on Performance-Based Services Acquisition available on-line at: **https://afkm.wpafb.af.mil/ASPs/eCourse/course.asp?Filter=OO-AQ-SV-AQ&CourseID=15**.

2.1.11. Installation Exercise Program Office (IEPO).

2.1.11.1. Organization.   The wing/installation commander determines whether the exercise program resides under the vice commander (CV), plans and programs office (XP), IG, or other equivalent staff-level office, unless otherwise directed by MAJCOM.

2.1.11.2. Staffing. Staffing levels vary among units based on mission complexity, but adequate manning is essential to mission readiness.   Successful IEPOs typically have three or more personnel assigned. Recommended staffing includes, as a minimum, one officer (field grade or civilian equivalent) and one enlisted (senior non-commissioned officer (SNCO) or civilian equivalent).   IEPO offices typically include a blend of AF specialty codes (AFSC) and experience that complement the mission requirements.

2.1.11.3. Training.   Prior to evaluating wing/installation activities, exercise evaluation team (EET) members will complete the core training outlined in AFI 10-2501, *Air Force Emergency Management (EM) Program Planning and Operations*.   Additional training may be directed by the EET chief to enable EET members to meet specialized team, functional area, host-nation, or local requirements or standards.   EET members may attend the USAF Inspectors Course as outlined in paragraph **2.8.** IEPO personnel and wing-designated EET members should serve as MAJCOM inspection team augmentees.

2.1.12. Exercise Safety.   During exercises where immediate distinction between non-participants (i.e., inspectors, evaluators, and observers) and participants (i.e., unit personnel, exercise players, and opposition forces (OPFOR)) is important to exercise safety, security, and/or success, non-participants will be clearly identified through the wear of safety/reflective vests or other clearly identifiable markings. Safety procedures and markings will be included in all exercise plans/scenarios and must be disseminated prior to the start of evaluations or exercises.

2.2. Limited Inspections .   Limited inspections are smaller, targeted inspections that assess selected elements of operational readiness and/or compliance of inspected units.   Limited inspections have a smaller footprint than a full-scale inspection. Limited inspections will be rated on the same scale as the associated full scale inspection.

2.3. Additional Inspections.

2.3.1. Federal Recognition Inspection (FRI). The gaining MAJCOM will conduct a FRI of a state unit when the unit is being considered for federal recognition or when asked to do so by the NGB. Conduct the FRI according to ANGI 90-201, *The Inspection System/Inspector General Activities*.   As soon as an acceptable FRI is complete on a unit, the gaining command assumes the responsibility assigned in AFI 10-301, *Responsibilities of the Air Reserve Component (ARC) Forces.*

2.3.2. Biological Select Agents and Toxins (BSAT) Inspections.   Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) IG will conduct BSAT inspections in accordance with governing directives.   The inspection is designed to evaluate a unit's compliance with applicable policies for laboratory operations within Biological Safety Level II/III (BSL) facilities which store and use BSAT.

2.3.2.1. Responsibilities.   AFMC/IG will conduct inspections for all units that are registered by the Center for Disease Control (CDC) to handle BSAT in accordance with

the governing directive DODI 5210.89_AFI 10-3901, *Minimum Security Standards for Safeguarding Biological Select Agents and Toxins*.

2.3.2.2. Frequency. The maximum inspection interval for BSAT inspections is 18 months. Inspections by the CDC or other HHQ inspections may be used to satisfy this requirement.

2.3.2.3. Rating. BSAT inspections will utilize a 3-tier rating scale: In Compliance, In Compliance with Comments, Not In Compliance.

2.3.2.4. Scope.   Inspections will assess compliance with guidance and policy in applicable program and personnel management functional areas. At a minimum, the following areas will be assessed:

2.3.2.4.1. Management. Ensure facilities and laboratories are properly maintained and registered to store BSAT.

2.3.2.4.2. Inventory/Accountability.   Review and validate documentation and procedures for inventories of BSAT and procedures for recording personnel entering and leaving biological restricted areas.

2.3.2.4.3. Biological Personnel Reliability Program (BPRP). Review records of responsible officers and personnel with access to AF BSAT and assigned to the BPRP.   Ensure processing and certification process is conducted IAW DODI 5210.89_AFI 10-3901.   Evaluate procedures for competent medical authorities, responsible official/certifying official, and command responsible officer.

2.3.2.4.4. Information Security.   Ensure classified, unclassified and sensitive information is handled and protected in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R, *Information Security Program*. Validate procedures for public release information ensuring it is vetted in accordance with appropriate security manager, public affairs and CDC guidelines.

2.3.2.4.5. Personnel Security. Validate security clearances for personnel allowed access to AF BSAT. Ensure individuals whose duties afford access to, or involve security or control of, biological select agents or toxins are emotionally and mentally stable, trustworthy, physically competent, and adequately trained to perform the assigned duties.   Assess testing and screening requirements directed by DODI 5210.89_AFI 10-3901.

2.3.2.4.6. Physical Security. Validate controlled area requirements and security measures affecting access control. Confirm the two-person policy procedures for accessing AF BSAT to include two-person integrity physical controls. Ensure the facility security plan and physical security plans are valid.

2.3.2.4.7. Reporting. Validate procedures are in-place for up-channel reporting of attempts to steal or divert BSAT; unauthorized access or movement of BSAT; and the loss or release of BSAT. Ensure reports are completed and maintained in the areas of security incidents, threat and vulnerability assessment, inspections and exercises, and corrective actions and improvements.

2.3.2.4.8. Safety. Validate adherence of DOD level, Air Force, AFMC and Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) safety standards.

2.3.2.4.9. Select Agent Shipping, Receiving, Transport, and Transfer. Validate all inbound DOD shipments and all outbound shipments were executed using all applicable international, federal, DOD, AF, and state regulations, policies, and guidance documents.

2.3.2.4.10. Training. Ensure initial standardized qualifications and training requirements for biosafety personnel are completed and properly documented.

2.3.2.4.11. Waivers & Exceptions. Confirm all waivers or exceptions to policy were vetted through HQ AFMC and HQ AF. Ensure proper waiver authority was used for all waiver requests.

2.3.2.5. Reporting. BSAT inspection reporting will follow procedures and requirements outlined in this instruction for compliance inspections.

2.3.3. Nuclear Weapons Related Materiel (NWRM) Inspections. Participating MAJCOM/IGs will conduct NWRM inspections IAW applicable guidance. This inspection is designed to evaluate a unit's capability to manage NWRM assets and will focus on the management and positive inventory control (PIC) of NWRM. Due to the critical nature of NWRM, NWRM inspections may be conducted in conjunction with other inspections (NSI, ORI, CI), but will be a separate, distinct, inspection providing a separate inspection report.

2.3.3.1. Ratings. NWRM inspections will utilize a 3-tier rating scale: In Compliance, In Compliance with Comments, Not In Compliance.

2.3.3.2. Applicability. NWRM inspections apply to all units that ship, handle, or store any item listed on the DOD or AF list of NWRM. Units that have handled NWRM in the past but have no indication of future NWRM involvement may not be subject to NWRM inspections.

2.3.3.2.1. MAJCOM/IGs will determine units to be inspected based on the official Air Force and DOD list of NWRM NSNs.

2.3.3.2.2. MAJCOM FAMs will notify the MAJCOM/IG when subordinate units change applicability status as defined above.

2.3.3.3. Frequency. Conduct NWRM inspections for each applicable unit at least every 24 months. Inspections can be done at once, or conducted in parts. If done in parts, all parts must be done within the 24 month period.

2.3.3.4. Scope. Inspections will be unit tailored to assess compliance with guidance and policy in all applicable functional areas. When applicable, the following areas will be assessed:

2.3.3.4.1. Management Responsibilities. Validate development and performance of required supply system updates for NSNs added to the NWRM list.

2.3.3.4.2. Identification, Marking, and Packaging. Verify accurate NWRM identification, serialized tracking and Unique Item Identifier (UII) markings. Ensure packaging personnel verify NWRM is properly classified, described, packaged, marked, labeled, and in the proper condition.

2.3.3.4.3. Storage. Ensure items are clearly marked and provided segregated storage. Verify storage locations are properly marked as unclassified and classified. Validate accuracy of record storage locations in appropriate information management system.

2.3.3.4.4. Shipment and Receipt. Verify shipment documentation, preparation, planning, and notification process. Validate shipment receipt, receiver acknowledgement and process for identifying discrepancies. Ensure shipment and receipt notifications are conducted within designated time frames.

2.3.3.4.5. Inventories and Audits. Ensure account balances are accurately reflected with periodic inventories. Evaluate inventory procedures.

2.3.3.4.6. Training. Ensure personnel with NWRM responsibilities receive initial and refresher training before they handle NWRM assets.

2.3.3.4.7. Supply Chain Management. Review supply chain management actions for items not managed in CAS. Assess processes and procedures used to promptly receive, manage, select, and move NWRM to authorized and intended recipients.

2.3.3.4.8. NWRM Conventional Munitions and Nuclear Weapons Trainer. (Detail to be added).

2.3.3.4.9. Depot/Field/Contractor Level Maintenance Processing. (Detail to be added).

2.3.3.5. Reporting. NWRM reporting will follow procedures and requirements outlined in this instruction for compliance inspections.

2.3.4. Wounded, Ill, and Injured (WII) Facility Inspections. When applicable MAJCOM/IGs will conduct WII Facility Inspections, as required by National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, House Record (H.R.) 4986, Section 1662, *Access of Recovering Service Members to Adequate Outpatient Residential Facilities*. WII Facility Inspections may be conducted in conjunction with other inspections (NSI, ORI, CI) but will be a separate, distinct inspection providing a separate inspection report. WII Facility Inspections will utilize a 3-tier rating scale: In Compliance, In Compliance with Comments, Not In Compliance.

2.3.4.1. Frequency. IAW NDAA FY 2008, H.R.4986, Section 1662, WII Facility Inspections will be conducted on a semi-annual basis CY 2009, then annually thereafter.

2.3.4.2. Scope. Criteria and actions IAW NDAA FY 2008, H.R.4986, Sec 1662, and DOD Housing Inspection Standards for Medical Hold and Holdover Personnel. WII Facility Inspections assess the condition of facilities for those Airmen currently on Medical Hold occupying AF-owned properties. Individuals recuperating in privately-owned housing fall outside the scope of these inspections.

2.3.4.3. Responsibilities.

2.3.4.3.1. SAF/IEI (Secretary of the Air Force, Installation, Environment, and Logistics). NLT 120 days prior to OSD report due date, SAF/IEI will validate inspection requirements with OSD and provide updated inspection requirements to SAF/IGI. Manage AF WII Facility Inspection checklist.

2.3.4.3.2. AF/A1S (Air Staff, Directorate of Services). NLT 120 days prior to OSD-established close-out date, AF/A1S will provide the list of individuals meeting the criteria for inspection to SAF/IGI. In addition, at the conclusion of each round of inspections, AF/A1S will post the individual inspection results and final report on the AF Wounded Warrior (AFW2) public website.

2.3.4.3.3. SAF/IGI. Oversees AF inspection requirements and coordinates with applicable MAJCOM/IGs for schedule and execution of inspections. Assists SAF/IG in distribution of WII Report and associated letters to SECAF, ASD(HA) and congressional committees.

2.3.4.3.4. AFIA/SG. Builds consolidated AF report from all MAJCOM WII inspections for each reporting period. NLT 30 days prior to OSD-established close-out date, staffs AF WII Facility Inspections report, congressional letters and ASD(HA) letter through SAF/IGI, SAF/FMBL, SAF/LL, AF/A4/7 and AF/SG to SAF/IG for signature.

2.3.4.3.5. MAJCOM/IGs. Conduct WII Facility Inspections within their MAJCOM on schedule directed by SAF/IGI. Provide individual inspection reports to AFIA/SG NLT 60 days prior to OSD-established close-out date. Post individual inspection reports on public MAJCOM website (or direct hyperlink to reports on AFW2 public website).

2.3.5. FAM Evaluations and Assessments. MAJCOM/IGs may elect to use the results of command FAM evaluations, assessments, and/or audits in lieu of additional IG inspections in those areas provided the criteria used in those evaluations meet or exceed the requirements of this instruction. When utilized, the MAJCOM/IG will publish the results of the FAM evaluations and assessments in the appropriate section of the MAJCOM/IG inspection report for that unit.

2.4. Self-Inspection. MAJCOMs will establish self-inspection programs for subordinate units. Self-inspection provides commanders with a tool for internal assessment of unit health and complements external assessments. Units will use HAF inspection checklists, once established, and deficiency codes listed in **Table 2.1** to conduct self-inspections. Unit, NAF, or MAJCOM supplemental checklists may be developed, as appropriate. Basic responsibility for problem solving and the corrective action process resides at the lowest appropriate command level. Problem solving should be applied through the AF eight-step problem solving model as outlined in the Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO21) Playbook (or SAF/SO approved publication) leading to identification of root causes and solutions to deficiencies.

2.5. Inspector General Evaluation Management System (IGEMS).

2.5.1. Description. An unclassified web-based software program serving as an inspection tool comprised of planning, executing, reporting, and corrective action management. In addition, IGEMS provides MAJCOM/IG teams with the capability to gather trend data on a multitude of inspection variables. If the need arises for classified reporting, MAJCOM/IGs will use classified reporting channels.

2.5.2. Phased Implementation. IGEMS will be phased for implementation by MAJCOM/IG teams on a schedule to be determined in coordination with SAF/IGI and MAJCOM/IGs.

2.5.3. Access management. Access to IGEMS will be administered by SAF/IGI and MAJCOM/IG Administrators.

2.5.4. Trend Reports. SAF/IG will use IGEMS to extract trend data of MAJCOM/IG results.

2.6. Inspection Write-ups. For CIs, ORIs, NORIs, HSIs, and additional inspections, inspection reports will only include write-ups categorized as Strengths, Deficiencies, and Recommended Improvement Areas (RIA). RIAs will not be used to document procedural deviations or non-compliance; they are only used to recommend a more efficient or effective course of action. For INSIs, LNSIs, and NSIs see Chapter **5**.

2.6.1. Deficiency write-ups will:

2.6.1.1. Be assigned a unique tracking number.

2.6.1.2. Describe, in sufficient detail, the deficiency and contextual facts as necessary to clearly convey the defect requiring resolution. The written description alone should be adequate for the inspected party to begin corrective action planning.

2.6.1.3. Be assigned a deficiency severity of Critical, Significant, or Minor.

2.6.1.4. Reference the applicable instruction, technical order, policy letter, or other source documentation.

2.6.1.5. Address impact of continued deviation or non-compliance for critical deficiencies.

2.6.1.6. Identify MAJCOM functional OPR (MAJCOM functional office responsible for coordinating on unit's corrective action plan).

2.6.1.7. Identify Office of Collateral Responsibility (OCR), if applicable.

2.6.1.8. Deficiencies that involve hosts/tenants outside the inspected unit's chain-of-command, higher headquarters (HHQ), other MAJCOMs, or non-AF entities will be categorized as HHQ/Support Agency Deficiencies.

2.6.2. Deficiencies External to Inspected Unit. When a MAJCOM/IG team assigns a deficiency to an organization outside their MAJCOM, the inspecting IG team will notify the owning MAJCOM/IG of the deficiency (or SAF/IGI for HAF or non-AF deficiencies) and courtesy copy both the tenant and host base units. Once notified, the owning IG will be responsible for tracking status and notifying the inspecting MAJCOM/IG when closed (See paragraph **5.12.2.** for reporting, tracking, and closure reporting of DTRA-identified NSI deficiencies). In instances where the inspection involves associate units, coordination between the associated and associating MAJCOM/IGs on how deficiencies are assigned, assessed, and resolved will be essential to ensuring timely resolution.

2.6.3. Deficiency Corrective Actions.

2.6.3.1. The MAJCOM/IG will track all deficiencies and provide the inspected unit with reply instructions as part of the final report. Corrective action plans will be provided to MAJCOM/IGs NLT 60 days after final inspection report is published.

2.6.3.2. The MAJCOM/IG, after review and coordination by the responsible MAJCOM FAM(s), will close all critical and significant unit-level and MAJCOM-level deficiencies. These deficiencies will be inspected during the unit's next scheduled inspection.

2.6.3.3. Minor deficiencies assessed to the inspected unit may be closed at the wing level, as determined by MAJCOM/IG, and will be inspected during the unit's next scheduled inspection. Minor deficiencies assessed to the MAJCOM-level will be closed by the MAJCOM/IG.

2.6.3.4. MAJCOM/IGs will forward all HAF-level actionable deficiencies to SAF/IGI for processing. SAF/IGI, after review and coordination by the responsible HAF functional(s), will close HAF-level deficiencies in collaboration with the inspecting MAJCOM/IG.

2.6.3.5. MAJCOM/IGs will ensure the deficiency corrective action process is included in the MAJCOM supplement to this AFI.

2.6.3.6. All deficiencies will be assigned a deficiency code(s) from **Table 2.1.,** by the corrective action OPR (at wing, NAF, MAJCOM, HAF), as part of the deficiency corrective action process.

2.6.3.7. Basic responsibility for problem solving and the corrective action process resides at the lowest appropriate command level. Problem solving should be applied through the AF eight-step problem solving model as outlined in the AFSO21 Playbook (or SAF/SO approved publication) to assist in identifying root causes and solutions to deficiencies.

2.6.3.8. MAJCOM FAMs and IGs should review units' corrective action plans for critical and significant deficiencies for appropriateness prior to closure. MAJCOM/IGs may require organizations provide problem solving documentation for those deficiencies.

2.6.3.9. In instances where corrective action responsibility is assigned to both the host and tenant unit (or supported and supporting unit), MAJCOM/IGs will assign an OPR and an OCR to correct the identified deficiencies.

2.6.3.10. The deficiency codes listed in **Table 2.1.** apply to all inspections listed in this AFI.

Table 2.1. Deficiency Codes and Explanations.

Category	Deficiency Code Sub-Categories
Equipment/ Tools	Adequacy of equipment/tools considered causal factor of deficiency.
	EQ1 Equipment Reliability
	EQ1.1 Inadequate equipment maintenance
	EQ1.2 Equipment defect or design flaw
	EQ2 Inadequate/Unavailable Equipment (not resource driven)
	EQ2.1 Base-Level support inadequate
	EQ2.2 HHQ-Level support inadequate
	EQ2.3 Outside/external-agency support inadequate
	EQ3 Equipment/Tool Accountability inadequate
	EQ4 Other Equipment/Tools Issue (describe)

Guidance	Existing guidance considered causal factor of deficiency. Guidance cited can be any authorized source IAW AFI 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*. If ─GD" cause code is used, the guidance cited will be provided to OPR.
	GD1 Complexity of Guidance
	GD2 No/Inadequate Guidance
	GD3 Incorrect/Conflicting Guidance
	GD4 Outdated/Non-current Guidance
	GD4 Other Guidance Issue (describe)
Leadership/ Supervision	Leadership or supervision considered a causal factor in the deficiency.

	LS1 – Inadequate Leadership/Supervision:
	
	  LS1.1 Supervisor/leadership involvement insufficient
	
	  LS1.2 Ineffective communication
	
	  LS1.3 Decision making process ineffective

	LS2 Work Environment
	
	  LS2.1 Equal Opportunity (EO) environment not supported
	
	  LS2.2 Workforce effectiveness limited by existing human relations climate
	
	  LS2.3 Physical working conditions not conducive to productivity
	
	  LS2.4 Other work environment issue (describe)

	LS3 Use of Resources
	
	  LS3.1 Unit incorrectly prioritized available resources
	
	  LS3.2 Unit failed to adequately program resources
	
	  LS3.3 Other supervisory resource issue (describe)

	LS4 Other Leadership/Supervision issue (describe)
Resource Shortfall	Lack of resources considered causal factor of deficiency.

	RS1 Funding Shortfall
	
	  RS1.1 Program shortfall (Air Force level)
	
	  RS1.2 Program shortfall (MAJCOM level)
	
	  RS1.3 Program shortfall (wing/installation level)
	
	  RS1.4 Parent unit withheld funding (applies to any unit through which funds are allocated/ distributed superior to the unit in question)
	
	  RS1.5 Other funding shortfall (describe)

	RS2 Personnel Shortfall
	
	  RS2.1 Assigned personnel less than accepted CONUS/OCONUS manning averages
	
	  RS2.2 Insufficient personnel due to TDY/deployment

	RS2.3 Insufficient personnel due to medical profile
	RS2.4 Insufficient personnel due to validated installation augmentee requirements shortfall
	RS2.5 Awaiting security clearance
	RS2.6 Other personnel shortfall (describe)
	RS3 Equipment Shortfall
	RS3.1 Awaiting resupply
	RS3.2 Not requisitioned
	RS3.3 Maintenance
	RS3.4 Deployed
	RS3.5 Other equipment shortfall (describe)
	RS4 Other Resource Shortfall Issue (describe)
Safety	Safety deviation considered causal factor of deficiency.
	SE1 Flight Safety Program Management / Implementation
	SE1.1 Flight Safety Program Management Inadequate
	SE1.2 Selected aspects of flight safety program not effectively implemented (describe)
	SE1.3 Flight Safety Supervisory support inadequate
	SE1.4 Other flight safety program management issue (describe)
	SE2 Flight - Personal Error / Safety Deviation (describe)
	SE3 Flight - Other Safety Deviation (describe)
	SE4 Ground Safety Program Management / Implementation
	SE4.1 Ground Safety Program Management Inadequate
	SE4.2 Selected aspects of ground safety program not effectively implemented (describe)
	SE4.3 Ground Safety Supervisory support inadequate
	SE4.4 Other ground safety program management issue (describe)
	SE5 Ground - Personal Error / Safety Deviation (describe)
	SE6 Ground - Other Safety Deviation (describe)
	SE7 Space Safety Program Management / Implementation
	SE7.1 Space Safety Program Management Inadequate
	SE7.2 Selected aspects of space safety program not effectively implemented (describe)
	SE7.3 Space Safety Supervisory support inadequate
	SE7.4 Other space safety program management issue (describe)
	SE8 Space - Personal Error / Safety Deviation (describe)
	SE9 Space - Other Safety Deviation (describe)
	SE10 Weapons Safety Program Management / Implementation
	SE10.1 Weapons Safety Program Management Inadequate

	SE10.2 Selected aspects of weapons safety program not effectively implemented (describe)
	SE10.3 Weapons Safety Supervisory support inadequate
	SE10.4 Other weapons safety program management issue (describe)
	SE11 Weapons - Personal Error / Safety Deviation (describe)
	SE12 Weapons - Other Safety Deviation (describe)
	Training considered a causal factor in the deficiency.
	TR1 Training Program Management
	TR1.1 Training program management inadequate
	TR1.2 Training guidance/policy/procedures inadequate
	TR1.3 Training oversight inadequate
	TR1.4 Training support inadequate
	TR1.5 Controls/metrics of training process/progress inadequate
	TR1.6 Other training program management issue (describe)
	TR2 Training Program Implementation
	TR2.1 Initial qualification training inadequate
Training	TR2.2 Hands-on training inadequate
	TR2.3 Upgrade/certification training inadequate
	TR2.4 Training supervisory support inadequate
	TR2.5 Training evaluation tools inadequate
	TR2.6 Training documentation inadequate
	TR2.7 Other training program implementation issue (describe)
	TR3 Personnel Error
	TR3.1 Error committed despite adequate training & guidance
	TR3.2 Inexperience
	TR3.3 Other personnel error (describe)
	TR4 Other Training Issue (describe)
Other	Other deviation considered causal factor of deficiency (used when no other Cause Code adequately describes the nature of the deficiency). Clear text will be used.
	OT1 Explain in Clear Text

2.7. AF Special Interest Item (SII) Program.

2.7.1. Purpose. SIIs provide a means to focus management attention and/or gather data to evaluate the status of specific programs and conditions in the field requiring AF senior leader attention. SIIs are used by HAF functional staffs to make policy adjustments and enhance decision-making. Active SIIs should not exceed more than five at any given time.

2.7.2. Responsibilities.

2.7.2.1. SAF/IGI. Manage the AF SII program by coordinating AF SII topic proposals, obtaining SAF/IG approval, distribute approved AF SII to MAJCOM/IGs, compile and forward SII data to the sponsoring agency.

2.7.2.2. SII Sponsors. Only HAF functionals may sponsor SIIs. Proposed SII topics may be initiated at any level but must be submitted by the appropriate HAF functional to SAF/IGI at safigi.workflow@pentagon.af.mil. Submit SII topic proposals in the format provided on the SAF/IGI Community of Practice (CoP).

2.7.2.3. MAJCOM/IGs.

2.7.2.3.1. SII Inspections. Inspect all applicable active SIIs during formal inspections. Units need only be inspected and reported once during the SII's active period. Gaining MAJCOM/IGs will coordinate with owning IGs prior to conducting SII inspections on gained units. Document the results of SII inspections as a separate section of the final inspection report.

2.7.2.3.2. SII Reports (RCS: SAF-IG(AR)0008). Consolidate SII inspection results and report quarterly to SAF/IGI at safigi.workflow@pentagon.af.mil. Provide a summary of units inspected, locations, dates of inspection, and electronic extract of the SII portion of the final inspection report. MAJCOMs will include unit SII self-inspection results NLT the third quarter report. IG remarks are important to the SII process and should be annotated IAW specific instructions attached to each SII.

2.7.2.4. Wing/Unit. Obtain SII information via MAJCOM/IG or SAF/IGI CoP. Wings/units not inspected during the active period of an SII will conduct a one-time self-inspection and report results to their MAJCOM/IG.

2.7.3. Rating. If rating is required as part of the SII, the scale will be specified in the SII instructions.

2.7.4. MAJCOM Command Interest Items (CII). Ensure that MAJCOM CIIs do not conflict with AF SIIs.

2.8. AF IG Inspector Eligibility, Training and Certification.

2.8.1. Eligibility. Officer inspectors should be senior captains (captains with more than 7 years commissioned service) or above. Enlisted inspectors must be 7-level or above.

2.8.2. Mandatory Training. All IG team members will complete the USAF Inspectors Course within 90 days of assignment to an IG team. While designed and required for newly assigned MAJCOM/IG team members, other MAJCOM-level inspectors and unit-level Exercise Evaluation Team (EET) members may attend on a space-available basis. Additional information regarding the Inspectors Course may be obtained at the SAF/IGI CoP.

2.8.2.1. MAJCOM/IGIs will submit course requests for the upcoming fiscal year to SAF/IGI NLT 01 September using the course request template on the SAF/IGI CoP.

2.8.2.2. MAJCOM/IG-Specific Training. MAJCOM/IGs will develop and provide all required specialized team, functional area, host-nation, or MAJCOM-specific training.

2.8.2.3. For required inspector training prior to assessing contractor functions, see paragraph **2.1.10.3.**

2.8.3. Recurring Training. All AF Inspectors will re-accomplish mandatory training NLT 48 months after certification.

2.8.4. Certification. MAJCOM/IGs, at a minimum, will certify all inspectors. Inspector certification to conduct inspections requires completion of mandatory and MAJCOM-specific training, as well as a field observation. Field observation requirement is a minimum of one over-the-shoulder inspection by a certified inspector.

2.9. Inspection Report Handling.

2.9.1. Classification. Review all reports prior to publication to ensure they are properly classified and marked IAW DOD 5200.1-R, and AFI 31-401, *Information Security Program Management*.

2.9.2. Report Marking. At a minimum, mark unclassified inspection reports "For Official Use Only (FOUO)" IAW DOD Regulation 5400.7/Air Force Supplement. For nuclear inspection reports, see paragraphs **5.16.** and **6.7.**

2.9.3. Releasability. AF inspection reports, related materials and drafts are official government documents and the AF controls their distribution. DOD members, DOD contractors, consultants, and grantees are permitted access to inspection reports IAW DOD Regulation 5400.7/Air Force Supplement. Non-DOD parties requesting inspection reports should be referred to the appropriate Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) office.

2.9.3.1. Release Determination Authority. Before release outside DOD, FOIA offices will receive a final release determination from SAF/IGI for NSI, INSI, LNSI, NORI, CI,ORI and any additional inspection reports. AFIA/CC is the release determination authority for Eagle Look and HSI reports.

2.9.3.2. Release Within DOD. MAJCOM/IGs are authorized to release inspection reports, in whole or in part, within DOD. Courtesy copy SAF/IGI on any release outside the AF.

2.9.3.3. Release of Inspection Summary to Media. An inspection summary may be released for inclusion in response to media queries or for internal information. The summary will be limited to the overall rating, inspection process/definition and, if desired, personal comments by the commander (e.g. general laudatory comments, perception of inspection process). The published summary will not contain detailed information (e.g. sub-area ratings, a list of individuals recognized by the IG, specific deficiencies, or specific ratings for inspection criteria).

2.9.3.4. Releasability Statement. The following statement must appear on the cover and each page of the report as well as in any transmission, presentation, or document containing protected IG material: ―*For Official Use Only. This report may be protected from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. Do not release or publish, in whole or in part, outside official DOD channels without express approval of the Director, SAF/IGI.*‖ Include similar statements on reports of inspections conducted jointly with inspection teams from other DOD agencies.

2.9.3.5. Inspection Outbrief. Unit outbriefs are considered a version of the inspection report and consequently fall within releasability restrictions. DOD members, DOD contractors, consultants, and grantees are permitted to attend inspection outbriefs at the discretion of the installation/wing commander. Community leaders and general public are not authorized access to inspection results, to include outbriefs, except as permitted by IAW DOD Regulation 5400.7/Air Force Supplement (see paragraph **2.9.3.**)

2.9.3.6. See paragraph **5.16.** and **6.7.** for additional guidance concerning NSI and NORI reports.

2.9.3.7. See paragraph **7.8.** for additional guidance concerning AFIA reports.

2.9.4. Distribution. MAJCOM/IGs will send an UNCLAS e-mail to safigi.workflow@pentagon.af.mil or a CLASSIFIED (up to SECRET) e-mail to safigi@af.pentagon.smil.mil:

2.9.4.1. For nuclear inspection reports, see paragraphs **5.16.2.** and **6.7.2.**

2.9.4.2. NLT 15 days of IG team departing inspected unit, send an executive summary of the inspection to include overall rating, MGA ratings, and all Critical deficiencies..

2.9.4.3. NLT 30 days of IG team departing inspected unit, send an electronic version of the final IG inspection report. If inspection report is produced in IGEMS, sending an electronic version is not required. Availability of reports on MAJCOM-specific internet sites does not satisfy this requirement.

2.10. Gatekeeper Functions.

2.10.1. AF Gatekeeper. AFIA Gatekeeper, in coordination with SAF/IGI, serves as the AF focal point for notification of HAF and non-AF assessments and relays visit notifications. AFIA Gatekeeper assists MAJCOM Gatekeepers in de-conflicting schedules as required.

2.10.2. MAJCOM Gatekeepers.

2.10.2.1. Establish Gatekeeper programs to de-conflict inspections, evaluations, and audits to minimize impact to units. Gaining MAJCOM Gatekeepers will de-conflict inspection, evaluation, and audit activity with owning MAJCOM Gatekeeper.

2.10.2.2. MAJCOM Gatekeepers do not have authority to deny access to inspectors/auditors from agencies outside their MAJCOM. If required, AFIA Gatekeeper will assist with resolving conflicts.

2.10.2.3. Submit an annual inspection schedule update to AFIA Gatekeeper NLT the last day of each quarter. Quarterly, AFIA Gatekeeper forwards the consolidated inspection schedule to MAJCOM/IGs, SAF/IGI, and AFSC/SEW. Distribute inspection schedules on a need-to-know basis.

2.11. Best Practices. Air Force Best Practices guidance is contained within AFH 38-210, *Air Force Best Practices Clearinghouse*, and managed by the Air Force Manpower Agency. Although inspection team leads may validate Best Practices, the expectation is that units will have previously submitted Best Practice candidates IAW AFH 38-210.

Chapter 3

COMPLIANCE INSPECTION (CI)

3.1. Execution. CIs are conducted to assess areas mandated by law as well as mission areas that are critical or important to the health and performance of organizations. Unit failure to comply with the established directives in these areas could result in legal liabilities, penalties, or mission impact. At a minimum, CIs will be conducted on all wing/wing equivalent units at an interval of no more than 60 months. MAJCOM/CC approval is required to exceed the 60-month inspection interval. MAJCOM/IGs will notify SAF/IG when a unit will exceed the inspection interval and will provide anticipated inspection date(s).

3.2. CI Rating. Three-tier rating (e.g., IN COMPLIANCE / IN COMPLIANCE WITH COMMENTS / NOT IN COMPLIANCE) should be sufficient to assess each compliance area. It is not the intent of this inspection to specifically rate organizations; the intent is to rate programmatic compliance.

3.3. AF Compliance MGAs and Sub-areas . Air Force Compliance MGAs represent key processes, procedures, and requirements based on public law, executive orders, DOD, AF, MAJCOM, and ARC directives and instructions. MAJCOMs may supplement the requirements of AF MGAs and add MAJCOM-specific MGAs. MGAs are organized according to the functional policy origin for each MGA. It is not the intent of this instruction to inspect units according to the numbered Air Staff construct but rather to better align inspection requirements with functional responsibilities and guidance. MGAs are delineated with a **bold font title** in this chapter.

    3.3.1. A1 (Manpower, Personnel, and Services).

        3.3.1.1. Equal Opportunity (EO) Program.

            3.3.1.1.1. Evaluate the effectiveness of military and civilian EO complaint processing procedures (formal, informal, and commander worked issues).

            3.3.1.1.2. Evaluate managerial and supervisory enforcement of AF EO policies and procedures.

            3.3.1.1.3. Evaluate human relations education and training.

            3.3.1.1.4. Evaluate organizational climate assessments.

        3.3.1.2. **Force Support.**

            3.3.1.2.1. Assess unit mortuary affairs planning and support (to include plans, memorandum of understanding, support agreements, and case files).

            3.3.1.2.2. Assess appropriated fund food service operations (to include cash control, contract management, subsistence accountability, and adherence to sanitation standards).

            3.3.1.2.3. Assess lodging operations (to include cash control; financial management; adherence to Air Force furnishing, amenities, and service standards; and quarters' utilization).

3.3.1.2.4. Assess fitness facility operations (to include cash control, adherence to equipment and operation standards, and evaluation of programs)

3.3.1.2.5. Assess ―Dram Shop‖ theory of liability training IAW AFI 34-219, *Alcoholic Beverage Program*.

3.3.1.2.6. Assess Customer Service (includes Individual Newcomer Treatment and Orientation (INTRO), in-processing, Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS), ID cards, and adverse actions).

3.3.1.2.7. Assess Force Management (includes leave, duty status, Unit Personnel Management Roster (UPMR), evaluations, and decorations).

3.3.1.2.8. Career Development (includes assignments, separations, retirements, reenlistments, and promotions).

3.3.1.2.9. Assess personnel program support to unit commanders (includes Information Technology (IT) support, communications and advisory products/services).

3.3.1.2.10. Assess Prime Readiness in Base Service (RIBS) training and equipment accountability.

3.3.1.2.11. Assess Resource Management to include personnel systems support.

3.3.1.2.12. Assess Installation Personnel Readiness functions.

3.3.1.2.13. Assess Program Manager (PM) ability to manage personnel programs (includes evaluations, decorations, fitness, and readiness indicators) in support of Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs), unit commanders, and IMA Unit Reserve Coordinators (URCs)

3.3.1.2.14. Assess Base Individual Mobilization Augmentee Administrator (BIMAA) ability to manage personnel programs (includes evaluations, decorations, fitness, and readiness indicators) in support of Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs), unit commanders, and IMA Unit Reserve Coordinators (URCs).

3.3.1.3. **Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR).** Ref DODI 6495.02, *Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program Procedures*; AFPD 36-60, *Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program;* AFI 36-6001, *Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program*.

3.3.1.3.1. Evaluate if essential training tasks identified in DODI 6495.02 and AFI 36-6001 are conducted for Victim Advocates (VA), Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARC), healthcare personnel, law enforcement, criminal investigators, judge advocates, and chaplains.

3.3.1.3.2. Inspect initial and periodic training.

3.3.1.4. **Suicide Prevention Program.** Evaluate Suicide Prevention Program IAW AFI 44-154, *Suicide and Violence Prevention Education and Training*.

3.3.1.5. **Trafficking In Persons (TIP).** Ref DODI 2200.01_AFI 36-2921, *Combating Trafficking in Persons (CTIP)*.

3.3.1.5.1. Assess unit compliance with CTIP training, which applies to all DOD military and civilian personnel.

3.3.1.5.2. Assess unit compliance with CTIP training requirement verification prior to all deployments.

3.3.1.5.3. Evaluate unit TIP awareness program, to include dissemination of local installation CTIP policy letter and local actions to increase CTIP awareness through a variety of public access methods. These methods may include, but are not limited to: hotline posters, base newspaper, commander's channel, commanders' call, handouts, and newcomer's briefings/orientation programs.

3.3.1.5.4. Assess unit compliance with CTIP training requirement verification prior to all deployments.

3.3.1.6. **Transition Assistance Programs (TAP).** Applies to all active duty personnel with more than 180 days of active service, all active duty personnel separated for disability regardless of length of active service, and all reserve component members (Reserve and Guard) demobilized after 180 days or more of active duty in support of a contingency. Ref DODD 1332.35, *Transition Assistance for Military Personnel* and AFI 36-3009, *Airman and Family Readiness Centers*.

3.3.1.6.1. Assess the unit's compliance with DODD 1332.35 sub paragraphs 5.4.1 through 5.4.6.

3.3.1.6.2. MAJCOM/IGs will forward, to SAF/IGI NLT 10 January, a consolidated report of inspected units' compliance.

3.3.1.7. **Voting Assistance Program (VAP).** Applicable to AD and AFRC; applicable to ANG units when mobilized. Ref DODD 1000.04, *Federal Voting Assistance Program* (FVAP) and AFI 36-3107, *Voting Assistance Program*.

3.3.1.7.1. Assess the unit's compliance with rules and procedures outlined in DOD and AF policy posted on SAF/IGI CoP.

3.3.1.7.2. MAJCOM/IGs will forward, to SAF/IG NLT 10 January, a consolidated report of VAPs assessments answering the DOD mandated questions.

3.3.2. A2 (Intelligence).

3.3.2.1. **Intelligence.**

3.3.2.1.1. Ensure personnel have been designated to support force protection missions, to include security forces (SF), integrated defense, and AFOSI counter-threat operations. If the base/unit does not have an organic intelligence capability, ensure processes/procedures are in place to meet the commander's, Antiterrorism Officer's and security forces' intelligence requirements.

3.3.2.1.2. Assess unit/installation processes/procedures for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating threat information/warnings.

3.3.2.2. **Intelligence Oversight.** Ref Executive Order 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*; DOD 5240.1-R, *Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons*; AF Policy Directive (AFPD) 14-1,

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Planning, Resources, and Operations; AFI 14-104, *Oversight of Intelligence Activities*. (OPR: AF/A2RR)

3.3.2.2.1. Assess compliance with the rules and procedures pertaining to collecting, retaining, and disseminating intelligence on US persons and the adequacy of Intelligence Oversight programs. Use AFI 14-104 and its associated inspection checklist.

3.3.2.2.2. MAJCOM/IGs will forward, to SAF/IGI NLT 2nd day following the end of each calendar year quarter, a consolidated report of all inspections of Intelligence Oversight.

3.3.2.2.3. MAJCOM/IGs will forward, to SAF/IGI NLT 5 January, the end-of-year report including a list of self-inspections conducted for that calendar year (see AFI 14-104 for specifics).

3.3.3. A3 (Air, Space, & Information Operations).

3.3.3.1. **Aircrew Protection.**

3.3.3.1.1. Evaluate unit's Aircrew Flight Equipment (AFE) training program to include use of performance-based evaluations for all aircrew members.

3.3.3.1.2. Assess AFE equipment availability, serviceability, configuration, accountability, and management.

3.3.3.1.3. Evaluate the unit's Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) program IAW AFI 16-1301, *Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Program*.

3.3.3.2. **Command Post (CP).**

3.3.3.2.1. Assess CP procedures in Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) IAW AFI 10-201, *Status of Resources and Training System*.

3.3.3.2.2. Assess CP procedures for building and transmitting reports IAW AFI 10-206, *Operational Reporting*.

3.3.3.2.3. Assess CP procedures and programs IAW AFI 10-207, *Command Posts*, for functional area responsibilities, console operations requirements, mission management/monitoring, training, testing, certification, rescue coordination, facility requirements, systems and status reporting, and CP security and entry control.

3.3.3.3. **Information Operations.**

3.3.3.3.1. Evaluate OPSEC Program IAW AFI 10-701, *Operations Security (OPSEC)*.

3.3.3.3.2. Evaluate military deception program IAW AFI 10-704, *Military Deception Program*.

3.3.4. A4 (Logistics).

3.3.4.1. **Logistics.**

3.3.4.1.1. Evaluate deployment training for deployment work center personnel and unit deployment managers in aircraft load planning, cargo processing/

handling/loading, passenger processing, and use of integrated deployment systems for updating execution and movement data supporting in-transit visibility.

3.3.4.1.2. Assess the maintenance and management of vehicle assets.

3.3.4.1.3. Evaluate Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) management procedures, processes, and safeguards (Vehicle Maintenance, Aerial Port, Shipment/Receipt).

3.3.4.1.4. Assess personal property and passenger movements for compliance with entitlements and regulations.

3.3.4.1.5. Evaluate Stock Control management processes (to include the Global Logistic Support Center, if applicable) used to support weapon system spares and the base missions.

3.3.4.1.6. Assess Repair Cycle Management to ensure tracking, status accuracy, and turn-in methods for all unserviceable assets in maintenance, including the execution of AF weapon system warranty processing.

3.3.4.1.7. Evaluate management of mission capable (MICAP) requisitions and reporting system processes (to include the Logistic Support Center if applicable).

3.3.4.1.8. Assess physical control, accountability, serviceability, and efficient management of the Readiness Spares Packages and Mission Support Kits.

3.3.4.1.9. Assess the physical control, accountability, serviceability, and efficient management of mobility assets to include assets decentralized throughout the wing (e.g., mobility bags and weapons).

3.3.4.1.10. Assess facility and equipment inspection and preventative maintenance programs.

3.3.4.1.11. Assess confined space, hazardous communication training/awareness, environmental compliance practices pertaining to fuel servicing operations, receipts, transfers, and inventory management.

3.3.4.1.12. Evaluate Fuels Management ability to train, maintain, receive, store, issue, and account for quality bulk petroleum products, cryogenic fluids, and missile propellants in a safe and timely manner.

3.3.4.1.13. Assess War Reserve (WR) Materiel management.

3.3.4.1.14. Assess the In Garrison/Expeditionary Site Plan process.

3.3.4.1.15. Assess the base's deployment planning process to ensure a reviews of all deployment-related documentation, e.g., OPLAN /CONPLAN Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) taskings, AEF Reporting Tool (ART) data, Unit Type Code (UTC) Availability (formerly AFWUS), the all-forces TPFDD for equipment and related UTC taskings, and Global Command and Control System (GCCS) Classified Newsgroups.

3.3.4.1.16. Evaluate unit's Support Agreement processes.

3.3.4.1.17. Evaluate compliance with Wood Packaging Material (WPM) inspection and reporting requirements.

3.3.4.1.18. Assess Arms, Ammunition and Explosive (AA&E) and classified cargo shipping and receipt procedures to ensure proper document preparation, assignment of Transportation Protective Services (TPS), shipment reporting and material handling.

3.3.4.1.19. Evaluate maintenance and disposition of shipment records (e.g., Bills of Lading, Reports of Shipments, Discrepancy Reports).

3.3.4.2. **Munitions (Conventional).**

3.3.4.2.1. Evaluate Munitions Maintenance to ensure assigned missiles, conventional munitions, and support equipment are inspected, maintained and serviced IAW established policy and technical guidance.

3.3.4.2.2. Evaluate Conventional Munitions Serviceability and Product Assurance to assess condition of the munitions stockpile to reliably support safe and effective air and ground operations for both training and combat missions. Key focus elements are munitions reliability, periodic surveillance inspections, specific event inspections (i.e., receipt, shipping, special, pre- or post-use inspections) to ensure fielded munitions systems serviceability. Additionally assess that flight and element training programs provide personnel capable of performing mission functions.

3.3.4.2.3. Evaluate Munitions Accountability to assess effectiveness of management controls for munitions assets, accuracy of accountable and auditable munitions transactions records, and management of munitions allocations, stock levels, inventories, requisition, and disposition.   Specifically assess the Munitions Accountable Systems Officer's (MASO) compliance with accounting processes.

3.3.4.2.4. Evaluate the Munitions Systems functions as it pertains to planning, scheduling, controlling and directing munitions activities to include processing of accountable transactions in Combat Ammunition System (CAS) and ensuring established security measures are implemented.

3.3.5. A5 (Plans & Requirements). TBD.

3.3.6. A6/XC (Communications & Warfighting Integration).

3.3.6.1. **Communications and Information.**

3.3.6.1.1. Evaluate training to support mission critical communication systems.

3.3.6.1.2. Assess the planning, configuration control, physical infrastructure/medium, management, maintenance, and security of the base's communication infrastructure.

3.3.6.1.3. Evaluate an installation's Spectrum Management Program.

3.3.6.1.4. Evaluate command and control (C2) systems maintenance.

3.3.6.1.5. Evaluate Knowledge Operations Management Programs to include Records Management, FOIA, Privacy Act, and Publication Management Programs for compliance of all legal and regulatory requirements.

3.3.6.1.6. Evaluate an installation's Scientific and Technical Information (STINFO) Program for compliance of all legal and regulatory requirements.

3.3.6.1.7. Evaluate management and security of IT Systems for compliance with all legal and regulatory requirements to include Information Assurance of legacy systems.

3.3.7. A7 (Civil Engineering and Security Forces & Force Protection).

3.3.7.1. **Civil Engineering.**

3.3.7.1.1. Assess whether Civil Engineers are meeting present and future facility and infrastructure requirements in accordance with the Civil Engineer Strategic Plan in the following areas:

3.3.7.1.1.1. Real Property Maintenance Activities: Real Property Maintenance (Restoration and Modernization, Facilities Sustainment Model), Real Property Services, and Demolition/Consolidation.

3.3.7.1.1.2. Work Information Management System (WIMS)/Automated Civil Engineering System (ACES).

3.3.7.1.1.3. Real Property Accountability.

3.3.7.1.1.4. Housing.

3.3.7.1.2. Assess Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force (BEEF)/Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineer (RED HORSE) training and Air Force Specialty Certifications.

3.3.7.1.3. Assess compliance with deployment requirements and other readiness programs.

3.3.7.1.4. Assess Fire Emergency Services (FES) flight using the FES Assessment Program (FESAP), National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) 1201 checklist.

3.3.7.1.5. Assess installation compliance with applicable environmental laws, regulations, and policies. In addition, assess remediation response plans.

3.3.7.2. **Emergency Management (Installation Commander, Group and Squadron Commanders, Detachment Commanders, and staff agency chiefs).**

3.3.7.2.1. Ensure the installation commander has met requirements listed in AFI 10-2501.

3.3.7.2.2. Ensure unit commanders have met requirements listed in AFI 10-2501.

3.3.7.2.3. Evaluate whether the base exercise program complies with AFI 10-2501, AFI 10-2603, *Emergency Health Powers on Air Force Installations*, and AFI 10-2604, *Disease Containment Planning Guidance*. The installation, unit or activity shall demonstrate the tasks and/or technical operations required to comply with exercise and evaluation program by conducting a base-wide exercise.

3.3.7.2.4. Evaluate base/unit training has been completed IAW AFI 10-2501, Chapter 6.

3.3.7.2.5. Assess installation's EM planning, coordination, implementation and execution of Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) 10-2 as required

by AFI 10-2501, Chapter 4, including checklists supporting CEMP 10-2 created by all assigned installation units.

3.3.7.2.6. Assess installation warning and notification system for peacetime response capability IAW AFI 10-2501, Chapter 9.

3.3.7.2.7. Assess Nuclear Chemical Biological Defense Report (CBDRT) reporting for the installation, per AFI 10-201.

3.3.7.3. **Disease Containment Response (Installation Commander, Group and Squadron Commanders, Detachment Commanders, and staff agency chiefs).**

3.3.7.3.1. Assess adherence to public health emergency training requirements listed in AFI 10-2603.

3.3.7.3.2. Assess installation's ability to meet specialized teams' personnel, equipment and training requirements, as applicable, listed in AFI 10-2501 and the CEMP 10-2.

3.3.7.3.3. Assess installation's public health emergency and disease containment planning, implementation/execution of the disease containment plan (DCP), as required by AFI 10-2603, and AFI 10-2604, including checklists supporting DCP created by all assigned installation units.

3.3.7.4. **Force Protection and Antiterrorism.**

3.3.7.4.1. Evaluate unit's Antiterrorism/Force Protection program to include subordinate units' adherence to AFI 10-245, *Antiterrorism (AT)*.

3.3.7.5. **Installation Security.**

3.3.7.5.1. Assess installation security at home stations. Installation security is comprised of physical security (Protection Level (PL) 1-3 resources), resource protection (PL 4 resources), police services, entry control, and base defense.

3.3.7.5.2. Assess key SF support program areas to include training and standardization evaluation, SF investigations, intelligence/counterintelligence/law enforcement in coordination with AFOSI, military working dog program, intrusion detection systems and the armory.

3.3.7.5.3. Assess information, personnel, and industrial security programs.

3.3.7.5.4. Assess confinement program.

3.3.7.5.5. Assess wing augmentation forces program support for SF, and the effectiveness of SF training/use.

3.3.7.5.6. Assess combat arms to include training and management program.

3.3.8. A8 (Strategic Plans & Programs). TBD.

3.3.9. A9 (Studies & Analyses, Assessments, & Lessons Learned). TBD.

3.3.10. A10 (Strategic Deterrence & Nuclear Integration).

3.3.10.1. **Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).**

3.3.10.1.1. Inspect applicable portions of the PRP at both nuclear-capable and non-nuclear-capable units to include Medical Treatment Facilities (MTF). At non-nuclear units, the PRP will be inspected to assess the overall effectiveness of the unit's implementation of the PRP IAW DOD 5210.42-R_AFMAN 10-3902, *Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)*. This inspection will focus on PRP screening (administrative qualification and certification processes), continuous evaluation, training, and management. MAJCOMs may satisfy PRP CI requirements for nuclear-capable units using results from most recent NSI.

3.3.10.1.2. Inspectors will use applicable sections of the inspection checklist found on the AF checklist site (**https://wwwmil.afrc.af.mil/afia**/).

3.3.10.1.3. If the program is managed by a recently-activated Force Support Squadron (FSS), inspect but do not rate the program until the FSS full operational capability (FOC) exceeds 120 days.

3.3.11. AA (Administrative Assistant).

3.3.11.1. Special Access Program. As outlined in AFPD 16-7, *Special Access Programs*, and AFI 16-701, *Special Access Programs*, the Director, Security, Critical Infrastructure (CI) and Special Program Oversight will determine the frequency, type, scope and team composition for all inspections conducted at government and Defense Industrial Base Contractor locations working on Special Access Programs (SAP) under the cognizance of the SECAF.

3.3.12. AG (Auditor General). TBD.

3.3.13. AQ (Acquisition).

3.3.13.1. **Acquisition.**

3.3.13.1.1. Evaluate compliance of acquisition, technology, and logistics units with DOD, Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS), AF, and MAJCOM instructions, policies and guidelines to plan, manage, deliver and sustain systems acquisitions and train personnel.

3.3.13.2. **Contracting.**

3.3.13.2.1. Evaluate if contract award, and contract management procedures are conducted according to applicable laws, executive orders, Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement (DFARS), Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFFARS), directives, instructions, and applicable MAJCOM Regulations.

3.3.13.2.2. Evaluate the Government Purchase Card (GPC) program, management, and administration across all functional areas IAW AFI 64-117, *Air Force Government-Wide Purchase Card (GPC) Program*.

3.3.13.2.3. Evaluate the contracting oversight office of the QA program IAW Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFFARS) MP5346.103, *Contracting Office Responsibilities*.

3.3.13.2.4. Assess plans for continuation of contractor services during crises as required by DODI 3020.37, *Continuation of Essential DOD Contractor Services During Crisis*, and AFI 63-124, *Performance-Based Services Acquisition (PBSA)*.

3.3.14. **Technology Protection.** Reference 2002 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)-- between Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Laboratories and Basic Sciences, Inspector General of the Department of Defense, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, Inspector General Department of the Army, Naval Inspector General, Inspector General Department of the Air Force, Director Internal Assessments, and Ballistic Missile Defense Organization -- on Security, Technology Protection, and Counterintelligence Inspections (can be found on SAF/IGI CoP). (OPR: SAF/AQR (Science, Technology, and Engineering) and AF/TE (Test and Evaluation))

3.3.14.1. To ensure their operations remain safe, affected MAJCOM/IGs will include designated USAF Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) facilities in the CI process to assess security, technology protection, and counterintelligence practices at those facilities (reference DOD IG *Security and Counterintelligence Inspection Guidelines*).

3.3.14.2. MAJCOM/IGs will forward, to SAF/IGI NLT 15 May, a consolidated list of all facilities that will be inspected in the upcoming fiscal year.

3.3.14.3. MAJCOM/IGs will forward, to SAF/IGI NLT 15 October, a consolidated report on all deficiencies identified during the previous fiscal year's inspections.

3.3.14.4. MAJCOM/IGs will forward, to SAF/IGI upon the conclusion of each inspection, any significant deficiencies (reference MOU for definition) and recommendations.

3.3.15. FM (Financial Management).

3.3.15.1. Financial Management and Comptroller.

3.3.15.1.1. Evaluate QA, Non-Appropriated Funds oversight, systems access controls, Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA), Anti-Deficiency Act, and audit liaison responsibilities.

3.3.15.1.2. Assess pay, travel, accounting, and disbursing functions.

3.3.15.1.3. Evaluate planning, programming, budgeting, and analysis functions.

3.3.15.1.4. Evaluate organization capability and training to conduct Independent Review Official and Economic Analysis duties in accordance with published guidance (AFPD 65-5, *Cost and Economics*; AFMAN 65-506, *Economic Analysis*; AFI 65-501, *Economic Analysis*; AFI 65-502, *Inflation*; and AFI 65-503, *US Air Force Cost and Planning Factors*).

3.3.15.1.5. Evaluate training program.

3.3.15.1.6. Evaluate Official Representation Fund (ORF) program in accordance with AFI 65-603, *Official Representation Funds-Guidance and Procedures* (self-inspection check list is available to assist MAJCOM/IGs and units as applicable).

3.3.16. GC & JA (General Counsel & Judge Advocate). TBD.

3.3.17. HC (Chaplain Corps). TBD.

3.3.18. HO (Historian). TBD.

3.3.19. IA (International Affairs). TBD.

3.3.20. IE (Installations, Environment, & Logistics). TBD.

3.3.21. IG (Inspector General).

    3.3.21.1. **AFOSI Detachment Operations.** (AFOSI IG only). In addition to inspecting applicable programs in **Chapter 3**, AFOSI IG will also inspect OSI-specific programs outlined in AFOSII 90-201, *Inspector General Activities*.

3.3.22. LL (Legislative Liaison). TBD.

3.3.23. MR (Manpower & Reserve Affairs). TBD.

3.3.24. NGB (National Guard Bureau). TBD.

3.3.25. PA (Public Affairs). TBD.

3.3.26. SB (Scientific Advisory Board)). TBD.

3.3.27. SE (Chief of Safety).

    3.3.27.1. **Safety.**

    3.3.27.1.1. Assess how the organization adheres to AF safety guidelines and procedures to include applicable Occupational Safety and Health Administration, confined spaces, and explosives safety standards.

    3.3.27.1.2. Assess mishap prevention programs IAW AFIs 91-202, *The US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program*, 91-204, *Safety Investigations and Reports*, 91-207, *The US Air Force Traffic Safety Program* and 91-301, *Air Force Occupational and Environmental Safety, Fire Protection, and Health (AFOSH) Program*.

    3.3.27.1.3. Assess unit explosive safety program, to include determination of compliance with AFI 91-202 and AFMAN 91-201, *Explosives Safety Standards*.

    3.3.27.1.4. Assess wing safety reporting program used to identify nuclear accidents (BROKEN ARROW), incidents (BENT SPEAR), and deficiencies (DULL SWORD).

    3.3.27.1.5. **Nuclear Weapons Intrinsic Radiation Safety Program.** Evaluate compliance, programs, implementation and management thereof per AFI 91-108, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Intrinsic Radiation Safety Program.*

3.3.28. SG (Surgeon General).

    3.3.28.1. Evaluate Community Action Information Board and Integrated Delivery System IAW AFI 90-501, *Community Action Information Board and Integrated Delivery System*.

    3.3.28.2. Consistent with the medical unit's home station mission and capabilities, evaluate IAW AFI 41-106, *Unit Level Management of Medical Readiness Programs,* the effectiveness in executing appropriate functions of the Medical Contingency Response Plan (MCRP) to support wing EM activities, including: medical counter-CBRN response; in-place patient decontamination; immediate medical response; in-patient

medical support; pharmaceutical support; threat agent surveillance; homeland defense-lab response; National Disaster Medical System support (Federal Coordinating Centers facilities only); public health emergencies; and aeromedical evacuation (AE) interface/support.

3.3.29. SO (AF Smart Operations 21). TBD.

3.3.30. ST (Air Force Chief Scientist). TBD.

3.3.31. TE (Test & Evaluation). TBD.

Chapter 4

OPERATIONAL READINESS INSPECTION (ORI)

4.1. Execution. ORIs evaluate and measure the ability of units to perform their wartime, contingency, or force sustainment missions. For maximum effectiveness in assessing operational readiness, all readiness MGAs should be assessed during the same visit. However, if required to divide the inspection into separate visits, the inspection will consist of two phases. Phase I evaluates the unit's transition from peacetime readiness and the unit's ability to maintain and sustain essential home station missions during and after the deployment of forces and includes the MGA of Positioning the Force.   Phase II evaluates the unit's ability to meet wartime/contingency taskings through the MGAs of Employing the Force, Sustaining the Force, and Ability to Survive and Operate (ATSO). Within the parameters set by MAJCOM/IGs, wing commanders may request appropriate unit activity be observed by MAJCOM/IGs to receive credit for Phase I or Phase II requirements. United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) may substitute a unit's North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Tactical Evaluation (TACEVAL) for ORI credit. At a minimum, ORIs will be conducted on all wing/wing equivalent units with a wartime, contingency, or force sustainment mission at an interval of no more than 60 months. MAJCOM/CC approval is required to exceed the 60-month inspection interval. MAJCOM/IGs will notify SAF/IG when a unit will exceed the inspection interval and will provide anticipated inspection date (s).

4.1.1. Scenarios. IG teams will attempt to create a realistic environment for evaluation while ensuring safety is not compromised. ORI scenarios evaluate garrison operations, contingency response (from both garrison and continuity of operations (COOP) location), and sustained performance.   When possible, combine ORI scenarios with existing exercises, contingency events, or other MAJCOM scenarios.

4.1.2. Performance. IG teams will focus on mission performance. Academic testing will not be used as a primary measure of readiness unless it serves a specific inspection objective or hands-on performance cannot be observed.

4.2. ORI Rating. Overall inspection performance, readiness MGAs, and sub-areas will be rated using the five-tier scale OUTSTANDING, EXCELLENT, SATISFACTORY, MARGINAL, and UNSATISFACTORY.

4.3. AF Readiness MGAs and Sub-areas. Units with a wartime or contingency mission will be rated in four MGAs: Positioning the Force, Employing the Force, Sustaining the Force, and ATSO in a hostile environment and/or contaminated Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) environment. Conduct Component Numbered Air Forces (C-NAF) ORIs using applicable guidance in Attachment **2**.

4.4. Positioning the Force. Positioning the force is defined as the deployment, reception, and beddown of tailored and prioritized forces.

4.4.1. **Command and Control (C2).** Evaluate the effectiveness of the initial response actions performed by the Installation Control Center (ICC) and other wing C2 agencies/elements.

4.4.1.1. Evaluate CP's and Commander's Senior Staff procedures for receiving processing and disseminating emergency action messages (EAM) IAW HHQ requirements as applicable.

4.4.1.2. Evaluate CP's and Commander's Senior Staff reporting in SORTS IAW AFI 10-201.

4.4.2. **Preparing for Operations .**

4.4.2.1. Evaluate weapon system generation and deployment.

4.4.2.2. Evaluate personnel readiness to deploy.

4.4.2.3. Evaluate equipment and logistic readiness.

4.4.2.4. Evaluate status reporting.

4.4.2.5. Evaluate Information Operations (electronic warfare, network warfare, and influence operations).

4.4.3. **Deployment Planning/Processing.** Assess unit's ability to position the force for mission employment through successful deployment execution.

4.4.3.1. Evaluate deployment planning.

4.4.3.2. Evaluate deployment process.

4.4.3.3. Evaluate use of automated deployment systems.

4.4.3.4. Evaluate medical deployment personnel processing support (individual or mass), as appropriate for wing mission and capabilities, including medical/dental/immunization clearance certification, pre-deployment health assessment, deployable medical records management, immunizations, prophylaxis distribution, and medical intelligence briefing.

4.4.4. **Reception and Beddown.** Assess unit's ability to receive and beddown forces for personnel accountability, equipment accountability, and adequacy of services provided.

4.5. Employing the Force. Employing the force is defined as the conduct and support of air and space operations from garrison or forward location to include: generating forces to combat or operational levels; providing timely information and intelligence dissemination; launching, recovering, or regenerating operational elements; planning for force replacement to continue operations; preserving installation security; wartime materiel support (WMS).

4.5.1. **Command and Control (C2).**

4.5.1.1. Evaluate if C2 functions support and facilitate mission accomplishment through proper arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures.

4.5.1.2. Evaluate CP's and Commander's Senior Staff procedures for building and transmitting Commander's Situational Reports (SITREP) IAW AFI 10-206.

4.5.1.3. Evaluate CP's quick reaction checklist procedures, as applicable, IAW AFI 10-207.

4.5.2. **Information Operations.**

4.5.2.1. Evaluate integration of all applicable Information Operations activities IAW AFPD 10-7, *Information Operations*.

4.5.2.2. Evaluate tactics conducted under military deception plans IAW AFI 10-704.

4.5.2.3. Evaluate Public Affairs tactics conducted in support of Information Operations (IO) objectives IAW AFI 35-101, *Public Affairs Policies and Procedures.*

4.5.3. **Intelligence.** Evaluate operational and target intelligence support to commanders. Evaluation should be relevant to unit's mission, and may include: Information Operations threats, threat assessment analysis, support to Threat/Force Protection Working Groups, Tactical Deception, tasking orders, production/collection/transmission requirements, effects-based assessment (tactical, operational), geospatial information and services (GI&S), force protection operations, etc.

4.5.4. **Maintenance.**

4.5.4.1. Control of maintenance.

4.5.4.2. Sortie production.

4.5.4.3. Aircraft maintenance during employment.

4.5.4.4. Munitions activity.

4.5.4.5. Airborne release reliability.

4.5.5. **Operations.**

4.5.5.1. Evaluate unit's ability to integrate deployed location procedures and requirements into unit's plans. Evaluate if the unit has a COOP plan which it exercises for contingency operations for incidents at the garrison location IAW AFI 10-208, *Continuity of Operations (COOP) Program*. Evaluate if all unit individuals know what actions to take during potential incidents.

4.5.5.2. Review application of unified commander's rules of engagement (ROE) for clarity and understanding within exercise constraints.

4.5.5.3. Evaluate established search-and-rescue procedures within exercise constraints (flying units).

4.5.5.4. Evaluate whether operations, equipment, and training can adequately meet wartime or contingency requirements.

4.5.5.5. AFE. Evaluate ability to provide aircrews with serviceable protective, survival, rescue, and CBRN defensive equipment.

4.5.5.6. Airfield Operations (Air Traffic Control and Airfield Management).

4.5.5.6.1. Evaluate ability of air traffic control to provide safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of aircraft.

4.5.5.6.2. Evaluate ability of airfield management to ensure adequate airfield facilities.

4.5.5.6.3. Evaluate any Base Operations Inter-Service Support Agreements.

4.5.5.7. Evaluate whether operating procedures can meet the requirement to mitigate the results of an airbase attack.

4.5.5.8. Evaluate ability of flying unit to meet tasking in designed operational capability (DOC) statements, Ready Aircrew Program (RAP) messages, OPLANS, and Air Tasking Orders (ATO) as applicable.

4.5.5.9. Evaluate ability of space unit to meet tasking in DOC statements, Fragmentation Orders, execution orders (EXORD), Space Tasking Orders (STO) as applicable.

4.5.6. **Weather.**

4.5.6.1. Evaluate the timeliness, accuracy, and relevance of weather support to users.

4.5.6.2. Evaluate the integration of global, regional, and local weather information into the unit's mission exploitation products.

4.5.6.3. Evaluate ability to accurately transmit local weather information in a timely manner.

4.6. Sustaining the Force. Defined as the ability to maintain and prolong combat support to all users for the duration of the operation.

4.6.1. **Communications and Information Systems Operations.**

4.6.1.1. Evaluate ability to provide non-secure and secure voice and data connectivity to support command, control, communications, and computer (C4) functions and to enable air and space forces to retrieve, create, fuse, and disseminate information.

4.6.1.2. Evaluate measures to protect critical information and C4 systems.

4.6.1.3. Evaluate C4 back-up and restoral capabilities.

4.6.1.4. Evaluate ability to provide, disseminate, and protect STINFO.

4.6.2. **Manpower, Personnel, and Services.** (military and civilian personnel management.)

4.6.2.1. Evaluate timeliness and accuracy of personnel management, casualty reporting, force accountability, reporting, and analysis.

4.6.2.2. Evaluate ability of deployed manpower elements to assess, account for, and manage the organization and adequacy of forces.

4.6.2.3. Evaluate the ability of manpower elements to access and refine manpower databases from forward deployed operating locations.

4.6.2.4. Evaluate the ability of the manpower and Personnel Support for Contingency Operations (PERSCO) teams to ensure alignment and accuracy of the PERSCO and manpower reporting numbers between the Unit Manning Document (UMD) and UTC databases.

4.6.2.5. Evaluate ability to perform wartime duties including mortuary, lodging, food service, community programs, and fitness programs.

4.6.3. **Civil Engineer.**

4.6.3.1. Assess capability to meet in-place wartime requirements and, if required, maintain a capability to deploy to another area.

4.6.3.2. Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force (BEEF) Mobile Forces: Evaluate forces' ability to perform tasks as outlined in AFI 10-210, *Prime Base Engineer Emergency*

Force (BEEF) Program. Emphasis should be given to the following: CBRN Defense and EM, expedient methods (beddown), expedient methods (construction), expedient methods (repair), explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), FES using the FESAP, NFPA 1201 checklist, expedient methods (destruction), force protection, and deployment support. Other tasks will include minimum airfield operating strip (MAOS) and airfield damage repair (ADR).

4.6.4. **Security Forces.**

4.6.4.1. Evaluate ability of base defense forces to plan and conduct defense operations to protect assets IAW the unit's Integrated Base Defense Plan.

4.6.4.2. Check for compatibility and interoperability of communication systems with other units, commands, services, and national or theater assets.

4.6.4.3. Assess police services and resource protection activities and responses.

4.6.4.4. Assess security of PL 1 - 4 resources and responses.

4.6.4.5. Evaluate ability of base defense forces to defeat Level I threats and disrupt or delay Level II threats.

4.6.5. **Logistics Readiness.**

4.6.5.1. Evaluate adequacy of material management to meet user asset requirements.

4.6.5.2. Assess physical control, accountability, serviceability, and efficient management of supplies and equipment.

4.6.5.3. Evaluate ability to safely and efficiently issue quality bulk petroleum products, cryogenic fluids, and missile propellants.

4.6.5.4. Evaluate ability to provide efficient and economical transportation services.

4.6.5.5. Evaluate ability to use economical, reliable, and up-to-date procedures to maintain vehicles in a safe and serviceable condition.

4.6.5.6. Evaluate ability to determine the location of unit passengers and cargo and to reprioritize or redirect movement in response to changing circumstances.

4.6.6. **Medical/Health Services.**

4.6.6.1. Consistent with the medical unit's deployment and generation missions as described on the unit DOC statement and/or listed on the Medical Resource Letter, evaluate the ability to provide medical support to deployed personnel, to include emergency, outpatient-inpatient medical care, AE interface, food and water safety and disease surveillance

4.6.7. **Rules of Law.**

4.6.7.1. Evaluate knowledge and understanding of the principles and rules of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) throughout the installation, commensurate with individual duties and responsibilities.

4.6.7.2. Evaluate knowledge and understanding of the applicable ROE and rules for the use of force.

4.6.7.3. Evaluate that legal (or command) representative briefed ROE as published by the combatant commander.

4.6.7.4. Evaluate adequacy of legal support for wartime and contingency operations.

4.6.7.5. Evaluate availability of legal assistance for deployed personnel.

4.6.7.6. Evaluate adequacy of legal office operational and mission readiness.

4.6.8. Financial Management (FM) and Comptroller Support.

4.6.8.1. Evaluate ability to provide FM decision support.

4.6.8.2. Evaluate ability to provide financial service support.

4.6.9. **Contracting.**

4.6.9.1. Evaluate adequacy of contracting support.

4.6.9.2. Evaluate ability to execute contingency operational contracting procedures.

4.6.9.3. Evaluate the ability to provide proper oversight of deployed operations contracts.

4.6.10. **Safety.**

4.6.10.1. Evaluate the effectiveness of mishap prevention program, including actions taken to mitigate risks associated with all phases of deployments and contingencies.

4.6.10.2. Evaluate the effectiveness of Operational Risk Management (ORM) program.

4.6.10.3. Evaluate the effectiveness of safety reporting.

4.6.10.4. Evaluate the effectiveness of the unit's flying safety program.

4.6.10.5. Evaluate the effectiveness of the unit's ground safety program.

4.6.10.6. Evaluate the effectiveness of the unit's weapons safety program.

4.6.11. **Chaplain.**

4.6.11.1. Evaluate ability to support religious observances.

4.6.11.2. Evaluate ability to provide and support pastoral care.

4.6.11.3. Evaluate ability to advise leaders on spiritual, ethical, moral, morale, and religious accommodation issues.

4.6.12. **Public Affairs (PA).**

4.6.12.1. Evaluate effectiveness of support to commander.

4.6.12.2. Evaluate effectiveness of all aspects of the PA program in directly helping to achieve organizational mission objectives.

4.6.12.3. Evaluate readiness to support deployed PA taskings.

4.6.12.4. Evaluate integration of research, planning, execution and assessment model into communication activities.

4.6.12.5. Evaluate readiness to performance effectiveness of deployed multimedia operations.

4.7. Ability To Survive and Operate (ATSO). Evaluate the unit's ability to conduct the full range of contingency operations, either in a stand alone, joint, or coalition forces operating environment, while simultaneously responding to or recovering from enemy attack, state/non-state use of CBRN weapons, major accidents, natural disasters, or HAZMAT incidents using the Air Force Incident Management System (AFIMS).

4.7.1. Command and Control.

4.7.1.1. Evaluate units' ability to control, collect, display, report, and disseminate information.

4.7.1.2. Evaluate ability of unit C2 agencies/elements to implement appropriate plans, procedures, and directives using AFIMS response structure as defined in AFI 10-2501 and AFMAN 10-2602, *Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Conventional (NBCC) Defense Operations and Standards*.

4.7.2. Prepare.

4.7.2.1. Determine if the installation CEMP 10-2; DCP, base support, joint support or expeditionary site plan identifies integrated tasks and assigns responsibilities to implement preparation, response, recovery, and sustainment actions.

4.7.2.1.1. Determine if the installation plan includes support provided to or received from joint service, host nation, or coalition forces.

4.7.2.1.2. Determine if the unit has identified and documented to HHQ critical infrastructure assets requiring special considerations for operational planning.

4.7.2.1.3. For units in medium or high threat areas or where a geographically specific Terrorism Threat Warning Report is in effect, determine if contingency plans are developed and training/exercises are conducted for both the home station and deployment location(s) IAW AFMAN 10-2602 and AFMAN 10-2605, *Education, Training and Exercise Competencies for Counter-Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Operations*.

4.7.2.2. Evaluate ability of the installation to implement CBRN defense plan actions to save lives, protect resources, recover from attacks, and restore mission capability.

4.7.3. **Protection.** Determine ability of organizations to prepare for and implement actions to protect personnel and resources from conventional and CBRN weapons effects.

4.7.3.1. Individual Protection. Determine if required individual protective equipment (IPE)/aircrew chemical defense ensemble (ACDE) is on-hand and serviceable and individuals are capable of using IPE/ACDE appropriately.

4.7.3.1.1. Determine if individuals have completed Protective Mask Fit training with their personal mask and understand the threat of CBRN agents as well as effective protective measures.

4.7.3.1.2. Evaluate individuals' knowledge of Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) levels IAW AF Visual Aid (AFVA) 10-2512, *Mission Oriented Protective Postures* (MOPP); ability to inspect and don their IPE within specified time criteria (AFMAN 10-2602, Table 5.1); ability to remove their IPE by processing through a

contamination control area (CCA); demonstrate the use of issued chemical decontamination kits, detection equipment, and chemical agent antidotes.

4.7.3.2. Collective Protection. Determine the ability to provide adequate collective protection for assigned and deployed forces and CCA capability for 20% of those forces during a 24-hour period.

4.7.3.3. Force Health Protection (FHP). Evaluate ability to execute force health protection activities.

4.7.3.4. Protective Hardening. Determine ability to provide permanent and expedient hardening protection for assigned and deployed forces.

4.7.3.5. Dispersal. Evaluate ability to disperse and protect critical assets.

4.7.3.6. Blackout. Evaluate ability to conduct operations under blackout conditions, as appropriate for the threat.

4.7.3.7. Critical Infrastructure. Determine if unit accomplished asset identification supporting the AF critical infrastructure program per AFPD 10-24, *Air Force Critical Infrastructure Program (CIP)*.

4.7.4. Contamination Avoidance and Control.

4.7.4.1. Evaluate ability to receive and disseminate information through the installation and theater CBRN defense warning and reporting system.

4.7.4.2. Determine adequacy, serviceability, and sustainment capability of available CBRN detection and monitoring equipment. Evaluate ability to deploy, operate, and maintain the CBRN detection and reporting system.

4.7.4.3. Determine adequacy of contamination avoidance plans and material stocks, based on the CBRN threat. Evaluate ability to implement contamination avoidance measures in preparation of and response to attacks.

4.7.4.4. Determine adequacy of contaminated waste collection, control, and disposal capability. Evaluate ability to implement contaminated waste collection actions at the unit and installation level.

4.7.4.5. Evaluate ability to identify and mark CBRN hazard and hazard areas, conduct post-attack risk assessment, and implement management actions to reduce mission degradation.

4.7.5. Respond.

4.7.5.1. Base Population. Evaluate ability of base population to react to MOPP and alarm condition changes and respond to attacks. Evaluate ability of base population to identify, mark, report, and avoid hazards after an attack. Evaluate ability of individuals to perform self-aid/buddy care and to identify/recognize symptoms associated with chemical attacks (to include toxic industrial chemical (TIC)/toxic industrial material (TIM)), biological events, disease outbreaks, and radiological/nuclear events.

4.7.5.2. Unit. Evaluate ability of unit to implement preparation, response and recovery actions after an attack. Evaluate ability of unit post-attack reconnaissance teams and other assigned specialized teams to conduct operations to include

detection/identification/quantification of threats to FHP. Evaluate ability of unit to manage the movement of casualties and exposed personnel to the appropriate medical treatment facility. Evaluate the ability of the unit to relocate, establish command and control functions and conduct operations from a COOP (alternate) site.

4.7.5.3. Joint Service, Host Nation or Coalition. Evaluate ability to integrate with assigned or attached joint service, host nation or coalition CBRN defense forces and support installation or theater missions.

4.7.5.4. Enemy Prisoners of War (POW), DOD Civilian and Contract Personnel. Evaluate ability to protect enemy POW, retained personnel, civilian internees, and other detainees in AF custody. Evaluate ability to protect DOD civilian and contract personnel not designated as emergency essential.

4.7.6. Mission Continuation/Restoration and Sustainment.

4.7.6.1. Evaluate ability to conduct integrated response operations, restore mission capability, and sustain operations.

4.7.6.2. Determine adequacy of personnel accountability and replacement actions.

4.7.6.3. Determine adequacy of CBRN defense individual and team equipment stock levels to support sustained operations.

4.7.6.4. Evaluate actions to initiate re-supply of critical CBRN defense equipment, including medical and pharmaceutical supplies.

Chapter 5

AIR FORCE NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTION (NSI) PROGRAM

5.1. NSI Program Guidance. Nuclear weapon systems require special consideration because of their political and military importance, their destructive power, and the potential consequences of an accident or unauthorized act. NSIs are performance and compliance-based inspections and are conducted to evaluate a unit's ability to manage nuclear resources while complying with all nuclear surety standards (reference DoD 3150.2-M, *DoD Nuclear Weapons System Safety Program Manual*). T.O. 11N-25-1 is the governing instruction for the conduct of NSIs. In instances where T.O. 11N-25-1 specifies responsibilities for ―Service‖, MAJCOMs fill that role. AF inspection teams will conduct NSIs in accordance with T.O. 11N-25-1 and reference this AFI for additional AF-specific inspection requirements. If there is conflict between T.O. 11N-25-1 and this instruction, T.O. 11N-25-1 will take precedence. Refer to Chapter **6** for guidance on NORIs.

5.2. NSI Inspector Eligibility, Training and Certification.

5.2.1. Eligibility. NSI inspectors must have nuclear experience or experience applicable to current systems in their respective MAJCOM prior to assignment. Officer inspectors should be senior captains (captains with more than 7 years commissioned service) or above. Enlisted inspectors must be 7-level or above.

5.2.2. Training.

5.2.2.1. Prerequisites. Prior to attending the AF NSI Inspectors Course, inspectors should attend the USAF Inspectors Course.

5.2.2.2. Mandatory Training. All AF NSI Inspectors will attend the AF NSI Inspectors Training Course.

5.2.2.3. Recurring Training. All AF NSI Inspectors will re-accomplish mandatory training NLT 48 months after certification.

5.2.2.4. Optional Training. NSI Inspectors are highly encouraged to attend other nuclear and/or inspection courses to add breadth and depth to their nuclear experience.

5.2.3. Certification. MAJCOM/IGs, at a minimum, will certify all NSI inspectors. Inspector certification to conduct NSIs requires completion of prerequisite and mandatory training, as well as field observation. Field observation requirement is a minimum of one over-the-shoulder NSI by a certified NSI inspector. MAJCOMs may add any MAJCOM-specific training requirements.

5.3. Unit Nuclear Certification/Decertification.

5.3.1. Unit Nuclear Certification. MAJCOM/CCs are the certification authority for nuclear-capable units. In this case a unit is defined as any nuclear capable AF Bomb Wing, Missile Wing, Fighter Wing, Air Base Wing, and NATO fighter bomber Wing/USAFE Munitions Support Squadrons. A nuclear-capable unit is defined as any wing, squadron or any other designated organization or base that has a mission to receive, store, handle, test, maintain, transport, load and unload, mate and demate, stand alert or perform strike missions with nuclear bombs or warheads. The unit need not possess nuclear weapons. Successful

completion of an INSI/NSI validates nuclear surety and is one of the activities per AFI 63-125, *Nuclear Certification Program*, necessary in gaining (INSI) and sustaining (NSI) nuclear certification.

5.3.2. Unit Nuclear Decertification. The MAJCOM/CC may withdraw unit nuclear certification for any of the following reasons:

5.3.2.1. The safety, security, or reliability of nuclear assets is uncertain.

5.3.2.2. The unit is unable to perform its nuclear operational mission.

5.3.2.3. A unit is rated less than SATISFACTORY during a NSI, LNSI, or NORI.

5.3.3. When decertifying, the MAJCOM/CC may permit the unit to retain a limited nuclear operational capability in mission areas where nuclear surety is assured.

5.3.3.1. If decertifying any portion, MAJCOM/CC will provide a memo to include the areas decertified and an expected get-well date. Distribute to **Table 5.1., Group 1**.

5.3.3.2. Upon recertification, MAJCOM/CC will provide a memo certifying the unit to resume the full range of nuclear operations. Distribute to **Table 5.1., Group 1**.

5.4. Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI). The MAJCOM, in coordination with HQ AFSC/SEW and SAF/IGI, will determine a unit's need for an INSI. The MAJCOM/CC will document the decision on whether or not an INSI is required. This memo will be forwarded to the unit(s) affected, the MAJCOM/IG, and appropriate staff functionals. For decisions to proceed with an INSI, the memo will list the specific areas subject to evaluation. Applicable functional staff will develop READY/NOT READY inspection criteria to be used by the IG during the INSI. Refer to **Attachment 3**, *Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection Requirements for Major Nuclear Mission Changes,* to assist in determining INSI requirements. Nuclear enterprise agencies will receive inspection notification (initiation and conclusion) through the MAJCOM/IG's use of **Attachment 4**, *Nuclear Inspection Messages and Summaries*.

5.4.1. An INSI will be used to evaluate and certify:

5.4.1.1. A unit's ability to assume its assigned nuclear mission.

5.4.1.2. A unit's ability to resume its nuclear mission following unit decertification.

5.4.1.3. That portion of a unit's mission that has been decertified.

5.4.2. In the following areas, the MAJCOM and headquarters (HQ) AFSC/SEW will jointly determine a unit's need for an INSI and document the decision as described in paragraph **5.4.** In instances where the lead MAJCOM and HQ AFSC/SEW disagree with the need for an INSI, one will be conducted. An INSI will also be used to evaluate and certify:

5.4.2.1. New or significantly-modified maintenance and/or storage facilities, to include new/modified support equipment and physical security systems (both lethal and non-lethal), integral to the operations and security of these facilities. It is the unit's responsibility to identify such changes to their MAJCOM Weapons Safety Division (SEW).

5.4.2.2. A unit's ability to perform its assigned nuclear mission following significant changes to weapons systems or portions thereof.

5.4.2.3. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) IAW DOD S-5210.41M_AFMAN 31-108, *Nuclear Weapon Security Manual.*

5.4.2.4. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams and nuclear logistics airlift units prior to assuming a supporting nuclear mission.

5.4.3. For units not previously nuclear-certified, conduct the INSI prior to receipt of WR. Conduct a NSI after receipt of WR and within 180 calendar-days of INSI completion.

5.4.4. For currently certified units programmed to receive a new weapon system/delivery system, conduct an INSI of operations and maintenance supporting the new system prior to receipt. Conduct a NSI within 180 calendar-days of INSI completion.

5.4.5. INSIs conducted on EOD teams, nuclear airlift units and certification of new or modified facilities, do not require a 180 calendar-day follow-up NSI.

5.4.6. INSIs as described in paragraph **5.4.2.** may be conducted in phases. If phased INSIs are conducted, the responsible MAJCOM will prepare an inspection plan identifying all required areas to be inspected by phase and forward the plan to HQ AFSC/SEW for review and approval. A READY rating must be achieved and maintained for the phase of the INSI under evaluation before evaluating the next phase. All phases must be rated READY prior to assuming nuclear operations. Phased READY ratings expire 18 months from issuance. Conduct a NSI, on all portions of the unit's nuclear mission, to include the addition of all phases, within 180 calendar-days of final INSI completion.

5.5. Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI). The NSI is designed to certify a unit's continued capability to perform its assigned nuclear mission. It inspects a unit's capability to manage nuclear resources while complying with applicable nuclear surety rules governing their nuclear mission. Additionally, a NSI inspects a unit's capability to safely and reliably receive, store, transport, secure, maintain, load, mate, lock/unlock, test, and render safe nuclear weapons. Missile launch crews, aircrews, command post controllers and release teams must demonstrate their knowledge of weapon acceptance procedures, nuclear weapon system safety rules, and nuclear weapon control order handling and authentication procedures.

5.5.1. Frequency of NSIs.

5.5.1.1. Inspection Frequency. Conduct NSIs of each nuclear-capable unit IAW T.O. 11N-25-1.

5.5.1.1.1. Waiver to Inspection Frequency. Waivers should be the last resort after all other avenues have been exhausted. MAJCOM/CC approval is required to exceed the inspection frequency. The MAJCOM/CC will notify agencies required by T.O. 11N-25-1 and provide informational copies to the CSAF and recipients listed in **Table 5.1., Group 1**. Waiver notification will include the rescheduled inspection date.

5.5.1.1.2. Exceeding Inspection Frequency. Exceeding the inspection frequency without MAJCOM/CC waiver results in unit decertification. Recertify IAW paragraph **5.4.**

5.5.1.2. No-Notice and Minimal-Notice NSIs. While not every full-scale NSI needs to be no-notice or minimal-notice, the inspection program should implement a measure of randomness to scheduled inspections. For each certified nuclear-capable unit, one out of every three full-scale NSIs should be no-notice or minimal notice. Refer to paragraph **2.1.1.1.**

5.5.1.3. Inspection notification procedures. In order to meet oversight and core team responsibilities, MAJCOM/IGs will notify the AFIA/CC at least 30 calendar days prior to inspection execution (refer to paragraphs **5.13.2.2.** and **7.2.2.**) Other nuclear enterprise agencies will receive inspection notification (initiation and conclusion) through the MAJCOM/IG's use of **Attachment 4**.

5.5.2. Sequencing with other inspections. MAJCOMs may conduct NSIs in sequence with other inspections. Where two MAJCOMs share nuclear surety responsibilities at a single installation, multi-MAJCOM NSIs (MMNSI) are encouraged to ensure host and tenant responsibilities are fully assessed and properly integrated. Where practical, a single group of inspectors from both MAJCOM/IG teams should be formed to evaluate host-base support functions and common host-tenant unit functions (i.e., PRP). When a MMNSI is impractical, either the host or tenant MAJCOM may perform these inspections with the concurrence of, and augmentation from, the other MAJCOM.

5.6. Limited Nuclear Surety Inspection (LNSI). The LNSI is limited in scope and does not evaluate all NSI areas applicable to the unit. They are designed to assess sustained performance of nuclear surety while minimizing the inspection footprint on a unit's operations. While LNSIs may be scheduled, no-notice, or minimal-notice inspections, each nuclear-capable unit will receive at least one no-notice or minimal-notice LNSI every 18 months. MAJCOM/IGs may conduct no-notice or minimal-notice LNSIs for a variety of reasons; however the LNSI does not establish a new or alter the existing DoD-directed NSI inspection frequency. The MAJCOM/IG will notify the unit to be inspected, and affected staff functionals via memo. This memo will list the specific areas subject to evaluation during the LNSI. Nuclear enterprise agencies will receive inspection notification (initiation and conclusion) through the MAJCOM/IG's use of **Attachment 4**. MAJCOMs may conduct LNSIs to:

5.6.1. Inspect one or more areas designated by the MAJCOM/CC or IG.

5.6.2. Re-inspect MGA or sub-area(s) of a certified unit that contributed to an overall UNSATISFACTORY or SUPPORT UNSATISFACTORY rating during a Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection (DNSI), NSI, or LNSI.

5.6.3. Re-inspect MGA or sub-area(s) of a certified unit that contributed to an adjectival MARGINAL or UNSATISFACTORY rating during a DNSI, NSI, or LNSI.

5.6.4. No-Notice and Minimal-Notice LNSIs. (Refer to paragraph **2.1.1.1.**) Each MAJCOM will conduct no-notice and/or minimal-notice LNSIs and determine appropriately-sized teams to target specific areas of concern or interest (e.g. a planned technical operation, logistics movement, security exercise, etc).

5.7. Nuclear Inspection Rating System.

5.7.1. For INSIs, assign a READY or NOT READY rating.

5.7.2. For all LNSIs and NSIs, assign overall unit ratings as specified for NSIs in T.O. 11N-25-1.

5.7.3. For all LNSIs and NSIs, assign unit sub-area ratings as specified for NSIs in T.O. 11N-25-1 with the following exception:

5.7.3.1. Rate unit weapons denial and recapture/recovery emergency exercise as ACCEPTABLE or UNACCEPTABLE (a pass or fail rating).

5.8. Reporting Criteria. For NSIs, LNSIs, and INSIs, reports will only identify Strengths, Deficiencies, and RIAs. RIAs will not be used to document procedural deviations or non-compliance; they should be used to recommend a more efficient or effective course of action.

5.8.1. Nuclear Surety Deficiencies and Corrective Actions. For reporting purposes, each NSI, LNSI, or INSI deficiency, as defined in T.O. 11N-25-1, will:

5.8.1.1. Be categorized as Critical, Significant, or Minor as defined in T.O. 11N-25-1.

5.8.1.2. Be assigned a unique tracking number.

5.8.1.3. Reference the applicable instruction, technical order, policy letter, or other source documentation.

5.8.1.4. Address impact of continued deviation or noncompliance, if required.

5.8.1.5. Identify the OPR for correcting the deficiency.

5.8.1.6. Include the OCR, if applicable.

5.8.1.7. Provide additional comments required to explain deficiency, if applicable.

5.8.2. Corrective Actions. See paragraph **2.6.3.**

5.8.2.1. Host and Tenant Findings. In instances where the deficiencies assess corrective actions responsibilities to both the host and tenant unit (or supported and supporting unit), MAJCOM/IGs will communicate to ensure primary (OPR) and collateral (OCR) responsibility actions for deficiency resolution have properly occurred.

5.8.2.2. Deficiencies Outside Inspected Unit's Control. Deficiencies attributed to inspecting MAJCOM staff will be managed by the MAJCOM/IG using the same process as described in paragraph **5.11.2.** For deficiencies outside the inspecting MAJCOM's control, the supporting MAJCOM's staff and IG CARS monitor will coordinate replies through inspecting MAJCOM/IG and AFIA. AFIA will monitor and request updates from the responsible agency.

5.8.2.3. For deficiencies from DTRA Inspections, see paragraph **5.12.2.** and T.O. 11N-25-1 added instructions..

5.9. DOD NSI MGAs. This instruction does not replicate the information contained T.O. 11N-25-1. The criterion below adds AF-specific inspection specifications and requirements to existing DOD criterion:

5.9.1. Management and Administration.

5.9.1.1. Management. Evaluate leadership, guidance, communication, and attitude of unit commander and key supervisors. When assessing management, consider whether deficiencies are the result of individual error or reflect management or supervisory training/experience gaps.

5.9.1.2. Administration.

5.9.1.2.1. Evaluate loading and management to include loading standardization, certification, training programs and schedules, and for certain non-US delivery aircraft, status, certification procedures and records.

5.9.1.2.2. Reentry system mating management to include standardization, training and certification programs, and maintenance plans as required.

5.9.1.2.3. Status of approved waivers, exemptions, deviations and exceptions.

5.9.1.2.4. Munitions Control. Evaluate Munitions Control in the planning, coordinating, directing and controlling munitions/weapons activities IAW AFI 21-204, *Nuclear Weapons Maintenance Procedures*.

5.9.1.2.5. Munitions/Maintenance Plans and Scheduling (P&S). Evaluate IAW AFI 21-204.

5.9.2. Technical Operations.

5.9.2.1. Evaluate each type of assigned weapon or weapon systems that units are tasked to support to assess safety, security, reliability and technical performance. These evaluations will be limited to those operations on which personnel are required to maintain certification. All record actions and reporting normally associated with the operation will be evaluated.

5.9.2.2. For all technical operations and/or task evaluations, the MAJCOM/IG team will select all unit task-certified/qualified teams (e.g., load crews, weapons crews, aircrews, missile crews, command post controller teams, etc) to perform the various NSI-required technical operations/task evaluations. Units may be required to submit team assignment documents, duty rosters, unit committed munitions lists, maintenance capability letters, etc, to the MAJCOM/IG before team arrival to expedite team selection. Evaluate individual Career Field Education Training Plans (CFETP), Load Training and Certification Document (AF IMT Forms 2435), PRP status, and work shifts when making team selections (maintain team integrity to the maximum extent possible).

5.9.2.2.1. Unit assessors, QA, and weapons standardization evaluators are also subject to evaluation. To demonstrate their knowledge and proficiency, they will normally be tasked to perform at least one evaluation of a maintenance operation within their area of responsibility.

5.9.2.2.2. Shop Supervisors involved in technical operations are subject to evaluation.

5.9.2.3. If a combined NSI/ORI inspection is conducted, technical operations shall be clearly divided between those conducted under peacetime (NSI) conditions and those conducted under wartime (ORI/NORI scenario), and shall be organized so there will be no confusion on the part of the inspected unit when transitioning from one phase to the other occurs.

5.9.2.4. Weapons Maintenance Technical Operations. Evaluate applicable technical operations designated in T.O. 11N-25-1, Table 2-3, for which the unit is tasked in their Maintenance Capability Letters (MCL) and Unit Committed Munitions Lists (UCML). Certain operations listed individually in Table 2-3 may be combined for the purpose of inspection. Inspectors will approve the starting and stopping configuration before the operation. During weapons maintenance technical operations evaluate adherence to technical data, documentation, overall safety, security and overall reliability of observed operations, to include final assembly testing.

5.9.2.5. Loading and Mating.

5.9.2.5.1. Aircraft Generation/Flightline Operations. Evaluate ability to conduct a complete weapons upload, from initial weapons break-out through aircrew acceptance and applicable post-load procedures. Loading operation must encompass each type and upload position (internal and external), as weapon system applicable. Evaluate unit ability to conduct a single weapon download/upload. Loading standardization crew/weapons standardization load crews /squadron load crews may be evaluated. Note: For custodial units supporting non-US delivery organizations, include the US technical load monitor activity.

5.9.3. **Tools, Test, Tiedown and Handling Equipment .**

5.9.3.1. Nuclear-Certified Vehicle Operations and Maintenance. Evaluate unit vehicle and equipment management, control, accountability, and maintenance practices for ensuring unit-assigned vehicles are maintained in a safe and serviceable condition. Evaluate applicable guidance, unit operator training and certification programs and unit vehicles for a safe and serviceable status

5.9.4. **Condition of the Stockpile .**

5.9.4.1. Sample Size. Examine at least 50% of the active/inactive assets in igloo storage and at least 25% of active/inactive assets in long term storage facility and weapon storage vaults.

5.9.4.2. Spot Inspections. Conduct spot inspections of weapons coded for retirement to ensure they are stored in a safe condition.

5.9.5. **Storage and Maintenance Facilities .**

5.9.5.1. Evaluate roads in storage areas, between storage and loading or missile launch areas.

5.9.5.2. Nuclear certified hoists. Critical deficiencies include using hoists which are unserviceable, unauthorized, or have not received mandatory load testing or safety related inspections.

5.9.6. **Security** .

5.9.6.1. Evaluate unit compliance with DOD S-5210.41M_ AFMAN 31-108, and other required security standards for protecting WR weapons and weapon systems. Security inspection sub-areas and inspection methodology are depicted in **Attachment 5.** Performance-based criteria, where designated, will be the primary means of the inspection. Compliance with existing requirements will be assessed through random sampling, and where practical, in conjunction with exercise events and/or task evaluations. Compliance with established requirements will be considered when determining the overall security area rating.

5.9.6.2. MAJCOMs will supplement this section to ensure their specific operating environments and elements of the published Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) *Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment* (NSTCA) (2005-2015) are addressed while ensuring safe exercise conditions to meet exercise objectives.

5.9.6.3. Weapon Denial and Recapture Exercise Planning:

5.9.6.3.1. MAJCOM/IGs working with their staff functional counterparts will develop realistic nuclear weapon security exercise scenarios to determine a unit's ability to meet the NWSS. The MAJCOM/IG team will determine the exercise scenario and coordinate scenario with DTRA during DNSI planning.

5.9.6.3.2. ORM and safety procedures will be used in planning and execution of security exercises at all levels of command. When exercises are collocated within operational areas, care will be exercised to avoid scenarios that could be interpreted as an actual hostile situation that might cause accidental injury to personnel or jeopardize the security of nuclear resources.

5.9.6.3.3. At IG discretion, exercise scenarios resulting in the opposing force (OPFOR) gaining access to nuclear weapons may automatically trigger the recapture or recovery exercise, as applicable. Inspectors will ensure both the OPFOR and exercise controllers know the ―adversary intentions‖ for the planned attack (e.g. sabotage weapon, destruction, theft, etc.).

5.9.6.3.4. All participants will apply appropriate INFOSEC and OPSEC measures to safeguard exercise information, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Likewise, the results of NSIs security exercises, or other like inspections under the auspices of the IG, will be appropriately classified, rated, critiqued, and reported for cross-tell purposes within the nuclear community.

5.9.6.4. OPFOR Planning. Exercise scenarios will portray an OPFOR that replicates adversaries identified in the published DIA NSTCA. Likewise, OPFOR capabilities will be matched as best as possible IAW this document to evaluate the unit's integrated effort to meet the NWSS. For those inspections where a force-on-force (FoF) exercise is planned, MAJCOMs are responsible for sourcing sufficient OPFOR members and exercise controllers to conduct the exercise. Use of a simulated engagement system (e.g. Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES)), while highly desired during the FoF, is optional. Ensure distinct separation of exercise play area from real world mission areas using visual identification tools (safety vest/belts, exercise controllers), safety briefings for trusted agents and normal exercise C2 communication announcements. All OPFOR, exercise controllers, and IG trusted agents will be under the operational direction of the inspecting IG.

5.9.6.5. Security Deviations. The IG will review the number and types of MAJCOM approved security deviations as well as assess the adequacy of and compliance with, associated compensatory measures.

5.9.6.6. Performance-based Assessment Methodology. When measuring performance to determine whether a unit meets the NWSS, inspectors shall apply the following methodology during their observation:

5.9.6.6.1. Observe and evaluate the integrated execution of security actions and responses (performance), and compliance with technical criteria, as applicable. Provide performance-based (Acceptable/Unacceptable) rates for exercises by factoring:

5.9.6.6.1.1. The timeliness/quality/strength of security/support force responses. For example, did the unit meet the tenets of the NWSS (i.e. Deny access or regain

custody)?

5.9.6.6.1.2. Execution of applicable plans and TTPs. For example, did the unit make sufficient effort to immediately deny access or regain custody?

5.9.6.6.1.3. Effect of active/passive defenses, deployed delay/denial systems, and other technology. For example, did the unit use available options to prevent the loss of/deny access to nuclear weapons to the adversary to include destruction of the weapon?

5.9.6.6.1.4. Unit application of integrated base defense activities in the overall effort to meet the NWSS. For example, did the unit bring available resources to bear on the event (e.g., technology, TTPs, EOD, etc.)?

5.9.6.6.2. Determine the effect (outcome) of executed security action(s) and response (performance), in conjunction with the impact of unit compliance with technical criteria and contribution of supporting security systems, as applicable, (see **Attachment 5**) to determine if the NWSS was met. For example:

5.9.6.6.2.1. Did the unit effectively execute applicable plans and employ sufficient forces in their effort to meet the NWSS?

5.9.6.6.2.2. Was unit C2 effective?

5.9.6.6.2.3. Did the unit up-channel information in sufficient detail and on time to appropriate HHQ agencies?

5.9.6.6.2.4. Were unit TTPs and applied security technology effective in meeting the objective?

5.9.6.6.2.5. Was unauthorized access denied or weapons custody regained?

5.9.6.6.3. Exercise Rating Criteria. Rate the weapons denial/recapture portion of this area using the ACCEPTABLE/UNACCEPTABLE (pass/fail) criteria (see paragraph **5.7.3.1.**). An ACCEPTABLE grade will be based on either successful denial or effective and timely recapture/recovery of affected nuclear weapon(s). When initial denial fails and the unit is not capable of regaining custody in a timely manner, the overall unit rate will be UNACCEPTABLE. Failure of a unit to initially deny unauthorized access or subsequent loss of custody of nuclear weapons does not automatically result in a failing grade for exercises. In these cases, IGs must consider specific nuclear weapon type, site-specific physical delay/denial mechanisms, site topography, climate, location, and adversary objective, as well as the effort of the security/support force to disrupt/delay an adversary's task and cause duress to the adversary as the exercise scenario plays out.

5.9.6.6.4. Modeling and Simulation. As available and applicable, the inspector may use computer modeling and simulation tools as enablers in determining security effectiveness and as a viable measuring tool for developing and refining response force scenarios based on the published DIA NSTCA.

5.9.7. **Safety.**

5.9.7.1. Compliance with explosive safety standards, explosives and active material limits, and Weapons System Safety Rules.

5.9.7.2. Nuclear Surety Program**.** Evaluate compliance, programs, implementation and management thereof per AFI 91-101, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*.

5.9.7.3. Assess FES flight using the FESAP, NFPA 1201 checklist.

5.9.7.4. Nuclear Weapons Intrinsic Radiation Safety Program. Although this program is fully addressed in paragraph **3.3.26.1.5.**, conduct a limited; spot-check inspection of the Intrinsic Radiation Safety Program to ensure programs are in place.

5.9.8. **Supply Support.** The supply management of nuclear ordnance, and WR major assemblies for positive accounting, custodial control, and status reporting.

5.9.9. **Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).** Evaluate PRP IAW DOD 5210.42-R_AFMAN 10-3902. In addition to the areas listed in T.O. 11N-25-1, the training program for all personnel who are part of the PRP shall be examined.

5.9.9.1. PRP inspection teams should contain an experienced or current certifying official as the lead PRP inspector, a PRP monitor, and will contain an experienced competent medical authority.   To minimize the inspector footprint, a single group of inspectors from both MAJCOM/IG teams should be formed to evaluate host-base support functions and common host-tenant unit functions (i.e., PRP).   When a MMNSI is impractical, either the host or tenant MAJCOM may perform these inspections with the concurrence of, and augmentation from, the other MAJCOM.

5.9.9.2. Inspectors will assess the administrative qualification, certification, continuing evaluation, removal from PRP duties, return to duty, training and management processes, using record reviews to substantiate above processes, employed by the unit.   PRP processes, not records reviews, will be the primary focus.

5.9.10. **Logistics Movement.** Evaluate all units supporting or having responsibility for logistics movement of nuclear weapons by observing loading, transporting, unloading, and custody transfer procedures of representative types of weapons. The team should conduct the inspection (other than an INSI) during missions involving WR weapons when available. Evaluate:

5.9.10.1. Convoy operations.   Includes operational movements to or from launch facilities and weapon movement activities to include security support. For ICBM units, the capability to transfer/transport, load/unload, tiedown and transfer custody of weapons for payload transfer missions may be evaluated as a logistics movement.

5.9.10.2. Explosives and active material limits.   Observe compatibility of items during transportation.

5.9.10.3. Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) Support. Evaluate PNAF support plans, security support, and logistics movement (see AF Joint Instruction (AFJI) 11-204, *Operational Procedures for Aircraft Carrying Hazardous Materials*, AFI 11-299, *Nuclear Airlift Operations (FOUO)*) for PNAF certified units and installations supporting nuclear airlift missions. Logistics airlift units must demonstrate ability to safely and properly load, transport, unload, and transfer custody of weapons. **Note:** For PNAF Units, security support will be evaluated for aircrew security actions during the PNAF movement as required by AFI 11-299.

5.10. AF NSI MGAs. In addition to the MGAs outlined in T.O. 11N-25-1, the following MGAs (**in bold print**) will also be inspected, as applicable:

5.10.1. **Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD).** Evaluate (1) classroom and practical training program, (2) condition of facilities and vehicles, (3) availability, serviceability, and demonstrated use of nuclear support equipment, (4) maintenance of technical orders, operating instructions, Team Chief Guides, AF Form 55, *Employee Safety and Health Record,* AF Form 623, *Individual Training Record,* and other related publications, (5) initial and annual certification and decertification documentation, if required, (6) knowledge of hazardous and classified weapons components, and (7) render safe procedures (RSP) and continuation of RSP.

5.10.2. **Nuclear Control Order Procedures.** Evaluate CP, aircrew, Permissive Action Link/Code Management System lock/unlock teams, and missile crew responses to nuclear control orders as well as effectiveness of applicable C2 functions IAW HHQ directives.

5.10.3. Emergency Exercises.

5.10.3.1. Emergency Evacuation. (USAFE Units only). Evaluate unit plans and procedures to evacuate assets IAW command directives. The unit, as tasked by HHQ, must demonstrate the ability to effectively and safely perform and report emergency evacuation operations in accordance with HHQ directives.

5.10.3.2. Command Disablement. Rate on an ACCEPTABLE or UNACCEPTABLE (a pass or fail rating) basis. Evaluate the unit's plans and procedures to meet the primary objective to render weapons tactically useless and for the removal, storage, and destruction of specified WR components according to HHQ directives. The unit must demonstrate the ability to effectively and safely perform and report, in accordance with HHQ directives, command disablement actions whether tasked by HHQ or to prevent the unauthorized use of WR weapons should hostile forces threaten to seize them.

5.10.3.3. Emergency Response. Rate on an ACCEPTABLE or UNACCEPTABLE (a pass or fail rating) basis. Evaluate the wing/installation's response to a peacetime overt attack to determine how effectively base resources are used to defend against overt attacks on areas where WR weapons or weapon systems may be located (e.g., in storage, in maintenance, in convoy). Use realistic scenarios that are based on the NWSS per paragraph **5.9.6. Note:** WR weapons will not be used in exercises.

5.10.3.3.1. Evaluate the response of tasked agencies including initial-response teams, disaster response force (DRF), SF, munitions/maintenance, wing safety, civil engineers, medical, C2, and follow-on recovery operations (IAW applicable DOD and USAF guidance, the installation security plan, and other documents specific to denial/recapture/recovery operations). The evaluation will also consider:

5.10.3.3.1.1. The wing/installation's assessment of the threat and immediacy of actions taken during response/recapture/ recovery.

5.10.3.3.1.2. The effectiveness of the planning, training, and exercising of tasked agencies and/or activities to counter an overt attack or preparations for an overt attack.

5.10.3.3.1.3. The use of available wing/installation resources to counter or

recover from an overt attack.

5.10.3.3.1.4. The command, control, and communications (C3) of all forces involved.

5.10.3.3.1.5. The implementation of the installation force protection plans.

5.10.3.3.1.6. Timeliness and accuracy of required reports.

5.10.3.3.2. An UNACCEPTABLE rating will be awarded for the Emergency Exercise area when:

5.10.3.3.2.1. Unit response forces do not meet DOD S-5210.41M_AFMAN 31-108 timing criteria.

5.10.3.3.2.2. Unit response forces do not conduct recapture operations as specified in DOD S-5210.41M_AFMAN 31-108, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3261.01A, *Recapture and Recovery of Nuclear Weapons*, and CJCSI 3261.02A, *Recapture and Recovery Response Force Guidance*.

5.10.3.3.2.3. Unit fails to re-establish adequate security and access control for a WR weapon or weapon system;

5.10.3.3.2.4. If post recovery actions, weapon RSP, or RSP continuation procedures by EOD result in an unsafe or unreliable weapon.

5.10.4. **Use Control.** Evaluate Permissive Action Link/Code Management System, Command Disablement System, and Active Protection System operations per CJCSI 3260.01B, *Joint Policy Governing Positive Control Material and Devices*, and other applicable HHQ directives.

5.10.4.1. Award an UNACCEPTABLE rating for: the unauthorized or ineffective storage, control, or issue procedures for sealed authenticators or class 3 code management system/weapon coding equipment; or if incorrect codes are positioned/installed in weapons/weapons control panels.

5.11. Re-inspection of NSI/LNSI Deficient Areas.

5.11.1. When the unit receives an overall UNSATISFACTORY rating, the deficient areas that caused or contributed to the UNSATISFACTORY rating must be re-inspected using one of the following methods:

5.11.1.1. Re-inspect Prior to Termination. The team chief may conduct an immediate re-inspection. If the immediate re-inspection indicates that the deficiency is sufficiently corrected to permit operations, a follow-up inspection is not required. Do not re-inspect prior to termination if:

5.11.1.1.1. The failure is due to a systemic problem or a general lack of proficiency within the unit.

5.11.1.1.2. Suspension of nuclear weapon operations is in the best interest of nuclear safety, security, or reliability.

5.11.1.2. Re-inspect After Termination. In instances where re-inspection prior to termination is not appropriate or re-inspected area(s) are not sufficiently corrected, the MAJCOM/IG will schedule a re-inspection NLT 90 days from termination of inspection.

5.11.2. When a supporting unit receives a SUPPORT UNSATISFACTORY rating, the supporting MAJCOM/IG will:

5.11.2.1. Conduct the re-inspection of deficient area(s) NLT 90 days from termination of inspection.

5.11.2.2. Provide re-inspection results to the supported MAJCOM/CC and MAJCOM/IG within 5 days of concluding the re-inspection.

5.11.3. Re-inspection Rating. The rating for the re-inspected area(s) will not exceed SATISFACTORY. If all deficient areas are successfully re-inspected, the overall unit rating will be UNSATISFACTORY, RE-INSPECTED TO SATISFACTORY. Document re-inspection results via message format IAW **Attachment 4** and forward to **Table 5.1., Group 1** addressees.

5.12. Actions on Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Inspections.

5.12.1. Throughout the conduct of DNSIs, the MAJCOM/IG team will meet with the DTRA team to discuss inspection activities and potential deficiencies.

5.12.2. DNSI Reports. Units will coordinate replies to DTRA reports through their appropriate MAJCOM/IG and AFIA. Take corrective action based on the field report provided by the DTRA team at the time of the inspection.

5.12.2.1. Critical and Significant deficiencies require a description of the unit's corrective action and a discussion of those measures or procedures initiated to preclude their recurrence. Units should provide problem solving analysis (to include AF eight step problem solving method documentation/results), when requested. Closure of minor deficiencies require a wing/installation CC memorandum detailing unit corrective actions taken and that all corrective actions are complete.

5.12.2.2. The MAJCOM CARS monitor will coordinate the MAJCOM response(s) and forward to AFIA/IO with MAJCOM/IG concurrence. An initial response is required 90 days after the date of the final report. If the corrective action report is not closed within 180 days of the date of the final report, the MAJCOM CARS monitor will provide AFIA an update every 30 days on open deficiencies until the report is closed.

5.12.2.3. AFIA will review and forward corrective action reports to DTRA recommending closure on deficiencies, as applicable.

5.12.2.4. When all deficiencies are corrected, AFIA will request DTRA close the inspection report. AFIA will forward DTRA closure acceptance to MAJCOM/IG and CARS monitor.

5.12.2.5. Deficiencies Outside Inspected Unit's Control. Deficiencies attributed to inspecting MAJCOM staff will be managed by the MAJCOM/IG using the same process as described in paragraph **2.6.3**. For deficiencies outside the inspecting MAJCOM's control, AFIA will monitor and request updates from the responsible agency and forward to DTRA with the MAJCOM/IG update.

5.12.3. When DTRA assigns a unit rating of SATISFACTORY (Support Unsatisfactory), UNSATISFACTORY or UNSATISFACTORY (Support Unsatisfactory), the MAJCOM/CC must evaluate the results to determine if unit nuclear decertification is appropriate. The MAJCOM will notify DTRA of the certification/decertification decision within 24 hours of DTRA inspection termination.

5.12.4. Surveillance Inspections (SI). MAJCOM/IGs will courtesy copy AFIA/IO of all responses to DTRA SIs.

5.13. AFIA NSI Core Team. (see paragraph **7.2.1.**)

5.13.1. AFIA NSI Core Team Roles. A core team of certified NSI inspectors centralized at AFIA will augment the MAJCOM/IG team for all scheduled NSIs. The Core Team will combine with the MAJCOM/IG Team to form a single unit, under the direction of the MAJCOM/IG Team Chief. AFIA will provide the Deputy Team Chief.

5.13.1.1. The MAJCOM/IG Team Chief retains the authority as the on-scene director and is responsible for determining the inspection grade and completing the inspection report to the MAJCOM/CC.

5.13.1.2. The Core Team provides expertise across MGA assessed during NSIs. The Core Team will augment NSIs within an 18-month inspection cycle across the nuclear-capable MAJCOMs (ACC, AFMC, AFSPC, AMC, AFGSC, and USAFE). The Core Team will augment MAJCOM/IG Teams on all scheduled and no-notice NSIs used to operationally certify nuclear-capable units. The Core Team will also augment NSI re-inspections and select LNSIs and INSIs.

5.13.1.3. Primary objectives of the Core Team are to improve standardization of NSIs, elevate the MAJCOM/IG Team's inspector experience and expertise and contribute to NSI lessons learned and trend analysis processes. Additionally, Core Team members will support the semi-annual NSI process review, the NSI inspector training and certification program, applicable conferences and meetings held throughout the nuclear enterprise, and/or duties assigned by AFIA/CC.

5.13.2. AFIA NSI Core Team and MAJCOM/IG Team Responsibilities. The AFIA NSI Core Team will augment the MAJCOM/IG Team in conducting and reporting inspection of the nuclear surety MGAs as outlined in **Chapter 5**.

5.13.2.1. The MAJCOM/IG Team Chief and the Deputy Team Chief from AFIA are responsible for developing full team complement consisting of permanent party, Core Team members, and required subject matter experts (SME) augmentees. Core Team inspector participation will be dependent on MAJCOM requirements and inspector availability.

5.13.2.2. Scheduling. At least 30 calendar days prior to inspection execution, the MAJCOM/IG Team and Core Team will draft a Sequence of Events (SOE) review to include discussion of NSI objectives, determine task assignment (area of responsibility) of all inspectors, and any inspection-unique circumstances or requirements.

5.14. AFIA NSI Oversight Team. (see paragraph **7.2.2.**)

5.14.1. AFIA NSI Oversight Team Roles and Responsibilities. The Oversight Team is a separate unit from the Core Team. The Oversight Team will provide a separate report for

each inspection routed through the AFIA/CC and TIG to SECAF. The AFIA Oversight report to the SECAF will contain any matters deemed appropriate by the Oversight Team including the details of the adjudication effort, to include the dissenting opinion(s).   An Oversight Team will conduct 100% oversight of all scheduled and no-notice NSIs used to operationally certify nuclear-capable units. The Oversight Team will also conduct oversight of NSI re-inspections and select Limited NSIs (LNSI) and Initial NSIs (INSI).

5.14.1.1. Upon completion of oversight, the Oversight Team will provide a separate, non-collaborative report to the SECAF regarding the quality, standardization and conduct of the combined MAJCOM/IG/AFIA Core Team. This report will also include any significant inspection items resulting in non-concurrence with the MAJCOM overall rating that required adjudication. The oversight report will be provided to the MAJCOM/CC, upon request.

5.14.1.2. The Oversight Team will not perform inspections but has the authority to intervene in an inspection for reasons of safety or critical non-compliance or whenever the AFIA Oversight Team Chief determines there has not been an appropriate degree of response from the MAJCOM/IG Team. Any intervention by the Oversight Team will stop that portion of the inspection until the issue is resolved.

5.14.1.3. During DNSIs conducted by DTRA, the Oversight Team will additionally serve as a liaison between DTRA and the AFIA/MAJCOM/IG composite team.

5.14.1.4. The Air Force Safety Center (AFSC) will provide augmentation to the AFIA Oversight Team IAW AFI 91-101.

5.15. Adjudication. Third party adjudication will occur for all types of nuclear surety inspections when differences exist between inspecting teams and oversight teams when such differences will affect the final overall rating of the unit. An adjudicated decision on the unit's overall grade will be reached before out-briefing the unit. Adjudication efforts will consult, and may solicit inputs/positions from, all applicable resources available, within the nuclear enterprise. Adjudication decisions will be resolved at the lowest level possible. Either the MAJCOM/IG Team Chief or the AFIA NSI Oversight Team Chief may enter an overall unit inspection rating into Level 1 adjudication, if needed.

5.15.1. Level 1 Adjudication. In the event the MAJCOM/IG Team and the AFIA NSI Oversight Team cannot agree on an overall inspection rating, the MAJCOM/IG and AFIA/CC will collectively adjudicate the overall rating decision and provide that decision to the MAJCOM/IG Team Chief. The MAJCOM report will reflect the overall rating stemming from this decision, but will neither include, nor disclose, elements of disagreement between the teams. The MAJCOM/IG or the AFIA/CC may enter an overall unit inspection rating into Level 2 adjudication, if needed.

5.15.2. Level 2 Adjudication. If a Level 1 adjudication decision cannot be reached by the MAJCOM/IG and AFIA/CC, TIG will adjudicate an overall rating decision and provide that decision to the SECAF and MAJCOM/CC. The MAJCOM/CC will communicate TIG's final overall rating to the MAJCOM/IG. The MAJCOM report will reflect the overall rating stemming from this decision, but will neither include, nor disclose, elements of disagreement. The AFIA Oversight report will include the details of the adjudication effort, to include the dissenting opinion(s).

5.15.3. Based on TIG and A10 (NOB Secretariat) recommendation and SECAF/CSAF approval, adjudication insights may be included with other IG-related issues as agenda items at the NOB. All adjudication decisions decided below TIG will be included as agenda items at the next NSI process review.

5.15.4. In all cases, the MAJCOM/CC will retain unit certification authority.

5.16. NSI Reports.

5.16.1. Classification and Marking. Classify and mark all NSI, LNSI, and INSI reports IAW T.O. 11N-25-1, AFI 31-407, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Security Classification Policy,* CG-W-5, the *Joint Nuclear Weapons Classification Guide*, and Executive Order 12958 as amended, *Classified National Security Information*.

5.16.2. Formal Report (RCS: SAF-IG(AR)0005). Document NSI results in a report and distribute to all recipients in **Table 5.1.**, **Group 1** within 30 days of inspection completion. Distribute the report to agencies in **Table 5.1., Group 2** as necessary. MAJCOM/IGs will ensure agencies not included in **Table 5.1.** but identified as OPRs for corrective actions are included in the report distribution.

 5.16.2.1. MAJCOM/IGs will annotate in their final MAJCOM/IG inspection report any associated DTRA inspection or AFIA oversight role

5.16.3. Executive Summary (RCS: SAF-IG(AR)0006). An executive summary will be accomplished and distributed prior to IG departure from inspected unit IAW Attachment **4**. Ensure agencies identified as OPRs for corrective action, and not included in the standard summary distribution, are added to the distribution.

Table 5.1. NSI Report Recipients.

GROUP 1
SAF/IGI 1500 Wilson Blvd, Suite 110 Rosslyn, VA 22209-2404
AF/SE 1400 Air Force Pentagon Washington, DC 20330-1400
AF/A7S 1340 Air Force Pentagon Washington, DC 20330-1340
AF/A10 1488 Air Force Pentagon, Room 4C858 Washington, DC 20330-1488
AF/A10-O 1488 Air Force Pentagon, Room 5E720 Washington, DC 20330-1488
AFSFC/SFO 1517 Billy Mitchell Blvd Lackland AFB, TX 78236-0119

AF/A4L 1030 Air Force Pentagon Washington, DC 20330-1030
AFIA/IO 9700 Ave G SE, Suite 340 Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5670
AFSC/SEW 9700 Ave G SE Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5670
US NCCS Skyline 3, Suite 500 5201 Leesburg Pike Falls Church, VA 22041-3202
DTRA/CSNI 1680 Texas St SE Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5669
GROUP 1 (cont)
JS/J39 Deputy Director for Global Operations Attn: J-39/STOD Rm MA872 3000 Joint Staff Pentagon Washington, DC 20318-3000
AFNWC 1551 Wyoming Blvd SE Kirtland AFB, NM, 87117-5617
USSTRATCOM/J005 Office of the Inspector General 901 SAC Blvd Suite 1H9 Offutt AFB, NE 68113-6005
GROUP 2
NGB-IGD 1411 Jeff Davis Hwy, Suite 11600 Arlington, VA 22202-3231
ACC/IG 175 Sweeney Blvd Langley AFB, VA 23665-2799
AFMC/IG 4375 Chidlaw Road Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433-5760
AFSPC/IG 125 East Ent St Peterson AFB, CO 80914-1281

AMC/IG 510 POW-MIA Dr, Suite E105 Scott AFB, IL 62225-5020
USAFE/IG Unit 3050 Box 60 APO, AE 09094-5060
AFGSC/IG Address City, State, Zip Code

A detailed email list (by individual name) will be maintained on the SAF/IGI CoP. This list will be updated quarterly. Contact SAF/IGI for details.

Chapter 6

AIR FORCE NUCLEAR OPERATIONAL READINESS INSPECTION (NORI) PROGRAM

6.1. Execution. The NORI is a performance-based readiness evaluation of nuclear-tasked units which support United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and Joint Chief of Staff (JCS)-directed OPLANs. NORIs require units to demonstrate their operational capability of nuclear and nuclear-support in a time-constrained environment. MAJCOMs will conduct NORIs on units with nuclear delivery systems at intervals not to exceed 36 months. Nuclear support units will receive a NORI at intervals not to exceed 60 months. MAJCOM/CC approval is required to exceed the 36- or 60-month inspection interval. MAJCOM/IGs will notify SAF/IG when a unit will exceed the inspection interval and will provide the anticipated inspection date(s). A NORI does not reset the 18-month frequency of a NSI.

6.2. NORI Rating. Wing/installation overall performance, MGAs, and sub-areas will be rated using the five-tier rating system of OUTSTANDING, EXCELLENT, SATISFACTORY, MARGINAL, and UNSATISFACTORY. USAFE may award NORI credit for successful completion of the NATO Strike Evaluation (STRIKEVAL). To receive NORI credit from a STRIKEVAL, USAFE/IG must ensure specific events are observed by inspector personnel either augmenting the NATO team or specifically sent to observe the events.

6.3. AF NORI MGAs. The focus of the NORI is force generation, employment, and reconstitution (as applicable). Safety should be addressed in all applicable MGAs. All NORI MGAs and sub-areas will be rated.

Table 6.1. NORI MGAs.

NORI Major Graded Areas	ACC	AFSPC	AFGSC	AMC	USAFE	AFMC*
1. FORCE GENERATION						
1.1. Command and Control: Unit's ability to respond to positive control orders and Commanders Senior Staff actions.	X	X	X	X	X	X
1.1.1. Nuclear Status Reporting: A unit's ability to submit generation reports to higher headquarters IAW applicable guidance.	X	X	X	X	X	X
1.1.2. Commander's Senior Staff. Unit's ability to manage alert generation.	X	X	X	X	X	
1.2. Nuclear Weapons System Capability: Wing's ability to generate all war plan weapon delivery systems and weapons within EAP-STRAT/NATO timing criteria.	X	X	X		X	X
1.2.1. Nuclear Operations Support	X		X	X		

NORI Major Graded Areas	ACC	AFSPC	AFGSC	AMC	USAFE	AFMC*
Capability: Wing's ability to generate all war plan air refueling and command and control sorties within EAP-STRAT/NATO timing criteria.						
1.3. Munitions Support: Wing's ability to effectively monitor, manage and coordinate actions to accomplish munitions-specific mission requirements.	X	X	X		X	X
1.4. Operations: Wing's ability to manage and control assigned resources, conduct adaptive planning, accomplish Forward Location Aircraft Generation (FLAG) operations (if applicable), and manage and sustain an alert force and alert force response capability.	X	X	X	X	X	
1.5. Security: Wing's overall sufficiency and effectiveness of security provided for generating and sustaining personnel and equipment (includes Area Establishment, Entry Control, Convoy and Response Force).	X	X	X	X	X	
1.6. Maintenance: Maintenance functions will be evaluated on management practices used to ensure safe, reliable maintenance while complying with nuclear safety and surety directives and the implementation of HHQ and local plans.	X	X	X	X	X	X
2. EMPLOYMENT.						
2.1. Command and Control: Unit's ability to respond to positive control orders and Commanders Senior Staff actions.	X	X	X	X	X	
2.1.1. Nuclear Status Reporting: A unit's ability to timely and accurately submit applicable Nuclear Execution & Reporting Plan (NEREP) reports.	X	X	X	X	X	X
2.1.2. Commander's Senior Staff. Unit's ability to monitor alert status, maintain situational awareness and sustain alert operations.	X	X	X	X	X	

NORI Major Graded Areas	ACC	AFSPC	AFGSC	AMC	USAFE	AFMC*
2.2. Nuclear Control Order Procedures: Assess the entire scope of Command Post controller and air/missile crew scenario actions and emergency action testing.	X	X	X	X	X	
2.3. Mission Execution. Unit's ability to complete assigned operational taskings.	X	X	X	X	X	
3 RECONSTITUTION.						
3.1. Bomber Strategic Aircraft Reconstitution Team (BSART). Unit's ability to effectively reconstitute the force for future operations.	X		X			X
3.2. Tanker Strategic Aircraft Regeneration Team (TSART). Unit's ability to effectively regenerate the force for future operations.				X		

Note: AFMC/IG will be involved in NORIs based on AFNWC Phase III PAD 08-05

6.4. Planning. When possible for AD (and required for ARC no-notice or minimal-notice), inspections should coincide with unit participation in USSTRATCOM annual Field Training Exercise (FTX) exercises. The MAJCOM/IG will coordinate with applicable MAJCOM and/or NAF Exercise Programs, NAF-staff, USSTRATCOM exercise planners, and unit trusted agents in developing a realistic exercise scenario that fulfills inspection requirements.   NORIs will execute to the DOC statement.   Written waivers to deviate from DOC statement will be submitted to the MAJCOM/IG.

6.4.1. For units with both a nuclear and conventional mission, the NORI will normally be conducted as a separate inspection but may be scheduled in conjunction or in sequence with an ORI or NSI.

6.4.2. If sequential inspections are conducted to assess nuclear surety, conventional readiness, and/or nuclear readiness, inspection objectives and criteria must be clearly delineated.

6.4.3. If conducted sequentially, each inspection type will have an independent report.

6.5. Re-inspection of NORI Deficient Areas.

6.5.1. When the unit receives an overall UNSATISFACTORY rating, the deficient areas that caused or contributed to the UNSATISFACTORY rating must be re-inspected using one of the following methods [See paragraph 5.3. for guidance concerning unit deficiencies and continued nuclear certification status, if applicable]:

6.5.1.1. Re-inspect Prior to Termination. The team chief may conduct an immediate re-inspection.   If the immediate re-inspection indicates that the deficiency is sufficiently

corrected to permit operations, a follow-up inspection is not required. Do not re-inspect prior to termination if:

6.5.1.1.1. The failure is due to a systemic problem or a general lack of proficiency within the unit.

6.5.1.1.2. Suspension of nuclear weapon operations is in the best interest of nuclear safety, security, or reliability. If necessary, reference paragraph **5.3.2.** for decertification procedures.

6.5.1.2. Re-inspect After Termination. In instances where re-inspection prior to termination is not appropriate or re-inspected area(s) are not sufficiently corrected, MAJCOM/CCs will establish re-inspection timelines to ensure deficiencies are resolved and unit readiness to support National war plans is verified as soon as practical but NLT 90 days from termination of the inspection.

6.5.2. Re-inspection Rating. The rating for the re-inspected area(s) will not exceed SATISFACTORY. If all deficient areas are successfully re-inspected, the overall unit rating will be UNSATISFACTORY, RE-INSPECTED TO SATISFACTORY.

6.6. Corrective Actions. See paragraph **2.6.3.**

6.7. NORI Reports. Carefully consider the classification of reports using AFI 31-407, CG-W-5, and Executive Order 12958 as amended. (Reference paragraph **2.9.**).

6.7.1. Classification. Review all reports prior to publication to ensure they are properly classified and marked IAW AFI 31-407, CG-W-5, and Executive Order 12958 as amended.

6.7.2. Formal Report. Document NORI results in a formal report and distribute to all recipients in **Table 5.1.**, **Group 1** within 30 days of inspection completion. Distribute the formal report to agencies in **Table 5.1.**, **Group 2** as necessary. Ensure agencies not included in **Table 5.1.** but identified as OPRs for corrective actions are included in the report distribution. [Exception: All requests for USAFE reports must be routed through the appropriate NATO office.]

6.7.3. Executive Summary. An executive summary will be accomplished and distributed prior to IG team departure from inspected unit IAW Attachment **4**. Ensure agencies identified as OPRs for corrective action, and not included in the standard summary distribution, are added to the distribution.

Chapter 7

AIR FORCE INSPECTION AGENCY (AFIA) PROGRAM ELEMENTS

7.1. Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA). Provides AF leaders independent, timely assessments and support to improve readiness, discipline and efficiency, to include oversight of NSIs, process improvement facilitation and support for AFSO21 initiatives, CIs of FOAs and DRUs, and conducts AF HSIs.

7.2. Inspections and Oversight Directorate (AFIA/IO).

7.2.1. **AFIA NSI Core Team.** A core team of certified NSI inspectors centralized at AFIA will augment the MAJCOM/IG team for all scheduled NSIs. The AFIA Core Team will combine with the MAJCOM/IG Team to form a single unit, under the direction of the MAJCOM/IG Team Chief. AFIA will provide the Deputy Team Chief. See paragraph **5.13.**

7.2.2. **AFIA NSI Oversight Team.** AFIA/IO provides oversight assessments to MAJCOM/CCs and TIG on the consistency of MAJCOM NSIs. Conducts in-depth trend analysis, assesses the sufficiency of corrective actions to inspection deficiencies and provides deficiency status and metrics to personnel in the AF nuclear surety arena. See paragraph **5.14.**

7.2.2.1. AF clearinghouse for MAJCOM responses to DTRA Nuclear Weapon Technical Inspection deficiencies. AFIA/IO reviews CRITICAL and SIGNIFICANT nuclear surety deficiencies identified in DTRA inspection reports and requests clarification of deficiencies. AFIA/IO also reviews MAJCOM actions taken to correct these deficiencies and endorses them to DTRA. In cases where AFIA or DTRA non-concurs, AFIA/IO returns corrective action responses to MAJCOM for clarification. Seeks consultative assistance from AFSC/SEW as needed.

7.2.2.2. Provides nuclear surety-related oversight of NSIs, LNSIs and INSIs by overseeing all full-scale MAJCOM-conducted NSIs to include re-inspections and no-notice NSIs. Additionally, provides observer(s) when the Defense Threat Reduction Agency/Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (DTRA/CSNI) inspects Air Force units under the auspices of T.O. 11N-25-1. AFIA will coordinate each NSI visit with the respective MAJCOM/IG Gatekeeper and will honor the IG trusted agent system to protect the minimum or no-notice aspect of the inspection. In the course of directly observing MAJCOM inspectors conducting their activities, AFIA/IO team members will not intervene in the inspection process unless the safety, security, or reliability of a weapon is in jeopardy, or injury to personnel, and the MAJCOM inspectors fail to take appropriate actions to correct the situation.

7.2.2.2.1. Upon inspection conclusion, the AFIA Oversight Team Chief will provide a separate report, routed through AFIA/CC and TIG to SECAF, MAJCOM/CC and MAJCOM/IG. The report provides an assessment of the MAJCOM/IG team and their conduct of the inspection. Specific areas to be addressed in each report include:

7.2.2.2.1.1. Concurrence or non-concurrence with the MAJCOM/IG assessment of nuclear surety.

7.2.2.2.1.2. Contentious issues (include areas requiring SAF/IG adjudication).

7.2.2.2.1.3. Composition of the qualification and training of MAJCOM inspection team.

7.2.2.2.1.4. Use of current AF and MAJCOM checklists and inspection guides.

7.2.2.2.1.5. Implementation and understanding of policy and guidance.

7.2.2.2.1.6. Adequacy of MAJCOM/IG validation.

7.2.2.2.1.7. Sufficiency of MAJCOM/IG report.

7.2.2.2.1.8. Sufficiency of MAJCOM/IG team's deliberative process.

7.2.2.3. Coordinates the proposed DTRA NSI inspection schedule for AF units.

7.2.2.4. Provides observer(s) when DTRA inspects AF units under the auspices of T.O. 11N-25-1.

7.3. DRU and FOA CIs. AFIA conducts CIs of AF-level DRUs and FOAs IAW **Chapters 1**, **2**, and **3**.

7.3.1. Inspection Checklists. AFIA will use checklists generated by HAF functional staffs IAW paragraph **2.1.5.** These inspections will focus on the applicable MGAs listed in Chapter **3** as a minimum, and any additional MGAs listed in paragraph **3.3.** that are mutually agreed upon by AFIA and the DRU/FOA commander.

7.3.2. Ratings. Each DRU and FOA receives an overall rating of OUTSTANDING, EXCELLENT, SATISFACTORY, MARGINAL, or UNSATISFACTORY.

7.3.3. CI Re-inspection. Units receiving an overall rating of Marginal or Unsatisfactory during a CI will be scheduled for a re-inspection within 24 months.

7.3.4. Reports and Follow-up

7.3.4.1. Official reports will be published on the final day of the inspection, directly following the commander's out-brief.

7.3.4.2. Critical and Significant deficiencies are answerable to AFIA/IO in accordance with instructions in the official report.

7.3.4.3. AFIA conducts in-depth trend analysis, assesses the sufficiency of corrective actions to inspection deficiencies and provides deficiency status and metrics to SAF/IGI and DRU/FOA personnel.

7.4. Health Services Inspection (HSI). HSIs assess the functioning and execution of AF Medical Service (AFMS) programs and processes at the local level in order to provide senior leadership with accurate data upon which to base policy decisions. HSIs also assess the ability of AF medical units to fulfill their health service support missions by providing required capability, including provision of medical care, success in training and equipping deployable personnel, and support of the host wing mission.

7.4.1. Criteria and Inspection Guides. HQ AFIA/SG derives criteria from health care policies of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, the office of the AF/SG, various civilian medical oversight agencies [such as the Joint Commission and the Accreditation Association for Ambulatory Health Care (AAAHC)], the NGB, and the AFRC. Air Force Inspection Agency, Medical Operations Directorate (AFIA/SG), based on

changes in health care policies, regulatory guidance and coordination with MAJCOM SG staffs, annually updates the next year's inspection guide and posts to the AFIA Community of Practice. Inspectors assess sustained performance by reviewing substantiating documents created since the last inspection.

7.4.2. Ratings.   Each medical unit receives an overall rating of OUTSTANDING, EXCELLENT, SATISFACTORY, MARGINAL, or UNSATISFACTORY.

7.4.3. HSI Frequency.

7.4.3.1. AD medical treatment facilities are inspected, with an overall AFMS average of 36 months. An HSI is normally conducted simultaneously with a survey by the Joint Commission for bedded medical units and AAAHC for non-bedded medical units. AD units are selected for inspection based upon criteria jointly agreed upon by AFIA, AAAHC and the Joint Commission.

7.4.3.1.1. AD medical units update their AFIA held demographics whenever they become aware of an event that may affect the scheduling process. AD bedded medical units must update their electronic Joint Commission application upon notification from The Joint Commission, which occurs 15 months prior to their anniversary date. Significant changes should be reported to the Joint Commission within 30 days of change. The Joint Commission also requires an annual self-assessment Periodic Performance Review (PPR) via electronic submission. Notification for e-application and PPR submission requirements are provided per email to the Military Treatment Facility (MTF) CC 15 months prior to the accreditation anniversary date. AD non-bedded medical units must submit a new application with AAAHC which must be received no later than 90 days prior to their reaccreditation survey date. During the term of accreditation, AAAHC also requires written notification within 30 days of any significant organizational, operational or financial changes that can occur.

7.4.3.1.2. AFIA contacts the MAJCOM/IG gatekeeper approximately 90 days prior to a scheduled HSI to ascertain any unannounced MAJCOM planned activities that may interfere with the HSI process.

7.4.3.1.3. MTFs requesting postponement/re-schedule of a scheduled AD inspection must be forwarded to AFIA/SG for approval following Wing CC (or equivalent), MAJCOM SG coordination and AF/SG concurrence. MTFs should allow sufficient time to process and coordinate postponement requests ensuring AFIA/SG has appropriate information to make a decision to approve/disapprove the request. Refer to paragraph **7.4.3.3.** for postponement/re-schedule criteria.

7.4.3.2. ARC units are inspected on average every 48 months not to exceed 60-months from the date of the last HSI. AFIA/SG publishes a calendar year ARC HSI schedule in coordination with AFRC/IG/SG and NGB/IG/SG. In keeping with AF policy regarding inspection footprint, AFIA/SG will, to the greatest extent possible, schedule medical unit HSIs simultaneously with other scheduled wing inspections and assessments (e.g., CI, ASEV). Unit requests for postponement/re-schedule of a scheduled ARC or AES HSI must be forwarded to AFIA/SG following MAJCOM coordination and policies. Units should allow sufficient time to process and coordinate postponement requests ensuring

AFIA/SG has the time and appropriate information to make a decision to approve/disapprove the request. Refer to paragraph **7.4.3.3.** for postponement/re-schedule criteria. **Note:** For purposes of this instruction, NGB/SG is a MAJCOM equivalent.

7.4.3.3. Certain events or circumstances may affect inspection scheduling for AD and ARC units. The following are criteria and guidelines units will use to determine if a request for postponement/re-schedule is justified. Any request to postpone an AD inspection exceeding 36 months and an ARC inspection exceeding 60 months requires a waiver from the AFIA/SG.

7.4.3.3.1. A medical unit deploying 20% or more of its assigned medical personnel for greater than 90 days will not be inspected 30 days (AD) or 90 days (ARC) following an AEF deployment.

7.4.3.3.2. An ARC unit undergoing a wing-level weapon system conversion (resulting in a significant impact of the medical unit) will be inspected within 6 months after such a conversion.

7.4.3.3.3. A unit change resulting in 50% or greater change in personnel authorizations.

7.4.3.3.4. A real-world disaster or contingency operation resulting in the unit relocating or suspending operations.

7.4.3.3.5. A unit participating in a MAJCOM-level inspection (e.g., ORI) involving 40% or more of the unit's personnel occurring simultaneously with the scheduled HSI.

7.4.3.4. Follow-up inspections.

7.4.3.4.1. All units receiving an overall rating of ―UNSATISFACTORY‖ or ―MARGINAL‖ during an HSI will be scheduled for a re-inspection within 18 months.

7.4.3.4.1.1. The MAJCOM SG or equivalent will conduct a staff assistance visit within six months to assess status. This report will be forwarded to AFIA/SG.

7.4.3.4.2. For ARC and ARC AE units, the next scheduled HSI will be conducted in conjunction with the next scheduled CI not to exceed 60 months from the date of the initial unsatisfactory/marginal HSI.

7.4.4. Reports and Follow-up Responses. An electronic/paper copy HSI report is published and left with the unit and wing CC at the conclusion of the inspection. A final copy is distributed to AF/SG, MAJCOM SG and other interested staff agencies after review at AFIA.

7.4.4.1. ―Critical‖ and ―Programmatic Failure‖ (Scores of 0 and 1) assessments for all units require a response (close-out or interim update) within 3 months of the inspection. These assessments are expected to be completely resolved within 12 months. Units are required to provide follow-up replies, including estimated completion dates, every 90 days until closure to their respective MAJCOM SGs (or equivalent) IAW instructions outlined in the HSI final report.

7.4.4.2. ―Critical‖ and ―Programmatic Failure‖ (Scores of 0 and 1) assessments for ARC units and AESs require a response (close-out or interim update) within 6 months of the inspection.   Units are required to provide follow-up replies, including estimated completion dates, every 3 months until closure to their respective MAJCOM SGs IAW instructions outlined in the HSI final report.   These assessments are expected to be completely resolved within 12 months.

7.4.5. Special Emphasis Items (SEI). SEIs are limited studies performed during HSIs whose purpose is to gather information on specific issues. Topics to be researched are submitted by field or HQ personnel to AFIA/SG for approval/disapproval. SEIs are normally terminated within 6-12 months, and the results are briefed at the annual IG-SG Annual Review. There should be no more than 3 active SEIs at one time.

7.4.6. Consultative Visits and Virtual Element Reviews. AFIA/SG provides Consultative Team Visits to MTFs as requested by USAFE/SG and PACAF/SG.   Specifically, the following MTFs will be considered based on their short assignment tour length: Osan, Kunsan, Lajes and Incirlik. Other MTFs may request individual functional area consultant visits through the AFIA/SG Support and Consultation Division. AFIA/SG's ability to honor these requests is based on inspection schedule and resource availability. AFIA/SG publishes an annual schedule of Virtual Element Reviews. These Virtual Element Reviews are a functional area specific review and discussion of every criterion in our HSI Guide. Over the course of a CY, every criterion will be discussed. Dial-in numbers and passwords are distributed AFMS-wide prior to each review through MAJCOM/SGs and AFMOA.

7.5. Field Inspection. As applicable, these inspections provide SAF/IG credible, independent assessments of AF operational readiness, efficiency, discipline, morale, economy, and effectiveness, as well as assist in oversight of the AF inspection system.

7.5.1. IG Team Augmentation. On request, AFIA inspectors may augment MAJCOM/IG teams during inspections of field units. AFIA augmentees do not write a separate report. Rated inspectors with current medical and physiological training prerequisites may fly as observers in unit aircraft when appropriate to their inspection role.

7.5.2. Contingencies and Combat. AFIA inspectors may deploy to forward locations and field HQs during contingency and/or combat operations to observe processes and recommend solutions to readiness problems beyond the control of the local AF field commander. These visits require approval by the appropriate unified command. This is not an inspection, but is an opportunity for an independent and impartial AF-level team to analyze systemic readiness problems that may need HAF or higher-level attention. Refer also to War Mobilization Plan, Volume 1, Annex O.

7.6. Inspector General Directed Investigation (IGDI). An IGDI is a high-priority investigation directed by TIG. These investigations are usually time sensitive and deficiencies and recommendations are of significant interest to the AF, members of Congress, or the general public. TIG approves all requests for IGDIs.

7.7. TIG Brief Magazine. AFIA publishes *TIG Brief* (Air Force Recurring Publication [AFRP] 90-1) which provides authoritative guidance and information to CC, IGs, inspectors, and AF supervisors and leaders at all levels of command. Anyone may submit articles to AFIA/PI. Articles should relate anticipated or actual problems, recommendations to improve management,

safety, security, inspection or operational techniques, cross tell of lessons learned, best practices, or contemporary issues of interest to the AF.

7.8. Report Handling.

7.8.1. See **Section 2.9**, this document.

7.8.2. CIs and HSIs are privileged documents and may be released in whole or in part only within DOD with the express approval of AFIA/CC while ensuring the privileged status of the reports is protected.

7.8.2.1. CIs are routinely released to inspected DRU/FOAs and the Air Staff. AFIA/IO will maintain a record of the official request for CIs.

7.8.2.2. HSIs are routinely released to the unit, their MAJCOM and the Air Staff. Summary reports of HSIs may be published within the AF if approved by AFIA/CC. AFIA/SG will maintain a record of the official requests for HSIs.

7.8.3. IGDIs are privileged documents and may be released in whole or in part by SAF/IG IAW AFI 90-301, *Inspector General Complaints Resolution*.

7.8.4. AFIA/IO Oversight reports will be transmitted to SECAF via AFIA/CC and TIG and to the inspected MAJCOM/CC/CV/IG. Oversight report information copies will be transmitted to HQ USAF/SE, HQ USAF/A10, HQ USAF/A4/7, HQ AFSC/SEW, AFNWC/CC, and the other nuclear capable MAJCOM/IGs IAW the controls specified in paragraph **5.16.**

7.9. Information Collection, Records, and Forms.

7.9.1. Information Collections. No information collections are created by this publication.

7.9.2. Records. The program records created as a result of the processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with AFMAN 33-363 and disposed of in accordance with the AFRIMS RDS located at **https://www.my.af.mil/gcss-af61a/afrims/afrims**/.

7.10. Prescribed and Adopted Forms.

7.10.1. Prescribed Forms.

There are no prescribed forms in this publication.

7.10.2. Adopted Forms.

AF Form 55, *Employee Safety and Health Record*

AF Form 623, *Individual Training Record Folder.* **Note:** Maintain and dispose of IAW AFI 36-2201V3, *Air Force Training Program on the Job Training Administration*

AF IMT 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*

AF Form 2435, *Load Training and Certification Document*

DD Form 2648, *Pre-separation Counseling Checklist for Active Component Service Members.* **Note:** Maintain and dispose of IAW AFI 36-3009

DD Form 2648-1, *Pre-separation Counseling Checklist for Reserve Component Service Members Released from Active Duty*. **Note:** Maintain and dispose of IAW AFI 36-3009

RONALD F. SAMS, Lt Gen, USAF
The Inspector General

Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

References

AFFARS Appendix CC, *Contingency Operational Contracting Support Program (COCSP)*

AFFARS *MP5346.103, Contracting Office Responsibilities*, August 2005

Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO21) Playbook, October 2007

AFH 38-210, *Air Force Best Practices Clearinghouse*, 9 April 2001

AFI 10-201, *Status of Resources and Training System*, 13 April 2006

AFI 10-206, *Operational Reporting*, 15 October 2008

AFI 10-207, *Command Posts*, 4 April 2008

AFI 10-208, *Continuity of Operations (COOP) Program*, 1 December 2005

AFI 10-210, *Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force (BEEF) Program,* 21 March 2008

AFI 10-245, *Antiterrorism (AT)*, 30 March 2009

AFI 10-301, *Responsibilities of Air Reserve Component (ARC) Forces*, 16 August 2006

AFI 10-701, *Operations Security (OPSEC)*, 18 October 2007

AFI 10-704, *Military Deception Program*, 30 August 2005

AFI 10-2501, *Air Force Emergency Management (EM) Program Planning and Operations*, 24 January 2007

AFI 10-2603, *Emergency Health Powers on Air Force Installations*, 7 December 2005

AFI 10-2604, *Disease Containment Planning Guidance (FOUO)*, 6 April 2007

AFI 11-299, *Nuclear Airlift Operations (FOUO)*, 19 March 2008

AFI 14-104, *Oversight of Intelligence Activities*, 16 April 2007

AFI 16-701, *Special Access Programs,* 1 November 1995

AFI 16-1301, *Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Program*, 6 September 2006

AFI 21-204, *Nuclear Weapons Maintenance Procedures*, 17 January 2008

AFI 31-401, *Information Security Program Management*, 1 November 2005

AFI 31-407, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Security Classification Policy*, 25 November 2008

AFI 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management,* 18 May 2006

AFI 34-219, *Alcoholic Beverage Program*, 17 October 2007

AFI 35-101, *Public Affairs Policies and Procedures*, 29 November 2005

AFI 36-2201 V3, *Air Force Training Program on the Job Training Administration*, 4 February 2005

AFI 36-3009, *Airman and Family Readiness Centers*, 18 January 2008

AFI 36-3107, *Voting Assistance Program*, 10 September 2003

AFI 36-6001, *Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program,* 29 September 2008

AFI 41-106, *Unit Level Management of Medical Readiness Programs*, 14 April 2008

AFI 44-154, *Suicide and Violence Prevention Education and Training*, 3 January 2003

AFI 63-124, *Performance-Based Services Acquisition (PBSA)*, 1 August 2005

AFI 63-125, *Nuclear Certification Program*, 15 March 2004

AFI 64-117, *Air Force Government-Wide Purchase Card (GPC) Program*, 31 January 2006

AFI 65-501, *Economic Analysis*, 10 November 2004

AFI 65-502, *Inflation*, 21 January 1994

AFI 65-503, *US Air Force Cost and Planning Factors*, 4 February 1994

AFI 65-603, *Official Representation Funds-Guidance and Procedures,* 17 February 2004

AFI 90-301, *Inspector General Complaints Resolution*, 15 May 2008

AFI 90-501, *Community Action Information Board and Integrated Delivery System*, 31 August 2006

AFI 90-1001, *Responsibilities for Total Force Integration*, 29 May 2007

AFI 91-101, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*, 19 December 2005

AFI 91-108, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Intrinsic Radiation Safety Program,* 29 November 1993

AFI 91-202, *The US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program*, 1 August 1998

AFI 91-204, *Safety Investigations and Reports*, 24 September 2008

AFI 91-207, *The US Air Force Traffic Safety Program,* 22 May 2007

AFI 91-301, *Air Force Occupational and Environmental Safety, Fire Protection, and Health (AFOSH) Program,* 1 June 1996

AFJI 11-204, *Operational Procedures for Aircraft Carrying Hazardous Materials*, 11 November 1994

AFMAN 10-2602, *Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Conventional (NBCC) Defense Operations and Standards*, 29 May 2003

AFMAN 10-2605, *Education, Training and Exercise Competencies for Counter-Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Operations*, 30 June 2008

AFMAN 33-363, *Management of Records*, 1 March 2008

AFMAN 65-506, *Economic Analysis*, 10 November 2004

AFMAN 91-201, *Explosives Safety Standards*, 17 November 2008

AFPD 10-7, *Information Operations*, 6 September 2006

AFPD 10-24, *Air Force Critical Infrastructure Program (CIP)*, 28 April 2006

AFPD 14-1, *Intelligence Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Planning, Resources, and Operations*, 2 April 2004

AFPD 16-7, *Special Access Programs,* 10 March 1993

AFPD 36-60, *Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program,* 28 March 2008

AFPD 65-5, *Cost and Economics*, 5 August 2008

AFPD 90-2, *Inspector General-The Inspection System*, 26 April 2006

AFOSII 90-201, *Inspector General Activities,* 2 May 2005

AFRIMS RDS

AF Visual Aid (AFVA) 10-2512, *Mission Oriented Protective Postures (MOPP)*,

24 December 2002

ANGI 90-201, *The Inspection System/Inspector General Activities,* 11 August 2004

CG-W-5, *Joint Nuclear Weapons Classification Guide*

CJCSI 3260.01B, *Joint Policy Governing Positive Control Material and Devices*,

13 February 2006

CJCSI 3261.01A, *Recapture and Recovery of Nuclear Weapons*, 1 July 2004

CJCSI 3261.02A, *Recapture and Recovery Response Force Guidance*, 21 June 2004

Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) 10-2

Disease Containment Plan (DCP)

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment (NSTCA) (2005-2015)

DOD 3150.2-M, *DOD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program Manual,* 23 December 1996

DOD 5200.1-R, *Information Security Program*, January 1997

DOD S-5210.41M_AFMAN 31-108, *Nuclear Weapon Security Manual*, 15 January 2007

DOD 5210.42-R_AFMAN 10-3902, *Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)*,

13 November 2006

DOD 5240.1-R, *Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons,* 1 December 1982

DOD Regulation 5400.7/Air Force Supplement, *DOD Freedom of Information Act Program*, 24 June 2002

DODD 1000.04, *Federal Voting Assistance Program* (FVAP), 14 April 2004

DODD 1332.35, *Transition Assistance for Military Personnel*, 9 December 1993

DODD 3150.2, *DOD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program*, 23 December 1996

DODI 2200.01_AFMAN 36-2921, *Combating Trafficking in Persons (CTIP)*, 23 February 2009

DODI 3020.37, *Continuation of Essential DOD Contractor Services During Crisis*, 6 November 1990

DODI 5210.89_AFI 10-3901, *Minimum Security Standards for Safeguarding Biological Select Agents and Toxins,* 24 September 2007

DODI 6495.02, *Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program Procedures*, 23 June 2006

DOD IG *Security and Counterintelligence Inspection Guidelines*

Executive Order 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*, 4 December 1981

Executive Order 12958 as amended, *Classified National Security Information*, 17 April 1995

Fire Emergency Services Assessment Program (FESAP) National Fire Protection Association Agency (NFPAA) 1201 Checklist

Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, House Record (H.R.) 4986, Section 1662, *Access of Recovering Service Members to Adequate Outpatient Residential Facilities*

T.O. 11N-25-1, *DOD Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection System*, 19 February 2008

Title 10 United States Code (USC) 8020, *Inspector General*, March 2004

Abbreviations and Acronyms

A1—Manpower, Personnel & Services

A1S—Directorate of Services

A2—Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance

A3/5—Operations, Plans & Requirements

A4/7—Logistics, Installations & Mission Support

A4L—Directorate of Logistics

A7C—The Civil Engineer

A7S—Security Forces & Force Protection

A8—Strategic Plans & Programs

A9—Studies & Analysis, Assessments & Lessons Learned

A10—Strategic Deterrence & Nuclear Integration

A10O—Operations & Integration Division

AAAHC—Accreditation Association for Ambulatory Healthcare

AA&E—Arms, Ammunition, & Explosive

AALPS—Automated Air Load Planning System

ABW—Air Base Wing

ACC—Air Combat Command

ACDE—Aircrew Chemical Defense Ensemble

ACES—Automated Civil Engineering System

ACF—Analysis, Correlation and Fusion

ACO—Airspace Control Order [AOC]

ACP—Airspace Control Plan [AOC]

AD—Active Duty

ADP—Airspace Defense Plan [AOC]

ADR—Airfield Damage Repair

AE—Aeromedical Evacuation

AECS—Automated Entry Control System

AECT—Aeromedical Evacuation Control Team [AOC]

AEF—Air and Space Expeditionary Force

AF—Air Force

AFAA—Air Force Audit Agency

AFE—Aircrew Flight Equipment

AFFARS—Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement [AOC]

AFFOR—Air Force Forces [AOC]

AFH—Air Force Handbook

AFI—Air Force Instruction

AFIA—Air Force Inspection Agency

AFIMS—Air Force Incident Management System

AFJI—Air Force Joint Instruction

AFMAN—Air Force Manual

AFMC—Air Force Materiel Command

AFMS—Air Force Medical Service

AFNGOSG—Air Force Nuclear General Officer Steering Group

AFNWC—Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center

AFOSH—Air Force Occupational & Environmental Safety, Fire Protection, & Health

AFOSI—Air Force Office of Special Investigations

AFPD—Air Force Policy Directive

AFRC—Air Force Reserve Command

AFRP—Air Force Recurring Publication

AFRIMS—Air Force Records and Information Management System

AFRP—Air Force Recurring Publication

AFSC—Air Force Specialty Code

AFSFC—Air Force Security Forces Center

AFSFC/SFO—Air Force Security Forces Center, Operations Division

AFSO21—Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century

AF/ST—Air Force Chief Scientist

AFVA—Air Force Visual Aid

AG—Auditor General

ALCT—Airlift Control Team [AOC]

AMC—Air Mobility Command

AMCT—Air Mobility Control Team [AOC]

ANG—Air National Guard

AOC—Air and Space Operations Center

AOD—Airspace Operations Directive [AOC]

AOR—Area of Responsibility

APO—Army Post Office

AQ—Acquisitions

AQR—Science, Technology, & Engineering

ARC—Air Reserve Component

ARCT—Air Refueling Control Team [AOC]

ARSW—Armament Systems Wing

ART—AEF Reporting Tool

AT—Antiterrorism

ATO—Air Tasking Order

ATSO—Ability To Survive and Operate

AW—Airlift Wing

BEEF—Base Engineer Emergency Force

BSART—Bomber Strategic Aircraft Reconstitution Team

BSAT—Biological Select Agents and Toxins

BW—Bomb Wing

C2—Command and Control

C3—Command, Control, and Communications

C4—Command, Control, Communications, and Computers

CA—Combat Assessment [AOC]

CARS—Corrective Action Report Status

CAS—Combat Ammunition System

CBDRT—Chemical Biological Defense Report

CBRN—Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

CC—Commander

CCA—Contamination Control Area

CCCA—Common Core Compliance Area

CCI—Critical Compliance Item

CCRC—Common Core Readiness Criteria

CDD—Capability Development Document

CEMP—Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan

CFETP—Career Field Education Training Plan

CI—Compliance Inspection

CII—Command Interest Item

CJCS—Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJCSI—Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

CMOS—Cargo Movement Operating System

NAF—Component-Numbered Air Force

COA—Course of Action

COCOM—Combatant Command [AOC]

COCSP—Contingency Operational Contracting Support Program [AOC]

COD—Combat Operations Division [AOC]

COMPUSEC—Computer Security

COMSEC—Communications Security

COOP—Continuity of Operations

COP—Community of Practice

CP—Command Post

CPD—Combat Plans Division [AOC]

CPI—Continuous Process Improvement

CSAF—Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

CSNI—Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations

CSW—Combat Support Wing

CTIP—Combating Trafficking In Person; also known as TIP – Trafficking In Persons

CV—Vice Commander

DCAPES—Deliberate Crisis Action Planning & Execution Segments

DCP—Disease Containment Plan

DEERS—Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System

DFARS—Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement

DIA—Defense Intelligence Agency

DMF—Deployed Medical Facility [AOC]

DMPI—Desired Mean Point of Impact [AOC]

DNSI—Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection

DOC—Designed Operational Capability

DOD—Department of Defense

DODD—Department of Defense Directive

DODI—Department of Defense Instruction

DOD IG—Inspector General, Department of Defense

DRF—Disaster Response Force

DRU—Direct Reporting Unit

DTRA—Defense Threat Reduction Agency

EAM—Emergency Action Message

EAP—Emergency Action Plan/Procedures

ECF—Entry Control Facility

EET—Exercise Evaluation Team

EM—Emergency Management

EO—Equal Opportunity

EOC—Emergency Operations Center

EOD—Explosive Ordnance Disposal

ESS—Electronic Security System

FAM—Functional Area Manager

FAR—Federal Acquisition Regulation

FES—Fire Emergency Services

FESAP—FES Assessment Program

FHP—Force Health Protection

FLAG—Forward Location Aircraft Generation

FM—Financial Management

FMFIA—Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act

FOA—Field Operating Agency

FOC—Full Operational Capability

FoF—Force-on-Force (exercise)

FOIA—Freedom of Information Act

FOUO—For Official Use Only

FRI—Federal Recognition Inspection

FSS—Force Support Squadron

FTX—Field Training Exercise

FVAP—Federal Voting Assistance Program

FW—Fighter Wing

FY—Fiscal Year

GC—General Counsel

GCCS—Global Command & Control System

GD—Guidance

GI & S—Geospatial Information and Services

GPC—Government Purchase Card

GSORTS—Global Status of Resources and Training System

HAF—Headquarters Air Force

HAZMAT—Hazardous Materials

HC—Chaplain Corps

HHQ—Higher Headquarters

HO—Historian

HQ—Headquarters

H.R.—House Record

HSI—Health Services Inspection

HVI—High Value Initiative

IAW—In Accordance With

IBDSS—Integrated Base Defense Security System

ICBM—Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

ICC—Installation Control Center (formerly known as Battle Staff or Wing Operations Center (WOC))

IDS—Intrusion Detection Systems

IE—Installation, Environment, & Logistics

IEPO—Installation Exercise Program Office

IG—Inspector General

IGDI—Inspector General Directed Inspection

IGEMS—Inspector General Evaluation Management System

IGI—Inspections Directorate

IGQ—Complaints Resolution Directorate

INFOSEC—Information Security

INSI—Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection

INTRO—Individual Newcomer Treatment & Orientation

IO—Inspections and Oversight Directorate

IPE—Individual Protective Equipment

ISR—Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance [AOC]

ISRD—ISR Division [AOC]

IT—Information Technology

IW—Information Warfare [AOC]

JA—Judge Advocate

JAOP—Joint Air Operations Plan [AOC]

JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff

JFACC—Joint Force Air Component Commander [AOC]

JFC—Joint Force Commander [AOC]

JIPOE—Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Environment [AOC]

JIPTL—Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List [AOC]

JOA—Joint Operations Area [AOC]

KNB—Key Nuclear Billet

LIMFAC—Limiting Factor

LL—Legislative Liaison

LNSI—Limited Nuclear Surety Inspection

LOAC—Law of Armed Conflict

LOGMOD—Logistics Module

LPS—Lightning Protection System

MAAP—Master Air Attack Plan [AOC]

MAJCOM—Major Command

MAOS—Minimum Airfield Operating Strip

MASO—Munitions Accountable Systems Officer

MCL—Maintenance Capability Letter

MCRP—Medical Contingency Response Plan

MGA—Major Graded Area

MICAP—Mission Capable

MILES—Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System

MMNSI—Multi-MAJCOM Nuclear Surety Inspection

MOE—Measures of Effectiveness

MOPP—Mission Oriented Protective Posture

MOU—Memorandum of Understanding

MR—Manpower & Reserve Affairs

MRSP—Management of the Readiness Spares Packages

MSK—Mission Support Kits

MTF—Military Treatment Facility

MUMG—Munitions Maintenance Group

MUNS—Munitions Squadron

MUNSS—Munitions Support Squadrons

MW—Missile Wing

MWD—Military Working Dog

NAF—Numbered Air Force

NATO—North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBCC—Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, & Conventional

NCCS—Nuclear Command & Control System

NDAA—National Defense Authorization Act

NEREP—Nuclear Execution & Reporting Plan

NFPA—National Fire Protection Agency

NGB—National Guard Bureau

NGB—IGD—National Guard Bureau, Deputy Inspector General

NLT—No Later Than

NOB—Nuclear Oversight Board

NORI—Nuclear Operational Readiness Inspection

NOSC—D—Network Operations and Security Center - Deployed [AOC]

NSG—Nuclear Systems Group

NSI—Nuclear Surety Inspection

NSIC—Nuclear Surety Inspector Course

NSS—Nuclear Systems Squadron

NSTCA—Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment

NWRM—Nuclear Weapons Related Materiel

NWSS—Nuclear Weapons Security Standard

NWTI—Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection

OAT—Operational Assessment Team

OCR—Office of Collateral Responsibility

OPFOR—Opposing Force

OPR—Office of Primary Responsibility

OPSEC—Operations Security

OPTASK LINK—Operational Tasking Data Link

ORF—Official Representation Fund

ORI—Operational Readiness Inspection

ORM—Operational Risk Management

OSD—Office of the Secretary of Defense

PA—Public Affairs

P&S—Plans & Scheduling

PBSA—Performance-based Services Acquisition

PDF—Personnel Deployment Function

PED—Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination

PERSCO—Personnel Support for Contingency Operations

PI—Process Integration

PNAF—Prime Nuclear Airlift Force

POC—Points of Contact

POW—Prisoners of War

PPR—Periodic Performance Review

PRE—Personnel Readiness Element

PRP—Personnel Reliability Program

PS—Personnel

PWS—Performance Work Statement

QA—Quality Assurance

RAP—Ready Aircrew Program

RCA—Root Cause Analysis

RDS—Records Disposition Schedule

RDT&E—Research, Development, Test and Evaluation

RED HORSE—Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineer

RF—Response Force

RIA—Recommended Improvement Area

RIBS—Readiness in Base Services

ROE—Rules of Engagement

RSP—Render Safe Procedures

SABC—Self-Aid Buddy Care

SAC—Semiannual Compendium

SAF—Secretary of the Air Force

SAPR—Sexual Assault Prevention & Response

SARC—Sexual Assault Response Coordinator

SB—Scientific Advisory Board

SD—Strategy Division [AOC]

SE—Safety

SECAF—Secretary of the Air Force

SEI—Special Emphasis Items

SERE—Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape

SEW—Weapons Safety Division

SF—Security Force

SG—Surgeon General

SGT—Strategy Guidance Team

SI—Surveillance Inspection

SII—Special Interest Item

SITREP—Situational Report

SME—Subject Matter Expert

SNCO—Senior Non-Commissioned Officer

SO—AFSO21

SOF—Special Operations Forces

SOLE—Special Operations Liaison Element

SORTS—Status of Resources & Training System

SPINS—Special Instructions

SPT—Strategy Plan Team

STINFO—Scientific & Technical Information

STO—Special Technical Operations [AOC]

STRIKEVAL—Strike Evaluation

TACC—Tanker Airlift Control Center

TACEVAL—Tactical Evaluation

TACOPDATA—Tactical Operations Data

TACS—Theater Air Control System [AOC]

TAP—Transition Assistance Program

TCNO—Time Compliance Network Order

TE—Test & Evaluation

TET—Target Effects Team

TIC—Toxic Industrial Chemical

TIG—The Inspector General

TIM—Toxic Industrial Material

TIP—Trafficking in Persons

T.O.—Technical Order

TPFDD—Time Phased Force Deployment Data

TPS—Transportation Protective Service

TSART—Tanker Strategic Aircraft Generation Team

TST—Time Sensitive Targeting [AOC]

TTP—Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

UCC—Unit Control Center

UCML—Unit Committed Munitions Lists

UCNI—Unclassified Nuclear Information

UIF—Unfavorable Information File

UMD—Unit Manning Document

UPMR—Unit Personnel Management Roster

US—United States

USAF—United States Air Force

USAFE—United States Air Forces in Europe

USC—United States Code

USSTRATCOM—United States Strategic Command

UTC—Unit Type Code

VA—Victim Advocates

VAP—Voting Assistance Program

WII—Wounded, Ill, and Injured

WIMS—Work Information Management System

WPM—Wood Packaging Material

WR—War Reserve

XC—Warfighting Integration & Chief Information Officer

Terms

Ability to Survive and Operate (ATSO)—The ability to conduct the full range of contingency operations while simultaneously responding to or recovering from enemy attack, state/non-state use of CBRN, major accidents, natural disasters, or Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT).

Air Force Emergency Management (EM) Program—The single, integrated Air Force program to coordinate and organize efforts to prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the direct and indirect consequences of an emergency or attack. The primary missions of the Air Force EM program are to (1) save lives, (2) minimize the loss or degradation of resources, and (3) continue, sustain, and restore combat and combat support operational capability in an all-hazards physical threat environment at Air Force installations worldwide. The ancillary missions of the Air Force EM program are to support homeland defense and civil support operations and to provide support to civil and host nation authorities IAW DOD

directives and through the appropriate Combatant Command. The Air Force EM program is managed by the Office of The Civil Engineer, AF/A7C. Previously known as Base Disaster Plan (BDP) and Full Spectrum Threat Response (FSTR).

Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO21)—An objective assessment of key Air Force processes focused on improvement. AFSO21 tools and techniques are applied to promote process improvement, eliminate waste, and create a feasible action plan.

Best Practice—A superior method or innovative practice that contributes significantly to improved performance of a process.

Compliance Inspection (CI)—Inspections conducted to assess areas mandated by law as well as mission areas that are critical or important to the health and performance of organizations. Unit failure to comply with the established directives in these areas could result in legal liabilities, penalties, or mission impact.

Compliance Major Graded Area (MGA)—Key processes, procedures, or requirements based on by-law requirements, executive orders, DOD directives (DODD), Air Force, MAJCOM, or applicable Air National Guard instructions.

Critical Deficiency—Any deficiency that results or could result in widespread mission impact or failure.

Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection (DNSI)—A Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI) conducted by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

Deficiency—A validated inspection finding or observation.

EXCELLENT—The grade given to indicate performance or operation exceeds mission requirements. Procedures and activities are carried out in a superior manner. Resources and programs are very efficiently managed and relatively free of deficiencies.

Federal Recognition Inspection (FRI)—An inspection conducted to confirm that a unit (the organized militia of a State) meets the qualifications prescribed for the organization and composition of the ANG.

IN COMPLIANCE—Program or operation complies with governing directives and supports mission accomplishment. Deficiencies may exist but do not impede mission accomplishment

IN COMPLIANCE WITH COMMENTS—Program or operation does not comply with all governing directives and does not meet some mission requirements. Deficiencies exist that impede or limit mission accomplishment

Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI)—An inspection to evaluate a unit's readiness to assume or resume a nuclear mission or to evaluate and certify new or significantly modified maintenance and storage facilities or significant changes to weapons systems or portions thereof.

Inspector General Directed Investigation (IGDI)—A high priority investigation directed by The Inspector General.

Limited Inspection—An inspection with a reduced scope and scale. Limited inspections do not reset the clock for maximum inspection intervals.

Limited Nuclear Surety Inspection (LNSI)—A limited scope inspection, which does not evaluate all NSI areas applicable to the unit. LNSIs do not alter the 18-month NSI requirement.

Limiting Factor (LIMFAC)—A factor or condition that, either temporarily or permanently, impedes mission accomplishment. Illustrative examples are transportation network deficiencies, lack of in-place facilities, malpositioned forces or materiel, extreme climatic conditions, distance, transit or overflight rights, political conditions, etc.

Significant Deficiency—A validated deficiency that has or could have significant mission impact.

MARGINAL—The grade given to indicate performance or operation does not meet some mission requirements. Procedures and activities are not carried out in an efficient manner. Resources and programs are not efficiently managed. Deficiencies exist that impede or limit mission accomplishment.

Minimal-Notice Inspection—An inspection conducted with less than 45 days notice to the inspected organization.

Minor Deficiency—A validated deficiency that does not meet the definition for a Critical or Significant Deficiency but requiring corrective action.

No-Notice Inspection—An inspection conducted with less than 72 hours notice to the inspected organization.

NOT IN COMPLIANCE—Program or operation does not comply with key elements of governing directives. Significant deficiencies exist that could result in legal liabilities, penalties, or significant mission impact.

Nuclear-Capable—A support designation that indicates a unit has the capability to support the reception, storage, or handling of nuclear WR. This designation does not confirm or deny the actual presence of assets.

Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI)—A compliance-based inspection conducted to evaluate a unit's ability to manage nuclear resources while complying with all nuclear surety standards.

Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI)—An evaluation of operational readiness or ability to conduct combat operations in wartime for any unit with a wartime mission.

OUTSTANDING—The grade given to indicate performance or operation far exceeds mission requirements. Procedures and activities are carried out in a far superior manner. Resources and programs are very efficiently managed and are of exceptional merit. Minimal deficiencies exist.

Readiness Major Graded Area (MGA)—Criteria that establish an Air Force-wide common readiness standard for evaluation of like units or organizations.

Recommended Improvement Area (RIA)—An identified process, product, or capability which could be improved by a suggested course of action. RIAs will not be used in lieu of minor deficiencies.

SATISFACTORY—The grade given to indicate performance or operation meets mission requirements. Procedures and activities are carried out in an effective and competent manner. Resources and programs are efficiently managed. Minor deficiencies may exist but do not impede or limit mission accomplishment.

Special Interest Item (SII)—An area of focus for management; used to gather data and assess the status of specific programs and conditions in the field.

Strength—An area that far exceeds compliance directives or mission requirements and/or expectations.

UNSATISFACTORY—The grade given to indicate performance or operation does not meet mission requirements. Procedures and activities are not carried out in an adequate manner. Resources and programs are not adequately managed. Significant deficiencies exist that preclude or seriously limit mission accomplishment.

Wartime Material Support (WMS)—The ability for a unit to accelerate its core-mission operations in response to a wartime contingency. Depending upon the type of inspected unit, the IG presents wartime scenarios requiring acceleration in the following areas: acquisition, test, science and technology, or depot operations.

Attachment 2

COMPONENT-NUMBERED AIR FORCE (C-NAF) READINESS INSPECTIONS

A2.1. Major Graded Areas (MGA) and Sub areas. The C-NAF includes the Air Force Forces staff, the commander's support staff, the Air and Space Operations Center and specialty teams assigned throughout the C-NAF. The C-NAF will be evaluated in three major areas: These MGAs reflect the operational level campaign phases and the ability to survive in the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear environment: Phase 0/1 Shape and Deter, Phase 2/3/4 Seize the Initiative, Dominate, and Stabilize and ATSO.

A2.1.1. Air and Space Operations Center (AOC). AOC activities will be evaluated throughout the spectrum of operations. Evaluate processes and systems for conducting coalition and collaborative theater-wide support planning and ATO planning and execution to include multi-level information classification and security, information sharing and distribution, collaborative procedures and tools.

A2.1.2. Air Force Forces Staff (AFFOR). AFFOR staff support activities will be evaluated in the area of Service Component Responsibilities and throughout the spectrum of operations. Evaluate processes and systems for conducting coalition and collaborative theater-wide support planning and execution to include multi-level information classification and security, information sharing and distribution, collaborative procedures and tools.

A2.2. Phase 0/1 Shape and Deter.

A2.2.1. Crisis Action Planning

A2.2.1.1. Evaluate C-NAF's effectiveness of those initial response actions performed by the AOC which effects the unit's ability to complete integrated crisis action planning process.

A2.2.1.2. Evaluate AFFOR staff integration of service support functions with AOC mission execution across all mission areas.

A2.2.1.3. Evaluate transition from Phase 0/1 activities to follow-on phases, to include staff appointments, augmentation training and policy, and an integrated planning function.

A2.2.1.4. Evaluate whether C-NAF adequately monitors combat readiness status and directs actions that posture assigned forces for combat operations.

A2.2.2. Deployment, Reception and Readiness Management

A2.2.2.1. Determine if the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) and AEF Reporting Tool (ART) reporting are timely, accurate, and properly classified.

A2.2.2.2. Evaluate reclama, UIC change, and waiver submission processes.

A2.2.2.3. Determine whether all required automated deployment systems are effectively used and properly managed.

A2.2.2.4. Evaluate all deployment planning functions.

A2.2.2.5. Evaluate all deployment execution activities (as applicable).

A2.2.2.6. Evaluate effectiveness of those initial response actions performed by the C-NAF which effects the deploying units' ability to respond to deployment taskings.

A2.2.2.7. Determine if deployment planning is comprehensive, timely, and responsive to theater-wide taskings.

A2.2.2.8. Determine if theater-wide transportation assets are used efficiently.

A2.2.2.9. Determine if the deployment process is efficiently, effectively, and safely executed.

A2.2.2.10. Determine whether all required automated deployment systems are effectively used and properly managed.

A2.2.3. Exercise Planning and Execution

A2.2.3.1. Evaluate Planning and Execution of Operational-Level Exercises.

A2.2.3.2. Evaluate development of AFFOR Operational-Level Exercise Requirements.

A2.2.3.3. Evaluate Facilitate Exercise Plan (EXPLAN) Development.

A2.2.3.4. Evaluate coordination of joint and multinational training opportunities.

A2.2.3.5. Evaluate Master Scenario Events List (MSEL) Development.

A2.2.3.6. Evaluate management of exercise modeling and simulation needs, including database development.

A2.2.3.7. Evaluate exercise after-action items.

A2.2.4. Joint Air Operations Planning

A2.2.4.1. Evaluate Theater war planning, Non-Combatant Evacuation, Humanitarian Assistance, Peacekeeping and Enforcement planning, TPFFD development, and AFFOR force requirements development.

A2.2.4.2. Evaluate service, joint and combined planning, force bed-down and sustainment.

A2.2.4.3. Evaluate deliberate/adaptive planning to include the development of a Force Flow/TPFDD and Service branch and sequel plans.

A2.2.4.4. Evaluate the development of appropriate Annexes to OPLANs and CONPLANs.

A2.2.4.5. Evaluate development/review of safety contributions to relevant plans.

A2.2.5. Theater Security Cooperation

A2.2.5.1. Evaluate the AFFOR's support to the CCDR's Theater Security Cooperation Program (TSCP).

A2.2.5.2. Evaluate coordination of the TSCP with country teams in US embassies and the level at which their efforts complement the Country Team's Mission Performance Plans.

A2.2.5.3. Evaluate the inclusion of the typical TSCP goals of support for alliances as the basis for regional security and the assurance of allies of US commitment to regional security.

A2.2.5.4. Evaluate the effectiveness of regional engagement and theater security cooperation activities such as Military Engagement, Exchanges and Exercise Programs to achieve CCDR TSC goals.

A2.2.6. C-NAF Training

A2.2.6.1. AFFOR Training. Evaluate locally developed AFFOR immersion training processes, OPG support and contingency/crisis response training.

A2.2.6.2. AOC Training. Evaluate whether all core AOC crewmembers (members identified on appropriate AOC UTC) obtain and maintain the qualification and proficiency needed to effectively perform their unit's mission.

A2.2.6.3. Assigned/Gained AOC Augmentation Training. Evaluate whether all gained associate unit, core AOC crewmembers (members identified on appropriate augmentation AOC UTCs) obtain and maintain the qualification and proficiency needed to effectively perform their unit's mission.

A2.2.6.4. Enabler Training. Evaluate local training program for enabler personnel. Ensure enabler training includes unit specific training and duty position training on the task assigned to the trainee. Ensure enabler training is properly documented.

A2.2.7. Commander's Special Staff Support.

A2.2.7.1. Protocol, as applicable.

A2.2.7.1.1. Evaluate support for distinguished visitors, ceremonies, conferences, official meetings and military social events.

A2.2.7.1.2. Evaluate observation of all pertinent host nation customs and courtesies as appropriate.

A2.2.7.1.3. Evaluate official visit objective development, coordination and tasked assignments, and DV itinerary dissemination.

A2.2.7.2. Staff Judge Advocate (SJA).

A2.2.7.2.1. Evaluate legal support for assigned units and forces.

A2.2.7.2.2. Evaluate establishment, monitoring and prioritization of JA ULN and UTC requirements.

A2.2.7.2.3. Evaluate formulation, dissemination and oversight of policy for the maintenance of good order and discipline among all assigned and attached military personnel and in handling military justice matters, including foreign criminal jurisdiction, and adverse actions under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

A2.2.7.2.4. Evaluate legal support on issues such as host-nation support, acquisition and cross-servicing agreements, international agreements, status of forces agreements, legal basis for operations, command structure, claims, support to civilian

agencies (including NGOs), contract law, fiscal law, basic legal assistance and civil law issues, as applicable.

A2.2.7.2.5. Evaluate legal support regarding the Law of Armed Conflict and ROE issues.

A2.2.7.2.6. Evaluate clarifications to Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) provisions, and dissemination to DoD, DoS, combatant commands, MAJCOMs, and NAFs.

A2.2.7.3. Public Affairs (PA).

A2.2.7.3.1. Evaluate ability of PA to provide candid and timely counsel to commanders.

A2.2.7.3.2. Evaluate execution of public affairs operations.

A2.2.7.3.3. Evaluate monitoring, coordination, support and relationships with regional and international news media representatives, to include embedded media representative requirements, media escort, and media ROE enforcement.

A2.2.7.3.4. Evaluate news media training program for deployed forces.

A2.2.7.3.5. Evaluate communications and coordination with the COMAFFOR's staff, other theater POLADs and U.S. Embassy Country Teams, interagency departments (State and OSD), and applicable non-governmental (NGO) and international (IO) organizations, as applicable.

A2.2.7.3.6. Evaluate research, coordination, assessments, and forecasts for political implications/ ramifications of operations, targeting, and/or deployments.

A2.2.7.3.7. Evaluate support to OPLAN/CONPLAN annex and IGESP preparation.

A2.2.7.4. Historian (HO).

A2.2.7.4.1. Evaluate the collection, organization, and preservation of historical data encompassing C-NAF mission accomplishment.

A2.2.7.4.2. Evaluate submission processes for all required reports.

A2.2.7.4.3. Evaluate coordination with all staff agencies, higher headquarters, liaisons, sister services, and outside agencies, US and foreign, on historical matters.

A2.2.7.5. Chaplain Corps (HC).

A2.2.7.5.1. Evaluate development of plans and programs for religious ministry for the free exercise of religion for all DOD personnel, prisoners of war, civilian detainees, and displaced persons.

A2.2.7.5.2. Evaluate plans and programs for pastoral crisis intervention, distribution of foreign humanitarian assistance, mass casualty situations, and cultural and religious influences that could impact mission accomplishment.

A2.2.7.5.3. Evaluate coordination with all staff agencies, higher headquarters, liaisons, sister services, and outside agencies, as applicable.

A2.2.7.5.4. Evaluate development, review, revision, and maintenance of chaplain plans and policies in concert with the Combatant Command Chaplain.

A2.2.7.6. Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP).

A2.2.7.6.1. Evaluate coordination with all C-NAF agencies, higher headquarters, liaisons, sister services, and outside agencies, and host nation representatives, as applicable.

A2.2.7.6.2. Evaluate programs for organizing, training, and equipping AT/FP/SF personnel.

A2.2.7.6.3. Evaluate coordination, formulation and dissemination of policy, guidance and requirements for force protection, civil defense, USAF base defense, and C-NAF repatriation procedures.

A2.2.7.6.4. Evaluate monitoring and analysis of threat intelligence and unit SITREPs for force protection issues.

A2.2.7.6.5. Evaluate formulation of courses of action for the commander to counter emerging threats.

A2.2.7.6.6. Evaluate support and participation with the Force Protection Working Group (FPWG).

A2.2.7.6.7. Evaluate assessment of friendly vulnerabilities and the threat's capabilities to exploit them.

A2.2.7.6.8. Evaluate identification of potential countermeasures to deny the threat access to friendly critical areas.

A2.2.7.6.9. Evaluate coordination, COA recommendations to COMAFFOR, and implementation of operations security (OPSEC) and force protection conditions (FPCON) measures.

A2.2.7.6.10. Evaluate support and participation with the Threat Working Group (TWG).

A2.2.7.6.11. Evaluate analyses of susceptibility of personnel and resources to the threat.

A2.2.7.6.12. Evaluate COA recommendations to COMAFFOR, contingency plan implementation, requests for forces to higher headquarters, equipment augmentation, or Force Protection Condition (FPCON) level declaration.

A2.2.7.6.13. Evaluate requirements for core membership and participation, to include a minimum of the AT/FP director, AFOSI, Intelligence Officer, Medical Officer, Chief of Security Forces and other agencies as required by the commander.

A2.2.7.7. Safety (SE).

A2.2.7.7.1. Evaluate required training and qualifications for all C-NAF assigned personnel.

A2.2.7.7.2. Evaluate coordination, implementation and dissemination of supplemental safety policies and procedures.

A2.2.7.7.3. Evaluate mishap prevention program, and oversight of flight, weapons and ground safety issues throughout the AOR.

A2.2.7.7.4. Evaluate conduct and maintenance of risk assessments of AOR activities and locations.

A2.2.7.7.5. Evaluate after action reports, inspection reports and mishap reports in order to assess the overall status of safety in the AOR for the COMAFFOR.

A2.2.7.7.6. Evaluate maintenance of mandatory publications, management of local safety supplements and compliance with AFIs.

A2.2.7.8. Surgeon General (SG).

A2.2.7.8.1. Evaluate all matters concerning medical capabilities, theater medical evacuation, medical supplies and equipment, medical plans, operations, medical policy and force health protection issues for assigned, attached and transiting USAF personnel.

A2.2.7.8.2. Evaluate the development, oversight and management of a deployed force health protection program that includes identification of disease and non-battle injury threats, occupational and environmental health risk assessment, employment of preventive countermeasures, and a comprehensive deployed health surveillance system.

A2.2.7.8.3. Evaluate access to theater blood supplies and blood transshipment centers to meet mission blood requirements.

A2.2.7.8.4. Evaluate assessment of host nation support health care capabilities, facilities, and development of memorandums of understanding, as applicable.

A2.2.7.9. Information Management Officer (IMO) and IMO support.

A2.2.7.9.1. Evaluate development of a Web Content Manager's Guide, web site infrastructure and the facilitation of the necessary information exchange throughout the organization.

A2.2.7.9.2. Evaluate guidance, procedures and effectiveness of collaborative tool usage.

A2.2.7.9.3. Evaluate supplemental operating instructions and checklists required to implement the IMP and ensure IM personnel are trained to perform their duties.

A2.2.7.9.4. Evaluate formulation, coordination, and dissemination of the COMAFFOR's Information Management Plan (IMP).

A2.2.7.9.5. Evaluate formulation, coordination and dissemination of all reporting requirements from command admin staffs and command and control elements of all subordinate units.

A2.2.7.9.6. Evaluate validation and management of Requests for Information (RFIs) and the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR).

A2.2.7.9.7. Evaluate coordination with the AOC Communications Support Team, C/JTF IMO, Joint Information Management Board (JIMB), and other component IMOs.

A2.2.7.9.8. Evaluate Information Management Board (IMB) coordination of COMAFFOR-level IM issues to solve information management problems, refine and tailor information processes, and develop information solutions in support of the COMAFFOR mission.

A2.2.7.9.9. Evaluate development of a matrix of mission critical systems to define each system's priority and to reflect current operations.

A2.2.7.9.10. Evaluate oversight of messaging services for the COMAFFOR to include Defense Messaging System (DMS).

A2.2.7.9.11. Evaluate procedures for maintaining the Master Action Suspense Log (MASL) and the Significant Events Log (SEL).

A2.3. Phase 2/3/4 - Seize the Initiative, Dominate, and Stabilize.

A2.3.1. Joint Air, Space, and Cyberspace Operations.

A2.3.1.1. Support to the Joint Force.

A2.3.1.1.1. Joint C2. Evaluate the AOC's ability to create desired effects at the appropriate time and place to accomplish the mission.

A2.3.1.1.2. Evaluate the TACS ability to provides persistent real-time C2 of the battlespace allowing for the C2 of active and passive defense capabilities that enable the JFC to effectively detect adversary actions: to assess accurately the actions in order to develop actionable intelligence; to warn friendly forces in a timely manner; to direct focused tasks in order to defend against adversary attacks, and when necessary, to recover in minimum time.

A2.3.1.1.3. Battlespace Awareness (BA). Evaluate the AOCs proficiency in processing and presenting information that ensures comprehension of the operational environment -- the status and dispositions of friendly, adversary, and nonaligned actors; and the impacts of physical, cultural, social, political, and economic factors on military operations.

A2.3.1.1.4. Decision Superiority (DS). Evaluate the AOC's ability to make better decisions arrived at and implemented faster than an opponent can react.

A2.3.1.1.5. Evaluate if commanders are able to rapidly develop alternative courses of action, communicate decisions to subordinates, generate required effects, assess results and conduct appropriate follow-on operations. The optimum result is the employment of tailored force packages that integrate Service core competencies for effective joint and combined operations.

A2.3.1.2. Strategy.

A2.3.1.2.1. Assess how the strategy division personnel support the achievement of theater objectives by developing, refining, disseminating, and assessing the JFACC air, space and cyberspace strategy.

A2.3.1.2.2. Evaluate processes which results in, but not limited to the JAOP, Air Operations Directive (AOD), ATO, Airspace Control Order (ACO), Special Instructions (SPINS) inputs, JFACC apportionment recommendation for the JFC, and

operational assessment summaries. In addition, SD branch plans and sequels as required.

A2.3.1.2.3. Evaluate ability of the Strategy Plans Team (SPT) to lead the AOC in the joint air estimate process and the associate development of the JAOP to include prioritized effects based targeting team.

A2.3.1.2.4. Assess ability of the Strategy Guidance Team (SGT) to assist in the AOC transition from operational level to tactical level planning.

A2.3.1.2.5. Evaluate the Operational Assessment Team's (OAT) ability to operate within all aspects of strategy development and execution, focusing on evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of air, space, and IO.

A2.3.1.3. Plans.

A2.3.1.3.1. Evaluate the processes which results in the following outputs to include, but not limited to, data inputs to the SD for the daily air apportionment recommendation; the JIPTL with selected Desired Mean Point of Impact (DMPI) for attack and collection requirements; Master Air Attack Plan (MAAP); ATO with SPINS; ACO; Airspace Defense Plan (ADP); Airspace Control Plan (ACP); Tactical Operations Data (TACOPDAT); Operational Tasking Data Link (OPTASK LINK); C2 Communications Plan; C2 Architecture Plan; Close Air Support Plan; and ISR Synchronization Matrix.

A2.3.1.3.2. Evaluate the Target Effects Team's (TET) ability to establish linkage between the JFACC's vision and its practical application through the use of JFACC assets to achieve desired kinetic and non-kinetic effects on adversary capabilities.

A2.3.1.3.3. Evaluate MAAP teams ability to synthesize AOD, JIPTL, threat situation, review forecast weather, weapon system availability, and weapon employment options to produce a synchronized MAAP.

A2.3.1.3.4. Assess the ATO Production Team's ability to construct, publish and disseminate the daily ATO and applicable SPINS to appropriate JTF forces, which tasks air and space capabilities and assets in accordance with the MAAP.

A2.3.1.3.5. Evaluate the C2 Planning Team's ability to compose Airspace Management air defense, C2 architecture, and C2 communications planning cells.

A2.3.1.4. Operations.

A2.3.1.4.1. Evaluate ability to control and adapt ATO tasked missions in support of JFACC objectives. Assess ability to quickly execute dynamic and time-sensitive targets as well as, convey ATO/ACO changes and other subsequent orders to subordinate C2 agencies and Installation Control Centers (ICC).

A2.3.1.4.2. Evaluate Offensive Operations Team's ability to monitor and adjust force application and support sorties/missions during ATO execution.

A2.3.1.4.3. Evaluate Defensive Operations Team's ability to provide management oversight of theater air defense operations by coordinating, monitoring, and commanding theater air control system (TACS) elements and air defense assets.

A2.3.1.4.4. Evaluate Senior Intelligence Duty Officer Team ability to provide situational awareness and predictive battle space analysis, targeting support, and monitor/adjust ISR employment in support of the CODs ATO execution process.

A2.3.1.4.5. Assess ability of the Interface Control Team to determine data link participants, their equipment capabilities and limitations and respective needs, design of the data link architecture and production of the OPTASK LINK.

A2.3.1.5. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.

A2.3.1.5.1. Evaluate intelligence products and services that support the entire AOC, JFACC, air component operational units, other components and joint/coalition forces.

A2.3.1.5.2. Evaluate Analysis, Correlation, and Fusion (ACF) Team ability to organize into appropriate Analytical and Unit Support Cells in order to obtain and provide predictive and actionable intelligence derived from fused, all-source intelligence data.

A2.3.1.5.3. Evaluate Targets/Combat Assessment (CA) Team ability to coordinate and conduct the targeting process, as well as apply ROE and JFACC objectives, operations plans, sortie allocation, target status, and attack results.

A2.3.1.5.4. Evaluate ISR Operations Team ability to develop ISR strategy and plans and executing those plans to satisfy theater intelligence requirements.

A2.3.1.5.5. Evaluate Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED) team's ability to implement, coordinate, and maintain PED support from units/agencies outside the AOC.

A2.3.1.5.6. Evaluate ISR ability to assign personnel to support the Strategy, Combat Plans, Combat Operations and Air Mobility Division (AMD) divisions.

A2.3.1.6. Mobility.

A2.3.1.6.1. Evaluate the ability to plan, coordinate, task, and execute the intra-theater air mobility mission and integrate the inter-theater air mobility mission supporting JFC objectives through coordination with the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC). Assess ability to interface with the JFC's Area of Responsibility (AOR) movement validation authority.

A2.3.1.6.2. Evaluate Airlift Control Team (ALCT) ability to plan intra-theater and coordinate inter-theater airlift operations in the AOR/joint operations area (JOA) for the JFACC.

A2.3.1.6.3. Evaluate Air mobility control team(AMCT) ability to execute intra-theater and monitor inter-theater airlift missions.

A2.3.1.6.4. Evaluate Air Refueling Control Team (ARCT) ability to coordinate inter-theater and plan and execute intra-theater air refueling missions.

A2.3.1.6.5. Evaluate Aeromedical Evacuation Control Team (AECT) ability to coordinate inter-theater and plan and execute intra-theater aeromedical evacuation missions.

A2.3.1.6.6. AMD Support Functions. Evaluate the ability of AMD support functions to provide the AMD with diverse capabilities to help orchestrate the theater air mobility mission.

A2.3.1.7. Special Teams/Support Functions.

A2.3.1.7.1. Evaluate the ability of specialty Teams' support functions to provide the C-NAF with diverse capabilities to help orchestrate theater air, space and cyberspace power.

A2.3.1.7.2. Evaluate Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE) ability to coordinate, integrate, and de-conflict all Special Operations Forces (SOF) air, surface, and subsurface activities with applicable JFACC activities and AOC processes.

A2.3.1.7.3. Evaluate IO Team ability to plan, coordinate, task, monitor, and assessment of IO capabilities to support the JFACC objectives and air and space operations. Specific IO team responsibility areas include Planning, ROE, Target Development, Network Warfare Operations, Information Assurance, Special IO, Operational Military Deception, Psychological Operations, Electronic Warfare Operations, Counterpropaganda, Counterintelligence, and Public Affairs.

A2.3.1.7.4. Evaluate JAG's ability to employ legal expertise and resources to control and exploit the legal environment across the full spectrum of operational missions in the AOC.

A2.3.1.7.5. Evaluate the knowledge of assigned personnel concerning their responsibilities under LOAC. Determine whether all personnel have received LOAC training. Determine if specialized training is provided to aircrews, medical personnel, and security forces. Assess timeliness and accuracy of advice supplied to commanders on LOAC issues.

A2.3.1.7.6. Evaluate ROE with regards to the requirements of US law, policy, and international law.

A2.3.1.7.7. Determine if legal support is adequate for wartime and contingency operations.

A2.3.1.7.8. Evaluate the availability of legal assistance for deploying personnel.

A2.3.1.7.9. Evaluate JFACC use of applicable LOAC and ROEs for target recommendations including, but not limited to, JFC restricted and/or no-strike lists for the AOR.

A2.3.1.7.10. Evaluate Weather Support Team to collect, tailor, and report weather information to meet short, medium, and long-range mission needs for each AOC division, specialty/support functions, and JFACC staff.

A2.3.1.7.11. Evaluate Combat Support Team ability to provide logistical support and logistical systems for AOC requirements; and maintain the most current information for changes in force structure in the movement of critical combat material in the AOR

A2.3.1.7.12. Evaluate Knowledge Operations Management Team to design/execute Air Component's information flow strategy plan and the use of the information infrastructure to support the commander's needs for relevant and timely information.

A2.3.1.7.13. Evaluate, if responsible, the Rescue Coordination Center ability to coordinate joint personnel recovery tasks in the areas report, locate, support, recover, reintegrate in support of the Chief Combat Operations.

A2.3.1.7.14. Evaluate Special Technical Operations (STO) cell ability to develop integrated conventional operations that produce synergistic effects in the overall battle plan based on JFACC objectives.

A2.3.1.7.15. Evaluate DIRSPACEFOR ability in establishing and prioritizing military space requirements required by the JFACC and the policies for employing space capabilities in the AOR.

A2.3.1.7.16. Evaluate DIRMOBFOR ability to facilitate integration of inter-theater missions with intra-theater missions, coordinate with theater movement validation authority as required, and coordinate with AOC Director to integrate and de-conflict air mobility operations into the air and space assessment, planning, and execution processes.

A2.3.2. Service Component Responsibilities

A2.3.2.1. Personnel

A2.3.2.1.1. Evaluate the timeliness and accuracy of all personnel reports and supporting documents.

A2.3.2.1.2. Evaluate total force accountability; personnel policy, procedures, and implementation; and manpower requirements.

A2.3.2.1.3. Evaluate all matters concerning unit replacement plans and status of all components.

A2.3.2.1.4. Evaluate casualty reporting procedures.

A2.3.2.1.5. Evaluate C-NAF's augmentation program.

A2.3.2.1.6. Evaluate operation and maintenance of contingency manpower and personnel management systems.

A2.3.2.1.7. Evaluate representation and participation at all planning activities to include groups, boards, and cells to provide manpower and personnel expertise for current and future operations.

A2.3.2.1.8. Evaluate coordination of all theater food service, mortuary affairs, lodging and field exchange requirements/activities.

A2.3.2.1.9. Evaluate coordination of morale, welfare, and recreation activities.

A2.3.2.1.10. Evaluate administration of USAF non-appropriated funds.

A2.3.2.2. Intelligence.

A2.3.2.2.1. Evaluate intelligence analysis.

A2.3.2.2.2. Evaluate intelligence support to ISR operations; all assigned/attached intelligence units in theater; to deliberate, contingency and exercise planning; and planning and programming.

A2.3.2.2.3. Evaluate intelligence coordination and support policies with HHQ, combatant command, national intelligence agencies, AF organizations, etc.

A2.3.2.2.4. Evaluate intelligence system support and intelligence related Foreign Disclosure information.

A2.3.2.2.5. Evaluate management of intelligence manpower and personnel.

A2.3.2.2.6. Evaluate management and readiness of intelligence resources.

A2.3.2.2.7. Evaluate management of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) programs.

A2.3.2.2.8. Evaluate policy and direction for intelligence activities.

A2.3.2.2.9. Evaluate representation and participation on Threat Working Group (TWG), Force Protection Working Group (FPWG), Operations Planning Group (OPG), and Long-Range Planning Group (LRPG).

A2.3.2.3. Operations.

A2.3.2.3.1. Evaluate implementation of Air Force policy for air, space, cyberspace and information operations.

A2.3.2.3.2. Evaluate management of AFFOR operational related resources

A2.3.2.3.3. Evaluate Crisis Action Planning (Adaptive Planning) processes.

A2.3.2.3.4. Evaluate identification of operational requirements and coordination with other agencies/units/services/HHQ elements for fulfilling those requirements.

A2.3.2.3.5. Evaluate requirement validation, sourcing, and beddown of operational assets with the appropriate force provider staff.

A2.3.2.3.6. Evaluate reporting and planning guidance on consumable requirements (munitions, POL, etc.).

A2.3.2.3.7. Evaluate dissemination to appropriate units of changes in operations, deployment, or mission.

A2.3.2.3.8. Evaluate oversight of theater weapons and tactics issues of assigned/attached operational units.

A2.3.2.3.9. Evaluate functional oversight of all weather support to COMAFFOR and staff for deployment, mission execution, and redeployment; and deployed Air Force forces supporting the air and ground components.

A2.3.2.3.10. Evaluate management and prioritization of intra-theater deployment/redeployment activities.

A2.3.2.3.11. Evaluate oversight of Special Tactics Office (STO), Military Deception (MILDEC), IW, and OPSEC programs.

A2.3.2.3.12. Evaluate awareness, timeliness and reporting of information on the number and location of all friendly air and space assets.

A2.3.2.4. Logistics.

A2.3.2.4.1. Evaluate oversight, integration and operational level long- and short-range planning for and management of all logistics capabilities and activities for deploying units and the AOC.

A2.3.2.4.2. Evaluate monitoring, assessment, planning, status reporting and execution oversight of creation, positioning, generation, sustainment, recovery, and reconstitution of forces in support of global Air Force and Combatant Commander missions.

A2.3.2.4.3. Evaluate planning and coordination of aircraft and munitions beddown, maintenance supportability and integration issues.

A2.3.2.4.4. Evaluate identification, coordination and monitoring of logistics support requirements.

A2.3.2.4.5. Evaluate formulation and implementation of logistics support guidance, policy and plans.

A2.3.2.4.6. Evaluate preparation of logistics estimates and their use toward development, analysis, comparison and recommendation of COAs.

A2.3.2.4.7. Evaluate preparation of all logistics reports and the logistics input to the daily Situation Report (SITREP).

A2.3.2.4.8. Evaluate coordination of logistics support requirements and activities with other services/supporting agencies/deploying units/HHQ elements.

A2.3.2.4.9. Evaluate activities of liaisons (LNOs) to the AOC, combatant commander, J/C-staff, land and maritime components, and supporting agencies, as applicable.

A2.3.2.4.10. Evaluate management of host nation support, acquisition and cross-servicing agreements, and support agreements programs.

A2.3.2.4.11. Evaluate monitoring of Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) execution and beddown of personnel and assets.

A2.3.2.4.12. Evaluate planning and management of reception of forces, including reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSO & I).A2.3.2.4.13. Evaluate support to all cross-functional teams, as required.

A2.3.2.5. Plans and Requirements.

A2.3.2.5.1. Evaluate cross-functional coordination, movement and execution planning for all campaign phases.

A2.3.2.5.2. Evaluate integration of AFFOR execution planning efforts with J/CTF/Combatant Commander, multinational, and Service staffs throughout the campaign.

A2.3.2.5.3. Evaluate formulation and dissemination of foreign disclosure guidance.

A2.3.2.5.4. Evaluate facilitation of AFFOR component OPORD, CONOPS, and/or supporting plan development.

A2.3.2.5.5. Evaluate development of relevant branch plans and sequel plans.

A2.3.2.5.6. Evaluate cross-functional coordination and determination of assigned/attached units' beddown requirements.

A2.3.2.5.7. Evaluate collaborative planning efforts with the J/CFC/Combatant Commander and the coalition and service staffs in coordination with the AOC.

A2.3.2.5.8. Evaluate the requirements identification and prioritization processes.

A2.3.2.5.9. Evaluate the monitoring and assessments of events outside the JOA and current operations for present mission and post-hostility impacts.

A2.3.2.6. Communications.

A2.3.2.6.1. Evaluate monitoring, sustainment, protection, integration, and management of USAF networks in support of battlespace awareness across the range of military operations through timely and accurate dissemination of relevant information.

A2.3.2.6.2. Evaluate coordination with supporting theater C4 control center, theater network operations center, service network operations and security center, AOC communications focal point, and the AOC IO specialty team.

A2.3.2.6.3. Evaluate recommended COAs for COMAFFOR and C/JFACC consideration for countering emerging enterprise threats.

A2.3.2.6.4. Evaluate information management and postal planning support for deployed units.

A2.3.2.6.5. Evaluate formulation, dissemination and implementation of COMAFFOR communications and information policies.

A2.3.2.6.6. Evaluate frequency allocation and assignment compliance with technical parameters outlined under host-nation agreements, as applicable.

A2.3.2.6.7. Evaluate systems control (SYSCON) monitoring, troubleshooting and reporting of all communication assets/issues, mission systems, and connectivity supporting Air Force forces.

A2.3.2.6.8. Evaluate essential communication link architecture (secure and non-secure) with other services/supporting agencies/deploying units/HHQ elements.

A2.3.2.7. Installations and Mission Support.

A2.3.2.7.1. Evaluate overall COMAFFOR installation support functions/requirements and liaison activities with support functions of other components and the JTF.

A2.3.2.7.2. Evaluate monitoring, awareness, and dissemination of civil engineering and installation mission support matters that affect the accomplishment of COMAFFOR missions.

A2.3.2.7.3. Evaluate coordination of all Security Forces and AT/FP readiness requirements/activities.

A2.3.2.7.4. Evaluate coordination of all theater firefighting, EOD, and CBRNE readiness requirements/activities.

A2.3.2.7.5. Evaluate contractor identification in the theater, as applicable, and monitoring of contractor support activities.

A2.3.2.7.6. Evaluate coordination for other service regional wartime construction management support, contracting support, and real estate activities.

A2.3.2.7.7. Evaluate establishment of Expeditionary Regional Contracting Center (ERCC), as applicable.

A2.3.2.7.8. Evaluate cross-coordination and beddown of all USAF component forces, as applicable.

A2.3.2.7.9. Evaluate CBRNE Warning and Reporting procedures, capabilities, and activities including reporting up to the next higher component.

A2.3.2.7.10. Determine if contracting support is adequate for wartime and contingency operations.

A2.3.2.7.11. Evaluate ability to execute expedited contracting procedures in a contingency environment in accordance with Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFFARS) Appendix CC – Contingency Operational Contracting Support Program (COCSP).

A2.3.2.8. Analysis and Assessments.

A2.3.2.8.1. Evaluate program assessment and coordinated resource inputs to the supporting MAJCOM's Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process.

A2.3.2.8.2. Evaluate joint-related liaison processes and activities.

A2.3.2.8.3. Evaluate the inputs provided relating to all HQ USAF-generated Program Change Requests (PCRs), which affect force structure or manpower in purview.

A2.3.2.8.4. Evaluate compliance with program guidance issued by MAJCOM and HQ USAF, and the direction and guidance provided to subordinate commanders.

A2.3.2.8.5. Evaluate liaison activities with COCOM and C/JTF operational analysis and lessons learned functions, and reach-back efforts to coordinate with other US Air Force analytic and lessons learned organizations.

A2.3.2.8.6. Evaluate analytical support to deliberate and crisis action planners, including COA analysis.

A2.3.2.8.7. Evaluate support to the operational assessment team (OAT) in the AOC strategy division, and for projects outside the OAT scope.

A2.3.2.8.8. Evaluate collection, validation, dissemination and publication of lessons observed and learned.

A2.3.2.8.9. Evaluate facilitation of after-action reviews/reports and issue resolution for operations and exercises.

A2.3.2.8.10. Evaluate analytic support for exercise and training programs.

A2.3.3. **Ability To Survive And Operate (ATSO).**

A2.3.3.1. Evaluate the C-NAF's ability to meet Air Force standards for mission sustainment and mission capability restoration in mature theaters or austere regions following a chemical, biological, or conventional attack. All C-NAF personnel shall demonstrate the tasks and/or technical operations required to accomplish their theater-wide mission responsibilities in the expected threat environment at each level of command responsibility, from deployment to full wartime contingency operations at each base assigned to their control. All situations and coordination with assigned forces will be evaluated. Efforts will be expected to resolve or work around existing shortfalls when full response control is limited. Inspection focus is based on force location and combat situation of C-NAF personnel and assigned forces, as the contingency develops. Force survival activities will be evaluated in the area of ATSO; and the sub-areas of: Command and Control, Planning, Threat and Security Protection, Force Sustainability, and Information and Cyber Security.

A2.3.3.2. Operational Planning.

A2.3.3.2.1. Evaluate formulation, coordination, dissemination, and enforcement of pre-, trans-, and post-attack reporting requirements from all subordinate assigned/attached units.

A2.3.3.2.2. Evaluate the ability of the C-NAF to implement actions to save lives, protect resources, recover from attacks, and restore mission capability throughout the area of responsibility.

A2.3.3.2.3. Evaluate the formulation, coordination, and dissemination of an C-NAF CBRNE defense plan, to include C-NAF facilities, Co-located Operating Base (COB) resources and all subordinate assigned/attached personnel throughout the area of responsibility.

A2.3.3.2.4. Evaluate if the theater-wide CBRNE defense plan identifies integrated tasks and assigns responsibilities to implement pre-, trans-, and post-attack response and sustainment actions. Determine if the plans include support provided to or received from joint service or host nation forces.

A2.3.3.2.5. Evaluate the ability of the C-NAF to prepare for and implement actions to protect bases, personnel, and resources from CBRNE weapons effects.

A2.3.3.2.6. Evaluate the serviceability and access to individual protective equipment (IPE).

A2.3.3.2.7. Evaluate the personnel's knowledge of CBRNE concept of operations.

A2.3.3.2.8. Evaluate the plan to provide permanent and expedient hardening protection for theater assigned and deployed forces.

A2.3.3.3. Threat and Security Protection.

A2.3.3.3.1. Evaluate the ability to receive and disseminate information through the installation and theater NBC defense warning and reporting system.

A2.3.3.3.2. Evaluate the theater-wide adequacy, serviceability, and sustainment capability of available NBC detection and monitoring equipment. Evaluate the ability to deploy, operate, and maintain the NBC detection and reporting system.

A2.3.3.3.3. Evaluate the adequacy of contamination avoidance plans and material (e.g., plastic sheet, covers, tarps) stocks, based on the CBRNE threat. Evaluate the ability to implement pre- and post-attack contamination avoidance measures.

A2.3.3.3.4. Evaluate the adequacy of theater-wide contaminated waste collection, control, and disposal capability and the ability to implement contaminated waste collection actions.

A2.3.3.4. Force Sustainability.

A2.3.3.4.1. Evaluate the ability of assigned personnel's ability to react to FPCON, MOPP, and alarm condition changes and respond to attacks without prior warning.

A2.3.3.4.2. Evaluate the ability of individuals to perform self-aid/buddy care.

A2.3.3.4.3. Joint Service or Host Nation. Evaluate the theater-wide ability to integrate with assigned or attached joint service or host nation CBRNE defense forces and support installation or theater missions.

A2.3.3.4.4. Evaluate the theater-wide ability to protect (e.g., IPE, collective protection, hardening, evacuation) DOD civilian and contract personnel not designated as emergency essential.

A2.3.3.4.5. Evaluate the ability to protect (e.g., IPE, collective protection, hardening, evacuation) enemy prisoners of war, retained personnel, civilian internees, and other detainees in Air Force custody.

A2.3.3.4.6. Evaluate the theater-wide ability to conduct integrated response operations, restore mission capability, and sustain operations.

A2.3.3.4.7. Evaluate the theater-wide adequacy of personnel accountability and replacement actions.

A2.3.3.4.8. Evaluate the theater-wide adequacy of CBRNE defense individual and team equipment stock levels to support sustained operations.

A2.3.3.4.9. Evaluate the theater-wide actions required to re-supply critical CBRNE defense equipment.

A2.3.3.5. Information and Cyber Security.

A2.3.3.5.1. Evaluate the use of approved AOC baseline and extensions

A2.3.3.5.2. Evaluate measures to protect critical information and information systems.

A2.3.3.5.3. Evaluate Operations Security.

A2.3.3.5.4. Evaluate the security of information systems.

A2.3.3.5.5. Evaluate that timely and reliable communications links and local area networks are established and available.

A2.3.3.5.6. Evaluate the compatibility and interoperability of communications systems with other units, commands, and services, as well as national or theater compatibility.

A2.3.3.5.7. Evaluate all back-up communications and computer systems to ensure adequate support to primary mission and/or command and control.

A2.3.3.5.8. Evaluate the C4 restoration plan and the unit's ability to execute the plan.

A2.3.3.5.9. Evaluate the emergency action procedures and ability to execute.

A2.3.3.5.10. Evaluate deployed communications-computer capabilities and support equipment meet mission requirements.

A2.3.3.5.11. Evaluate the mediation plans for resolving Critical Infrastructure Program (CIP)-related problems affecting their mission assurance.

Attachment 3

INITIAL NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR MAJOR NUCLEAR MISSION CHANGES

Table A3.1. Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection Requirements for Major Nuclear Mission Changes.

	A	B	C	D	E
Item	Reason	Primary Unit Functions Affected	Type of Inspection	When Inspected	Remarks
1.	Assume nuclear mission (new unit or new mission).	All unit functions.	INSI	Before introducing WR weapons into the unit.	For non-phased INSIs, begin 18-month NSI cycle at INSI completion. For phased INSIs, begin18-month NSI cycle at completion of phase 1.
2.	Resume nuclear mission following decertification.	As specified by MAJCOM commander.	INSI	Before resuming nuclear operations.	Conduct NSI within 180 days of INSI completion (see Note 4).
3.	Geographic relocation of unit (non-contingency)	All unit functions.	INSI	Before introducing WR weapons into the unit.	For non-phased INSIs, begin 18-month NSI cycle at INSI completion. For phased INSIs, begin18-month NSI cycle at completion of phase 1.
4	Certifying new or significantly - modified maintenance, storage or operational facilities (ex. WSA/WS3, launch facility, etc)	As specified by MAJCOM commander (see Note 5).	INSI	Before introducing WR weapons into the new or modified facility.	INSI may be included as part of a scheduled NSI. Evaluate design, construction, security, and procedures (see Note 1).
5.	Certifying new or significantly - modified maintenance, storage or	As specified by MAJCOM commander (see Note 5).	INSI	Before introducing WR weapons into the new or modified	INSI may be included as part of a scheduled NSI. Evaluate design, construction, security policies, and procedures

	operational facility security systems (ex. WS3, IDS, launch facility security system, etc)			facility.	(see Note 2).
6	Activating new PNAF unit.	All unit functions.	INSI	Before conducting any operations involving WR weapons.	When changing PNAF squadrons within a wing, wing agencies do not require reevaluation during the INSI if their support functions remain unchanged by the squadron conversion.
7	New weapon type or significant weapon modification.	As specified by MAJCOM commander (see Note 5).	INSI	Before receiving the first new/modified WR weapon.	INSI may be included as part of a scheduled NSI.
8	New type of delivery system.	As specified by MAJCOM commander (see Note 5).	INSI	Before loading or mating WR weapon to new delivery system.	INSI may be included as part of a scheduled NSI.
9	Initially certify or recertify a unit assigned a contingency nuclear mission.	As specified by MAJCOM commander (see Note 5).	INSI (see Note 3)	Before conducting or deploying to conduct any operations involving WR weapons, to include, maintenance, operations, security, or command and control activities.	If the unit deploys and handles WR weapons during exercises, accomplish the inspection 90 calendar-days before deployment.

1. An INSI may be conducted on one or more facilities that are typical of new construction at a base. If no other similar structures or facilities are modified after the INSI of typical structures, an inspection of other structures or facilities is not required. If new structures or facilities are located in a specific area (alert area or weapons storage area) and all of the area is affected, inspect the entire area after construction is completed.

2.   An INSI of new security intrusion detection systems is required after satisfactory completion of the Phase III testing. Significantly modified intrusion detection systems must be recertified by an INSI. Significant modifications include added, removed, or modified sensors not part of the original certified system, change to source code on computer based intrusion detection system, or installation of new software (this does not include upgrades to existing software that have been properly certified). The responsible MAJCOM/IG must certify the system for operational use.

3.   An INSI is required if the unit is being certified for the first time for its contingency nuclear mission or if the 18-month certification is expired. An LNSI may be conducted (in lieu of a NSI) if the unit had a NSI within 18 months, but a subordinate unit requires certification. (EXAMPLE: A wing with two combat delivery squadrons tasked for a contingency nuclear capability receives an INSI, but only one of its two squadrons is certified. An LNSI may be accomplished if the second combat delivery squadron is subsequently tasked to demonstrate capability and the required certification inspection occurs within 18 months of the wing's last inspection. Under these circumstances, the MAJCOM inspection team, in coordination with HQ AFSC and concerned HHQ functionals, will decide whether to accomplish an LNSI or NSI.)

4.   An INSI is required if the unit has not had a NSI within the 18-month requirement unless a waiver to inspection frequency was approved by the MAJCOM/CC (refer to paragraph **5.5.1.1.1.**). The unit will be decertified and cease all nuclear critical tasks until the INSI is complete. The MAJCOM/CC is responsible for ensuring the safety and security of all nuclear assets during the interim period between decertification and recertification.

5.   Scope of required inspection will be determined by the responsible MAJCOM functional(s) in coordination with HQ AFSC and documented IAW paragraph **5.4.**

Attachment 4

NUCLEAR INSPECTION MESSAGES AND SUMMARIES

NOTE 1: Send messages via email. Consider message classification, NIPRNet vs. SIPRNet, digital signature and digital encryption protection.

NOTE 2: MAJCOMs may supplement information contained in this attachment.

NOTE 3: These messages are not a substitute for a final inspection report.

A4.1. Nuclear Inspection Initiation Notification (aka "Kick-off Message").

Table A4.1. Nuclear Inspection Initiation Notification (aka "Kick-off Message").

FROM: MAJCOM/IG or Team Chief

    TO: Inspected Unit/CC

    CC: MAJCOM/CC/CV (or appropriate staff)

             Numbered Air Force/CC, if applicable (or appropriate staff)

        All recipients in Table 5.1., Group 1

SUBJECT: Nuclear Inspection Initiation Notification for INSI for [unit/dates] (Classification) or

          Nuclear Inspection Initiation Notification of NSI for [unit/dates] (Classification) or

          Nuclear Inspection Initiation Notification of LNSI for [unit/dates] (Classification)

          Nuclear Inspection Initiation Notification of NORI for [unit/dates] (Classification)

1. (Classification) INSPECTION AUTHORITY: The [MAJCOM] IG Team is conducting a/an [no-notice, minimal-notice, scheduled] [INSI, NSI, LNSI, NORI] of the [unit and base] on [inclusive dates] in accordance with AFI 90-201. The inspection Team Chief is [grade and name].

2. (Classification) OVERVIEW: Provide brief summary of the areas or list of MGAs to be inspected. An executive summary of the inspection results will be released after the unit outbrief currently scheduled for DD-Mmm-YY and prior to IG Team departure.

3. (Classification) OVERSIGHT: List oversight agencies (if any)

A4.2. Executive Summary for Nuclear Surety Inspections.

Table A4.2. Executive Summary for Nuclear Surety Inspections.

[**NOTE:** This summary may contain information not appropriate for public release. This message will not be used as a substitute for HHQ Public Affairs or MAJCOM/PA guidance.]

FROM: MAJCOM/IG or Team Chief

    TO: Inspected Unit/CC

    CC: MAJCOM/CC/CV (or appropriate staff)

Numbered Air Force/CC, if applicable (or appropriate staff)

All recipients in Table 5.1., Group 1

SUBJECT: Executive Summary of INSI for [unit/dates] (Classification) or

Executive Summary of NSI for [unit/dates] (Classification) or

Executive Summary of LNSI for [unit/dates] (Classification)

1. (Classification) REFERENCES: (Include all applicable documents; e.g., for re-inspections, refer to report and date of the previous inspection.)

2. (Classification) INSPECTION AUTHORITY: The [MAJCOM] IG Team conducted an [INSI, NSI, or LNSI] of the [unit and base] on [inclusive dates] according to AFI 90-201. The inspection Team Chief was [grade and name].

3. (Classification) OVERVIEW: Provide a brief overview of systems inspected and areas observed.   Report deficiencies in paragraph 6 below, if applicable.

4. (Classification) UNIT INSPECTION RATING: [overall unit rating]. Provide amplifying comments if desired.

5. (Classification) Major Graded Area Ratings; provide amplifying comments if desired.

5.1. Management and Administration:

5.2. Technical Operations:

5.3. Tools, Test, Tiedown and Handling Equipment:

5.4. Condition of Stockpile:

5.5. Storage and Maintenance Facilities:

5.6. Security:

5.7. Safety:

5.8. Supply Support:

5.9. Personnel Reliability Program (PRP):

5.10. Logistics Movement:

5.11. Explosive Ordnance Disposal:

5.12. Nuclear Control Order Procedures:

5.13. Emergency Exercises:

5.14. Use Control:

6. (Classification) DEFICIENCIES: Identify any critical and/or significant deficiencies that contributed to a less than SATISFACTORY overall unit rating.

7. (Classification) CERTIFICATION STATUS: Provide [MAJCOM]/CC's certification decision. If an overall UNSATISFACTORY rating was awarded, provide [MAJCOM]/CC's decision regarding unit certification status and any compensatory/mitigating actions directed/implemented to alleviate any nuclear surety degrade pending re-inspection of deficient

area(s).

8. (Classification) OVERSIGHT: List oversight agencies (if any).

9. (Classification) OTHER INFORMATION: If inspection was conducted in concert with another inspection agency, provide the overall rating assigned by the other agency(ies).

A4.3. Executive Summary Format for Nuclear Operational Readiness Inspections.

Table A4.3. Executive Summary Format for Nuclear Operational Readiness Inspections.

[**NOTE:** This summary may contain information not appropriate for public release. This message will not be used as a substitute for HHQ Public Affairs or MAJCOM/PA guidance.]

FROM: MAJCOM/IG or Team Chief

   TO: Inspected Unit/CC

   CC: MAJCOM/CC/CV (or appropriate staff)

            Numbered Air Force/CC, if applicable (or appropriate staff)

            All recipients in Table 5.1., Group 1

SUBJECT: Executive Summary of NORI for [unit/dates] (Classification)

1. (Classification) REFERENCE: (Include all applicable documents; e.g., for re-inspections, refer to the message report and date of the previous inspection.)

2. (Classification) INSPECTION AUTHORITY: The [MAJCOM] IG Team conducted a NORI of the [unit and base] on [inclusive dates] according to AFI 90-201. The inspection Team Chief was [grade and name].

3. (Classification) Provide overview of systems inspected and areas observed. Report deficiencies in paragraph 6 below, if applicable.

4. (Classification) UNIT INSPECTION RATINGS: [overall unit rating]. Provide amplifying comments if desired.

4A. (Classification) FORCE GENERATION: [Use 5-tier rating scale, OUTSTANDING, EXCELLENT, SATISFACTORY, MARGINAL or UNSATISFACTORY]

4B. (Classification) EMPLOYMENT: [Use 5-tier rating scale, OUTSTANDING, EXCELLENT, SATISFACTORY, MARGINAL or UNSATISFACTORY]

4C. (Classification) RECONSTITUTION: [Use 5-tier rating scale, OUTSTANDING, EXCELLENT, SATISFACTORY, MARGINAL or UNSATISFACTORY] or N/A

5. (Classification) LIMITING FACTORS: If any, describe each problem and indicate its effect on the unit mission. Identify the functional manager responsible for corrective action and indicate if the support organization or higher command failed to provide required support. Describe corrective action taken during the inspection.

6. (Classification) CRITICAL/SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES: (If any, describe as in paragraph 5 above. Identify any deficiency that has a significant impact on nuclear surety or is a

RY rating. Include appropriate references and describe any corrective action taken during the inspection.)

7. (Classification) OTHER SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION: Include MAJCOM special subjects related to nuclear surety that were evaluated. Identify any oversight agency in attendance. Provide statements from any oversight agency, as applicable.

Attachment 5

AF NUCLEAR WEAPON SECURITY INSPECTION GUIDE

A5.1. Utilization. The inspection areas and items in this guide identify minimum-security standards and capabilities outlined in DOD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108. When assessing whether a unit complies with applicable technical criteria, inspectors use this guide to identify areas/items to conduct performance test(s), compliance validation, or security exercises. Inspectors also use this guide during security exercises to assess how applicable areas/items contribute to a unit's ability to meet the NWSS and provide effective response to emergencies. Inspectors will use the published Integrated Base Defense Security System (IBDSS) Capability Development Document (CDD) to inspect applicable technology listed in this guide.

Table A5.1. AF Nuclear Weapons Security Inspection Guide.

Inspection Subareas & Items	Inspection Methodology P=Performance Testing C=Compliance Validation E=Security Exercises		
Detection and Delay			
Item: Detection Capability/Electronic Security System (ESS)			
- ESS Program Management	P	C	E
- ESS Configuration & Integration	P	C	
- ESS Maintenance	P	C	
- System Performance Criteria (see IBDSS CDD)	P	C	E
- Approach, Perimeter & Interior Detection	P	C	E
- Video Motion/Object Detection	P		E
- Remote Visual Assessment	P		E
- Duress Alarm	P		E
- Long Range Assessment	P		E
- Annunciator & Display Equipment	P	C	E
- Remote Annunciator & Redundant Display	P		E
- Transmission Line Security	P	C	
- Periodic System Testing & Records	P	C	
- System Validation &/or Revalidation (as applicable)	P	C	
Item: Active & Passive Delay (Area/Facility/Personnel/Vehicle)			
- Physical Barriers	P	C	
- Blast Doors, Access Hatches & Vaults	P	C	
- Control of Avenues of Approach & Key Terrain		C	E
- Key & Lock Control		C	
Item: Boundary Barrier Subsystem			
- Perimeter Boundary Fencing		C	
- Clear Zone Management		C	

Inspection Subareas & Items	Inspection Methodology P=Performance Testing C=Compliance Validation E=Security Exercises		
- Vegetation Control		C	
- Final Denial & Perimeter Defensive Positions	P	C	E
- Area Warning Signs		C	
- Area Vehicle Barriers	P	C	E
- Area Openings, Grills & Grates		C	E
- Secondary Locks & Seals		C	
- Area Public Address System	P	C	E
- Area Airborne Assault Defenses		C	E
- Area Lighting Subsystem	P	C	
Item: Entry/Exit Control & Circulation			
- Site/Installation Entry/Exit Control	P	C	E
- Restricted Area Entry/Exit Control	P	C	E
- Limited Area Circulation Control	P	C	
- Exclusion Area Entry, Circulation & Exit Control	P	C	
- Badge Issue & Control Program	P	C	
- Automated Entry Control System (AECS) & Procedures	P	C	E
- Key & Code Control Center	P	C	
- Personnel, Vehicle, Package & Material Inspection/Searches	P	C	
- Entry Control Roster	P	C	
- Two-Person Rule Application	P	C	
- Escort Procedures	P	C	
Item: Emergency Response Exercises			
- Restricted Area Entry/Exit Control	P	C	E
- Personnel/Vehicle Accountability in Security Areas	P	C	E
- Host Nation Support (as applicable)	P		E
Assessment Capabilities			
- Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Assessment	P	C	E
- Night Vision Assessment	P	C	E
- Infrared Devices	P		E
- Thermal Imagery Assessment	P		E
- Low Light Assessment	P		E
- Ground-Based Radar Assessment	P		E
- Adversarial Tracking	P		E
Security Facilities Requirements			
- Site Security Control Center		C	E

Inspection Subareas & Items	Inspection Methodology P=Performance Testing C=Compliance Validation E=Security Exercises		
- Alarm Monitor Station		C	E
- Response Force & Security Force Facilities		C	
- Power Sources (Primary, Standby & Battery)	P	C	
- Use of Hardened Fighting Position (where applicable)	P		E
- Guard Towers & Post Shelters (where applicable)		C	E
- Entry Control Facility (ECF)		C	E
- Security Gatehouse		C	E
- SF Armory (Primary & Alternate Locations)		C	E
Communications			
- Security Reporting & Alerting System	P	C	E
- Command, Control & Communications (C^3)	P	C	E
- Secure Radio Infrastructure	P	C	E
- Static Post Telephone Network	P	C	E
- OPSEC & INFOSEC (Critical Information)	P	C	
Response and Denial Capabilities			
Item: Denial Capability (Site/Area/Facility)			
- Lethal & Non-Lethal Denial Capabilities	P	C	
- Denial System Configuration & Integration (see IBDSS CDD)	P	C	
- Man-in-the-Loop Concept (applies to lethal systems only)	P	C	
Item: Response Force (RF)			
- Armament & Ammunition		C	E
- Individual & Tactical Equipment	P	C	E
- RF Vehicles	P	C	E
- RF Performance (Security Exercises)	P		E
- RF Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (TTPs)	P		E
- RF Scheme of Maneuver (Team & Individual)	P		E
- RF Tactical Leadership & Supervision	P		E
- RF Job Knowledge	P	C	
Item: Protection Against Standoff Attack	P	C	E
Item: Performance & Integration of Support Forces	P	C	E
Plans, Instructions and Procedures			
Item: Anticipate and Mitigate Functions	P		E
- Local Threat Analysis & Site Vulnerability Assessments		C	
- Counterintelligence	P	C	
- Counter-Surveillance	P	C	

Inspection Subareas & Items	Inspection Methodology P=Performance Testing C=Compliance Validation E=Security Exercises		
- Tactical Deception	P	C	
- Liaison with Local Civil Authorities	P	C	
- Host Nation Intelligence, Integration, and Support	P		
Security Support			
- Site Plans, Programs & CONOPs		C	E
- Security Deviation Programs		C	
- Unit Training Program	P	C	
- Unit Standardization-Evaluation Program	P	C	
- Armory Operations (Primary/Alternate)	P	C	E
- Combat Arms, Training & Maintenance	P	C	
- Military Working Dog (MWD)	P	C	E
- Host Nation Support and Integration			E
Convoy and Prime Nuclear Airlift Force Security			
Item: Motor Vehicle Convoy Operations			
- Convoy Briefing	P	C	
- OPSEC & Critical Information Management		C	
- On-Base Movements	P	C	E
- Off-Base Movements	P	C	E
- Limited Area Movement (as applicable)	P	C	E
- Posting, Leadership & Supervision	P	C	E
- Weapons & Equipment	P	C	
- Convoy Vehicles	P	C	
- Convoy Communications	P	C	E
- Convoy Configuration		C	
- Deployment & TTPs	P		E
- Host Nation Support (as applicable)	P		E
Item: Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) Operations			
- PNAF Area Establishment	P	C	
- Aircraft Arrival/Departure Security Procedures	P	C	E
- Entry/Exit Control	P	C	
- Entry Authorization List		C	
- Physical Security		C	
- PNAF Security Posting		C	E
- Back-Up Force(s)	P	C	E
- RF Armament & Equipment		C	E

Inspection Subareas & Items	Inspection Methodology P=Performance Testing C=Compliance Validation E=Security Exercises		
- Tactical Supervision & Leadership	P	C	E
- Security Vehicles		C	
- Site Plan Execution, TTPs & Technology Application	P	C	E
- On/Off Load Security Procedures	P	C	E
- Final Denial Capability	P	C	E
Recapture/Recovery Operations [**Note:** Report results in Emergency Exercise, paragraph **5.10.3.**]			
- Site Plan Execution, TTPs & Technology Application	P		E
- Response Time	P	C	E
- Facility Breaching Equipment	P		E
- Back-Up Force(s)	P	C	E
- Follow-On Back Force(s)	P	C	E
- Host Nation Integration (as applicable)	P		E
- Post-Recapture/Recovery Operations	P	C	E